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Abstract

This mixed-method study is focused on the values, beliefs, and attitudes of
Jordanian elites towards liberalization, democratization and development. The study aims
to describe elites’ political culture and centers of influence, as well as Jordan’s viability
of achieving higher developmental levels. Survey results are presented. The study argues
that the Jordanian regime remains congruent with elites’ political culture and other
patterns of authority within the elite strata. However, until this “cautious liberal” political
culture of Jordanian elites changes, a transitional movement cannot arise that would lead
Jordan towards greater liberalism, constitutionalism and development. The study
concludes with implications for transitional movements in other developing countries,
particularly in the Arab region.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

A Study Problem Overview
This study is designed to describe the political culture of three groups of
Jordanian elites consisting of their values, beliefs, and attitudes towards
democratization and development in light of Jordan’s 1989 commitment to
liberalization and reform. Since its independence in 1946, Jordanian political
leaders, under the stewardship of the Palace, have promised to provide
Jordanians with their political rights to elect a Parliament and to form and join
political parties. As a result, Jordan witnessed two liberalization periods in 1952
and 1989, yet both promises remained incomplete. In fact, most previous studies
on Jordan’s political culture bypassed other exigencies for liberalization and
democratization and the complexity of the transitional movement. In view of
that, this study examines the perceptions, beliefs and values of how different
types of elite consider different aspects of Jordanian society that leads to
liberalization and democratization. It anticipates if elites’ political culture will
lead them to implement serious changes in the government and the political
system, or, if it is their political culture that restricts them from implementing
serious changes; due to believing that changes in the political system and
government might lead Jordan to political degeneration.
This chapter presents an overview of the problem, and outlines the
purpose of the study, including research questions and contributions. In addition
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it provides a summary of the analytic methods used, and the overview of a
dissertation outline, where each chapter is briefly described.

The Purpose, Research Question and Contributions of the Study
This study intends to describe the values, beliefs, and attitudes that
contribute to the formation of the political culture of three groups of Jordanian
elites: political, social, and economic, regarding democratization and
development; and seeks to define Jordan’s centers of influence and the regime’s
congruence relative to this political culture. The values and beliefs structure
both, the pace of, and the possibilities for social and political change (Almond
and Verba, 1963; Fattah, 2006; and Putnam, 1971). This description is based on
classical and modern elite theories that focus on elites’ roles in shaping the
values, beliefs, and attitudes of the masses, and their instrumental and influential
abilities to mold public institutions by maintaining the flow of communications
within the system, and enacting, interpreting, and enforcing the rules that govern
the masses (Beatty 2003; Putnam 1973, 1976; and Welsh 1979). Moreover, the
description of Jordanian elites’ political culture is also based on John Locke’s
political theory of “cautious liberalism” that has discordant tendencies towards
both liberalism and conservatism in terms of change in the political system
(Grant, 1987, p.204). The theory of “cautious liberalism” in addition to
Eckstein’s congruent theory and several other elite, political culture, and
development theories have formed the theoretical foundation for this study.
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In addition, personal knowledge and observations by the researcher, along
with a number of practical, intellectual, personal goals have added to this study’s
inferences. The practical and intellectual goals of this study are compatible with
the researcher’s motivations, personal goals, and curiosity about the lagging
behind situations, which stem from the researcher’s desire to see the wheel
moving towards achieving higher levels of liberalization, democratization, and
development in Jordan and the rest of the region.
This study examines and compares the political culture of the three groups
of elites consisting of influential and prominent political, social, and economic
figures in the Jordanian society, with the intent to clarify the differences among
elites’ values, beliefs, and attitudes in regards to liberalization, democratization,
and development. This study posits two key research questions and two
hypotheses:
Q1: What is the political culture that consists of Jordanian elites’ values,
beliefs, and attitudes towards the processes of liberalization,
democratization and political, social, and economic developments in the
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan?
Q2: Are there significant differences among the values, beliefs, and attitudes of
the three groups of Jordanian elites?
H1:

There are significant differences among the values, beliefs, and attitudes
of the three groups of Jordanian elites towards political, social, and
economic development.
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Q3: What are the values and beliefs of Jordanian elites concerning the center of
power in Jordan?
Q4:

Is Jordan’s current political regime congruent with the values, beliefs, and
attitudes of Jordan’s elites?

H2:

The regime is congruent with elite political culture.
Jordan is located in a turbulent region; see the map of Jordan and

geographical location in Appendix A. Its security and stability is important to
the United States and other international policymakers, and remains critical to
the rest of the Arab region as its theoretical orientation is relevant to the
conspicuous problems of the rapidly and constantly changing nature of Middle
Eastern politics (Jureidini and Mclaurin, 1984). This case study departs from the
typical approach taken by most studies on Jordan. It focuses on the values,
beliefs and attitudes of Jordanian elites and guides their political behavior,
providing a basis to explicate the political culture of Jordan and attempts to
apply the insights of social psychology in the study of comparative politics. The
study’s findings are comparable with other political cultures that share common
grounds with Jordan’s political culture, and fill the academic gap in this field of
study on Jordanian elites.
Arab elites that are influenced by its authors’ biased inclinations. Further, the
data gathering for this study is focused on materials that are more representative of the
values, beliefs, and attitudes of Jordanian elites. This study was conducted by running
face-to-face interviews with randomly selected elites. By putting emphases on the
academic purpose of this study and on the confidentiality of the identities of its
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respondents, the researcher could minimize skepticism, raise the level of participation,
and gather more data from the responses that were abundant and useful for the study.
Simultaneously, the absence of media affiliation steered the gathered data from
any censorship that might impact its validity.

A Brief Summary of Analytic Methods
The data for this study was collected in Amman, the capital of the
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, by meeting face-to-face with political, social,
and economic elites administering a survey. The survey included both closedand open-ended questions which generated quantitative and qualitative data
respectively. The survey questions explored the values, beliefs and attitudes of
Jordanian elites that were important in shaping the political culture of Jordan,
and influences the country’s capacity to make changes in their government and
political system. The respondents included current and previous incumbents of
randomly selected 100 government and prominent social and economic figures.
The data collection took place over a period of nine months with the
assistance of Jordan University’s Center for Strategic Studies (CSS).
Throughout the data collection phase careful attention was paid to the sensitive
nature of the topic.
The data analysis of this study is mostly descriptive. In order to compare
responses among the three groups of elites, namely political, social and
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economic elites, a one-way analysis of variance and Chi-square were conducted.
Qualitative data were coded and subjected to thematic analysis.
Lastly, the used techniques of close and persistent observation enabled the
interviewer during the face-to-face interviews to improve both the validity and reliability
of the gathered data. Kirk and Miller (1986) assert that “qualitative research is a
particular tradition in social science that fundamentally depends on watching people in
their own territory and interacting with them in their own language, on their own
terms…qualitative research has been seen to be naturalistic, ethnographic, and
participatory” (p. 9). Accordingly, being knowledgeable of Jordan’s history and ethnic
conditions, along with understanding elites’ religious backgrounds and Arabic language
have contributed to collecting valid and reliable data on elites’ values, beliefs and
attitudes as will be explained in chapter 3.

Dissertation Overview
This dissertation is organized in five chapters. Chapter 1 has presented the
introduction, statement of the problem, research questions, and the significance
of the study. Following this introduction is Chapter 2, which provides a
theoretical foundation presented in three bodies of literature relevant to this
study: the first theoretical framework includes theories on classical and modern
elite theories; the political, social, and economic Jordanian elites; and elites’
political culture. The second body of literature is solidified with theories on
authoritarianism, monarchy, and the Jordanian political system and regime
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verses theories of transition towards liberalization, democratization, and
political, social, and economic developments. The third body of literature
explains the theories of congruence and cautious liberalism applied to Jordanian
elites’ political culture. The theoretical framework in the literature review
provides a foundational understanding for the discussion of this dissertation by
supporting the researcher’s argument and outcomes in describing the political
culture of Jordanian elites.
Chapter 3 describes the methods. It provides explanations on the study
population, and the identification of elites in terms of positions, incumbents and
group classifications. It elucidates all the preparatory steps followed by the
researcher with a detailed narrative on the sample selection, survey design,
survey administration, and the procedures of the face-to-face interviews. The
chapter unfolds the contents of the survey questionnaire that includes a mixture
of open- and closed-ended questions. Collecting multiple types of data provided
a more comprehensive understanding for the political culture of those who may
impact the process of democratization and development in Jordan under its
authoritarian monarchical political system. As a result, the randomly selected
participants of the political, social, and economic elites were willing to
participate in the face-to-face interviews and to provide responses and
elaborations on the subjects of the entire questionnaire.
Chapter 4 summarizes the results of the study, portraying the outcomes of
quantitative and qualitative data analysis. The presentation of the data is
organized in conjunction with the two hypotheses of the study. The results are
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inferred in terms of their acceptance or rejection to each hypothesis with
emphases on the seven significant questions out of the thirty-five survey
questions.
Chapter 5 presents the discussion and conclusion of the results. It
discusses the implications of the statistical analysis by highlighting the patterns
of the cautious liberal political culture and the results that indicate significant
differences between elite groups. The conclusion of this study describes the
political culture of Jordanian elites and their cautious liberal nature that reflects
on decisions relevant to change in Jordan’s authoritarian monarchy and the
achievement of liberalization, democratization, and development.
In sum, this study contributes to a deeper understanding of the political
culture of Jordanian elites, along with other key factors of the Hashemites’
authoritarian regime that influence the trajectory of Jordan’s democratization
and development movement. Such understanding is crucial in determining the
success of the prospective transition from an authoritative monarchy to a
constitutional monarchy.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
The major themes of this study will emerge repeatedly in this review,
focusing on the theoretical foundations of values, beliefs, and attitudes that
constitute elites’ political culture towards liberalization, democratization, and
development; along with the ensued changes in the authoritarian monarchical
political system in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan. This review provides the
reader with three bodies of literature. First, it presents theoretical perspectives
that focus on classical and modern elite theories; the political, social, and
economic elites in the Middle East and Jordan; and elites’ political culture.
Subsequently, the second body of literature presents theoretical perspectives of
authoritarianism, monarchy, political regimes and the centers of influence verses
theories of transition towards liberalization, democratization, and political,
social, and economic developments. The third body of literature explains the
theories of congruence and cautious liberalism by focusing on their application
to Jordanian elites’ political culture, which may or may not shape the regime’s
political behavior pertaining to change and transitioning towards liberalization,
democratization, and development.
Although historical, geographical, and demographic data and incidents are
not directly factored into the analysis, these incidents will set this chapter’s
stage. This background information warrants an attempt to understand specific
but important characteristics of Jordanian elites’ political culture towards any
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changes in their political system; further in-sequence data will be included in
Appendix B.

An Overview of Jordan: Geographical Location
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is strategically located in the Middle
East; bound by Syria to the north, Iraq to the northeast, Saudi Arabia to the east
and south, the Red Sea to the south, and the West Bank in the Palestinian
National Authority and Israel to the west. Jordan covers a diversity of
landscapes over an area of 89,213 square kilometers, with a desert region that
spans over approximately 75% of that area. The lowest point on earth lies at the
Dead Sea, in Jordan, at 408 meters below sea level, verses 1854 meters above
sea level, which is the peak of Jabal Umm El Dami. Amman is Jordan’s capital
and it is located in the northwest; Al-Zarqa and Irbid are two major northern
cities; while Karak and Aqaba are two major southern cities.

Population, Religions, and Ideological Makeup: Jordanian Elite
Socialization
According to UNDP and World Bank 2013 reports, Jordan currently has a
population of approximately 6.5 million people, where nearly 3 million reside in
the capital, Amman. More than 70% of the population is under 30 years of age,
which 22% of those are between the ages of 15 and 24 (See Appendix B, Figure
2.1).
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The main reason behind the high rate of population growth was ascribed to
the influxes of Palestinian refugees since 1948 (Department of Statistics, 2008).
According to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) for
Palestinian refugees, about 224,000 people were admitted to UNRWA refugee
camps in the East Bank immediately after the June 1967 war. In 1986, UNRWA
cited 826,128 registered refugees in the East Bank, where roughly 205,000 of
which were in refugee camps. The estimate of Palestinians living in Jordan has
ranged from 60 to 70 percent of the total population, but the exact numbers are
unknown, particularly since official government statistics do not distinguish
between the nomadic tribal members who lived east of the Jordan River and the
West Bank urbanized groups that crossed the Jordan River to settle on the East
Bank (UNRWA/United Nations).
The Transjordan area has been continuously inhabited with archaeological
evidence suggesting sedentary settlements on both the East and West Banks of
the Jordan River. The inhabitants on both sides of the river were extensively
divergent, but the dominant form of social organization in Transjordan was that
of the tribe. Early in the seventh century a fundamental change occurred in the
predominantly Arab inhabited region. This change has influenced Jordan and its
neighbors to this day bringing the arrival of Islam, a newly developed religion
with strong roots in Christianity and Judaism. As a consequence, the inhabitants
of Transjordan have embraced the Islamic religion particularly on the East Bank
of the river which remained heavily nomadic or semi-nomadic. Hitherto, the
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West Bank remained multi-religious and dominated by an urban culture
(Jureidini & Mclaurin, 1984, p. 9).
The demographic components and location of Jordan has been inviting to
national ideologies and movements (Salibi, 1993). Arab nationalism, for
instance, was one of the most powerful ideologies of the sixties and seventies;
however, it was considered one of the most radical threatening movements to
the Jordanian monarchical regime.
Today’s Jordanian population has a dominant Muslim majority, with a
Christian minority of only 6% (Mufti, 1999). The non-Arab population in Jordan
comprises of 5% of the population, most being: Circassians, Chechens,
Armenians, Turkmen, and Gypsies, and all of which have maintained their
separate ethnic identities. The loyalty of both the Circassians and Chechens to
the Hashemites has guaranteed them fixed seats in the Parliament and important
incumbencies in the government. Most importantly are the Eastern Jordanian
prominent tribal leaders whose content and persuasion are important to the King
himself. The prominent tribal members represent big and powerful tribe.
Therefore, in order to keep these tribal figures and their tribal members gratified
and loyal to the regime, the King bestows them various privileges and financial
compensations. These figures were referred to, by several theorists and
respondents who participated in this study, as the “Old Guards,” who constitute
the center of influence and the internal elite strata that remain fundamental to the
stability of the regime (Al-Khalidi, 2011, Jureidini & Mclaurin, 1984, Malik,
1999, Robins, 2004).
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A Historical Overview
Retrospectively, Sharif Hussein bin Ali Al Hashemi was a Caliph living in
the province of Hijaz. In 1916, he proclaimed the independence of the
significant Hijaz province, ascribed to the two holy cities of Mecca and Medina
(Robins, 2004; Snow, 1972). Sharif Hussein was a grand Sharif, guardian of
Mecca, and the ruler of the Hijaz. As a Hashemite he was styled Sharif; ‘Sharif’
means noble and signifies descent from the Prophet. The Hashemites family is
the noblest in Islam, because they are affiliated with Al Hashem clan that
descends from Prophet Muhammad’s tribe ‘Al Quraish.’ Until this day, this
religious affiliation with Prophet Mohammad’s descent has been the Hashemites
source of legitimacy to their reign and extends their active pursuit of regime
longevity in the face of all challenges to their throne (Gubster, 1983).
Later, in the aftermath of WWI, Transjordan and the rest of the Arab
region were affected by two complicated British promises that were difficult to
reconcile. The first was made to the Jewish people as a result of Hayim
Weizmann’s efforts in 1898. Weizmann pushed the British foreign secretary
Arthur Balfour to send a letter to the leader of the British Jewish community
Walter Rothschild, or Baron Rothschild, stating that the British government
views in favor to a national home for the Jewish people to be established in
Palestine, and will use all their endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this
promise. According to the Jewish Virtual Library (2014), Weizmann was an
active Zionist leader, the President of the Zionist organization, and statesman
who convinced the United States government to recognize the newly established
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state of Israel. In 1949, Weizmann became the first President of the state of
Israel. The second promise was made to Sharif Hussein promising him the
creation of a new independent Arab Kingdom in the Transjordan desert (Shlaim,
1995, p. 22).
Indeed, the creation of the state of Israel in Palestine after the 1948 war
has affected Jordan more than any other neighboring country due to its
geographic location. Enormous Palestinian migrations took the eastern route,
because of its smooth topographic land and close distance, making it easier on
immigrants traveling by foot. Just by crossing the Jordan River from the West
Bank in Palestine, influxes of Palestinian immigrants ended up and settled on
the East Bank in Jordan. Jordan kept receiving a flooding amount of Palestinian
immigrants due to several war conditions. Since then, large numbers of
Palestinians have resided in Jordan, which affected the demographics of the
Jordanian society to date (Shlaim, 1995, p. 20).
Consequently, the new state of Jordan emerged on the region’s map after
the British separated Transjordan from the mandate of Palestine. This separation
was between the fertile lands and water resources of the West and the expansive
barren lands in the East. Hence, it affected both states politically,
demographically, and economically. The coastal area that is located west of the
Jordanian River is known as Palestine, and together, the western and eastern
lands were placed in a single mandate under the authority of the United
Kingdom. Since its early history, Palestine was rural and its society was
agrarian. Contrast to the Bedouins on the East Bank, the inhabitants on the West
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Bank settled there and valued land ownership, and this separation shaped the
legacy of the Hashemites, as well as the political culture of the Jordanian society
(Jureidini and McLaurin 1984, p. 9).
As a result to these political incidents, later in history, the regime used this
split between the same families and tribal members to plant a social faction seed.
In order to pursue particular political interests, the regime accentuated
discrimination between East and West Bankers. For example, as it was
previously mentioned in this study, Jordan’s military forces remained exclusive
and restricted to the members of Eastern Bedouin tribes (Robins, 2004).
According to Jureidini and McLaurin (1984), anthropologically and politically,
the West Bankers are those who settled west of the Jordan River, while the East
Bankers are the nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes that dominated the east side
of the River. The distinction between nomadic and cultivating societies has
remained applicable to the civilizations of the East and West Banks, with the
exception of some tribal nomadic elements on the West Bank, and towns on the
East Bank. Thus, many tribes have east and west branches as in the case of Salt
and Karak on the east of the River, and Jerusalem and Nablus on the west.
Although the numbers of West Bankers compose the larger part of the
population in Jordan and exceed the numbers of East Bankers, neither
component of the Jordanian society regard Jordan as Palestine (p. 11).
Since their early days, the East Bankers’ interactions went south to the
Arabian Desert, but the West Bankers’ interactions went to the west and north
responding to their urban and multi-religious character that was accentuated
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with the presence of a large Christian minority (Gubster, 1983; Jureidini &
Mclaurin, 1984). Some scholars emphasize and address this difference as a
social cleavage that undermines the country’s national legitimacy and unity;
Mufti, for instance, considers it a division in Jordan’s population. He further
states that this division was violently manifested in Jordan’s 1970 civil war, and
it still undermines the national unity, which is identified by Rustow (1970) as a
requisite for successful political liberalization (p. 101).

Elite Theory: The Center of Influence among Jordanian Elites
The classical theorists, Gaetano Mosca (1896) and Vilfrado Pareto (1916)
stated that the purpose of elite studies is to examine the structure of power in
communities, in order to know if power is in the hands of a cohesive minority
and to respond to the question of the nature of power in a society. Accordingly,
both classic and modern scholars define this minority group as the “elite,” and
they have acknowledged its members’ possession for power and other notable
traits (Parry, 1970, p. 34).
Mosca classified the elites in a society in terms of their exercise of
political power, or their engagement in the struggle for political leadership such
as the members of the government and of high administration, military leaders,
members of politically influential families of an aristocracy or royal house,
influential members of the intelligentsia, and leaders of powerful economic
enterprises. Moreover, Mosca defined this group as a distinguished group that
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appears in every society behind the formal holder of power, and it possesses
certain traits, exerts decisive political influence, and serves as a recruiting
ground for the members of the government. This group is the elite, or, as labeled
since ancient Greek times the oligarchy, or the aristocratic group in the society.
Mosca, though, did not think of elites as a group that is raised high above the
society, but they are connected with this classification through much larger
strata of sub-elite that supplies the elite ruling class with new recruits
(Bottomore, 1993; p. 5-7).
Consequently, the elites are defined in several ways, such as the ruling
class, upper class, governing elite, or dominant stratum. In every society there
are two strata: the superior upper one is the elite, while the inferior stratum is the
masses, or the non-elite. Pareto stated that the governing elite possess enough
wealth, power, and influence to lead the masses in collective actions (Bottomore
1993; Parry, 1970, 2005; Putnam, 1971).
In this respect, Pareto highlighted the appearance of two classes of people
in all societies and under all political systems: a class that rules and a class that
is ruled. The first is always the less numerous, performs all political functions,
mobilizes power, and enjoys the advantages that power brings; whereas the
second is directed and controlled by the first. The ruled are the masses, and the
rulers are the “governing elites” (Parry, 1970; Lenczowski, 1975).
Hence, the dominant upper class in Jordan consists of the East and West
Bank elites. Their wealth, power, and high governmental, social, and economic
positions make them influential and the most prominent figures in the Jordanian
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society. The influence and prominence of East Bank elites, for instance,
originate in the big tribes to which they belong. Through the years Jordan’s big
tribes have preserved power and affluence of resources; thus Jordan’s big tribes
have remained influential (Thomas, 2003, p. 543).
Accordingly, this study seeks to identify the specific group of Jordanian
elites that are the center of influence in Jordan. Pareto’s concept of “the
circulation of elites,” provides a theoretical foundation in responding to this
research question (RQ3) concerning the center of power in Jordan. The two
main aspects to Pareto’s concept are: 1.) the replacement of individuals within
the elite; and 2.) the replacement of one elite by another. These dynamic aspects
generally take place in elites’ strata due to mortality, attrition, and
replenishment.
The process of individual replacement is exclusive, while in other cases, is
an open process that allows less privileged individuals an opportunity to join the
ranks of the most influential figures in the society. By the same token,
Lenczowski (1975) asserts that behind the formal holders of power in the state,
there is an enduring group with certain distinguishable traits that exerts decisive
political influence. Moreover, this group serves as a recruiting ground for
members of the government, and may have an informal, loose structure while
enjoying economic and social power, and an inherited status in society (p. 3). In
the Jordanian case, this explains the existence of the most influential “Old
Guards” group of elites behind the formal holders of power in the Jordanian
government, and their impact over the institution of Palace and the entirety of
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the Monarch. The “Old Guards” are the East Bankers that the institution of
Army is constituted of with its soldiers and high rank officers. As Robin (2004)
asserted, Jordan’s military forces remained exclusive and restricted to the
members of Eastern Bedouin tribes. Further, Brynen (1998) explained that the
members of these Bedouin tribes are the regime constituents of East Bankers.
The regime grants East Bank elites financial and other rewards and privileges. In
return, these dividends protect, sustain, and guarantee the tribes’ support to the
regime, strengthen its circle of patronage, and enhance its legitimacy.
Ben-Dor (1984) conducted a comparative study on political elites in the
Middle East, underlining the importance of sub-elites who belong to the military
forces of few Middle Eastern countries. In the prelude of his study, Ben-Dor
cited a well-known Egyptian elite who still belongs to the Egyptian
intelligentsia, Mohammed Hassanein Haykal (1962) and whose socialization,
ideology, and attitudes have not changed up until our recent time. In the
aftermath of the military coup d'état and the Egyptian revolution of 1952,
Haykal stated: “Under the conditions that are typical of the class struggle in the
underdeveloped countries, and bearing in mind the feeling of the general public
that the leaders in power represent only interests which by their very nature are
opposed to those of the masses, the popular revolutionary movement has no
choice but to base itself on the army in order to pave the way for the revolution.”
Ben-Dor explains that when disintegration occurs in Middle Eastern
societies, it is typically due to a breakdown of the established patterns of
convergence, rather than class struggle, as he considers Middle Eastern societies
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to be based on convergence, and not on integration. He further emphasizes on
the religious impact on individuals in Middle Eastern societies, and their
conviction in ‘obedience’ whether spiritually, to God and the Prophet, or on a
societal or cultural aspect, where the ‘inferior’ role obeys any ‘superior.’
Therefore, the obedience for political leaderships is stemmed from this culture.
Accordingly, Ben-Dor argues against the notion of the military recruitment in
the Middle East to be based on class or social background, but claims a strong
association between the military and middle class in a society. Thus, the upper
class domination over society gets penetrated by the middle class intervention
through military revolutionary movements that can be described as endeavors
against reactionary rules. An example provided to further exemplify this point,
is the military recruitment sytem based on minorities in several Arab societies,
particularly in Syria in the case of the ‘Alawis’ (p. 6-8). This system is relatively
applied to the Jordanian case, as the regime exclusively recruits soldiers to join
the institution of Army from East Bank tribes. Therefore, when these soldiers
are promoted to high rank officer positions, they undergo a process of
“civilianization” and are further granted higher incumbencies by the King. BenDor explains that the civilianization process increases the professionalization of
the army and raises the proportion of civilian bureaucrats and technocrats in the
formal organs of the elite (p. 21).
Further, Ben-Dor explains that linking the military with the middle class
can transform society to more modern patterns, and asserts that the role of the
military can be understood through its interactions with upper and middle

21

classes in the society. When the upper class dominates the middle class, society,
and the regime, the military intervention is considered revolutionary, whereas its
intervention to stop mass domination is considered reactionary. However,
Middle East elite theorists emphasized that the high echelons of bureaucracy
remains substantial to the regimes of the Middle Eastern countries; where
without their cooperation and expertise, the top elites find themselves incapable
to exercise their power (Ben-Dor, 1984; Lenczowski 1980; Zartman, 1980).
For instance, the Jordanian military intervention of 1970 that eradicated the mass
domination and led to a civil war was coupled with severe austerity measures as a result
to East Bank elites’ attitudes. Individuals that belong to the Hashemite family have
started their reign by establishing a regime that is protected by the institution of Army
exclusive to East Bankers in order to protect their monarchical legitimacy and the
regime-based state. The endurance of this situation is based on the reciprocal relationship
between the Hashemites, and the sub-elite strata, where the Hashemites receive emphasis
on their status, and in return the sub-elites receive benefits, including financial dividends,
and other privileges, such as joining the bureaucratic apparatus of the state, and
occupying the highest incumbencies in Jordan’s administrative institutions.
Zartman’s approach in describing elites of Middle Eastern countries stems from
describing elites on the bases of their recruitment and promotion; elite socialization,
including formation, personalities, ideologies, and political culture; and elite decisions,
behaviors, and organizations. In his theory, he focused on who elites are, how they
acquire power, and what they do. The phenomenon of elite circulation generates from
recurrent interactions between the incumbent elites and the relevant situations that
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generate new elites. Elite circulation, according to Zartman relates to the "who" and the
"what" over time. Thus, there is no immediate prediction concerning who will be next in
power, or when a change will occur, but there is a likelihood of outlining who may be
next in power if specified conditions, assumptions, or consequences would suggest
particular types of people to hold power in certain circumstances. Zartman’s theory
provides an ideal type of elite circulation (p. 92-8). This model explains King Hussein’s
strategy of recruiting and promoting certain influential figures among the West Bankers
to join the Jordanian elite strata, forming the center of influence among Jordanian elites.
Further, realizing the differences and similarities among elite structures in
different Middle Eastern countries triggered Stone, (as cited in Zartman, 1980), to
conduct a comparative study and test the influence of the following four independent
variables: a.) recent history of elite circulation; b.) the current form of political structure;
c.) the social background and preparation; and d.) elites’ attitudes, personalities, and
motivations. Stone used a typology to test the relationship between the four variables,
where variables ‘a’ and ‘b’ represent studies that focus on political structures which elites
operate under, and variables ‘c’ and ‘d’ represent elites’ socialization, political culture,
and personal characteristics, by examining the relationships between ‘a’ and ‘c’ and ‘b’
and ‘d’ variables.
However, the viability of his study remains limited particularly that it depended
on existing data. Stone suggested other methods than the comparative analyses to study
elites in the Middle East such as the longitudinal analyses that involves following a
process of change over an extended period of time or a combination design but also these
methods had their limitations, which confirmed the scarcity of the conducted studies on
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elites in the Middle East. Moreover, there is a particular scarcity in single elite case
studies, which confirms that there has been a gap in the Middle Eastern elite literature.
Robins (2004) claims that the King selects the educated tribal members from the
big and influential tribes to occupy high governmental posts. On one hand, this selection
provides the regime with loyal and supportive influential tribal members, and on the
other, it is a royal offer that remains contingent to the loyalty of the incumbent to the
Monarch and his regime. Based on this equation, East Bank elites have always found
their refuge in tribalism, and so has the regime, particularly the “Old Guards” who mostly
form the center of influence. These elites do not follow the perceived description of the
classical elites defined by Mosca and Pareto, but are more fitting to Lenczowski’s (1975)
description, as a new type of elite who has political influence, power and predominance
that may be attributed to their manipulative skills, and in some nondemocratic cases, the
use or threat of force. However the ultimate skill of these elites is organizational; for
instance, an attorney, judge, or law professor can be appointed as a minister of justice,
and this appointment under authoritarian regimes is considered “natural.” As Lenczowski
notes, this appointment conforms to the common-sense expectation, that the head of the
department of justice “be a man with legal training and experience” (p. 5).
According to the CSS (1999), the old innate belief by East Jordanians
reckons tribalism and tribal affiliation as the source of pride, solidarity, and
power. Presently, the most important positions in the Jordanian government and
society are still occupied by East Jordanian prominent figures, whose clans can
be traced back in history of the Transjordanian tribes. Most of the well-known
family names in Jordan are ramifications of the most salient Jordanian tribes,
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which are Bani-Hassan, Bani-Sakher, Le’abaidat, Al-Gharaibeh, Bani-Hamida,
and Howaitat (see Appendix B, Map 2.1; Origins of East Bank Elites and the
distribution of Jordanian tribes). Some East Jordanians go by the same surname
of the original tribal name, such as Le’abaidat and Al-Gharaibeh, but many
others go by a family name that is a branch from the original one. As an
example, Bani-Hassan is known to be the biggest tribe in the Transjordanian
area, whose members alone are 30% of Jordanians. The name of the current
Prime Minister of Jordan, Abdulla Ensour, originates from Al-Nsoor clan, which
is one of the ramifications of Bani-Hassan. Also, the tribe of Bani-Sakher is
another example where its members are still famous, powerful, and wealthy.
However, Bani-Sakher is not a large tribe due to its involvement in frequent
wars in the past, causing a significant loss of members. Yet, today’s most
famous surnames root back from Bani-Sakher, such as Al-Lozi and Al-Fayez
clans, who occupied the most prominent positions in the Jordanian government,
such as the two Prime Ministers Ahmad Al-Lozi and Faisal Al-Fayez, also
Nasser Al-Lozi, the Chief of “Al Diwan Al-Malaki” or the Royal Court.
Additionally, the prominence of the West Bank elites is due to their power
and wealth that they established in Palestine. According to Smith (1986), in the
1930s Palestine had reached a level of prosperity that made it one of the most
advanced countries in the Middle East. The new oil refinery at Haifa and the
center of British communications during World War II rendered Palestine more
urbanized than before. As a result, the Palestinians became involved in
construction and in trade; particularly, the agricultural exports of citrus fruits,
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grain, and other crops. Also, they were employed in the railroads, huge military
construction projects, and government departments along with their Jewish
counterparts. In addition, the war brought Palestinians into the world market.
Several Palestinian entrepreneurs invested in government bonds, shares,
commodity stocks, and other forms of the 1930s financial papers, which enabled
many Palestinians to recover some of their wealth after their dispersion in 1948.
The sum of Palestinians’ investments was estimated by over £39 million sterling
pounds. Out of these amounts, £10 million sterling pounds were transferred to
Jordan alone, where the majority of exiles had taken refuge and at least £1.5
million was brought into the country in the form of banknotes prior to the
abolition of the Palestinian currency (p. 22).
Smith asserts that only a few Palestinians with available wealth in exile
were able to partially recoup their losses and, unlike the peasantry, to avoid the
confinement of life in the camps. For example, The Tuqan family of Nablus
used their funds in Jordan to expand their agricultural operations on the East
Bank and to start related industries with Board of Directors that included some
of the wealthiest merchants of Nablus, such as the Vegetable Oil Company of
Jordan. Also, Yusif Baidas, a former bank clerk and foreign exchange dealer in
Mandatory Palestine, used funds obtained from the release of accounts in
Barclays and started a multi-million dollar business in money exchange, which
started in Beirut and expanded throughout the Arab world, Europe, and Africa.
The Shoman family of Jerusalem, as another example, was able to transfer the
headquarters of the Arab Bank from Jerusalem to Amman and expanded its
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programs to become one of the largest banks in the Middle East today. Due to
the development of new forms of corporate enterprise in Palestine during the
1940s, other merchants and traders found it possible to transfer their businesses
abroad. The Arabian Insurance Company, for example, along with Middle East
Airlines, both reopened in Lebanon after 1948; by the end of the 1950s their
shareholders included some of the wealthiest Palestinians in the Arab world (p.
23-24).
Consequently, the wealthy Palestinian entrepreneurs who have become
holders of the Jordanian nationality are the original Palestinian bourgeoisie class
that formed the stratum of West Bank Jordanian elites. Similar to the stratum of
East Bank Jordanian elites, who occupy prominent positions in the government
and the army institution, West Bank Jordanian elites are the prominent
entrepreneurs, whose wealth, high educational levels, and noticeable liberal
exposure have enabled them to form the economic elite stratum. Their
prominent positions triggered the King to offer some of the West Bankers high
positions in the Jordanian government. In fact, Jordan’s stability has been
dependent on the King’s ability to martial and exploit the tribal loyalty. All
groups and ethnicities have their own elite prominent members who are close
and loyal to both the regime and the Monarch (Mufti, 1999, p. 105).
Generally, Pareto is concerned with the governing elites, because they
have power while the masses have none. The governing elites as Pareto defines
them are influential politicians, who can impact political decision-making,
directly or indirectly through their leadership positions in any of the industrial,
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labor, military or other fields. Also, Pareto emphasizes the capability of
opposition leaders in influencing the political situations in a society (Parry,
1970; p. 34). Further, there are two kinds of elites, according to Pareto: the
astute or cunning, referred to as ‘the foxes,’ and the courageous leaders,
particularly military leaders, referred to as ‘the lions.’ According to Faulks
(2000), throughout the state’s history, the different stages and times determined
which type of elite should govern.
Mosca sees the organizational skill as the key to elite rule, while Pareto is
more militant concerning the suitable psychological and personal attributes for
governing. The political elite’s mental strength protects them from being
overthrown. Most elite theorists based their theories on these two ideas. The first
idea emphasizes that power lies in positions of authority in key political and
economic institutions; while the second emphasizes the importance of some
psychological traits. The psychological, personal attributes, and intelligence of
elites set them apart; their intellectual superiority enable them to become the
highest accomplishers in any field and lead the masses (Parry, 2005; p. 36).
Throughout Jordan’s history, the regime’s figures that belong to a tribal
power base and are entrenched in state bureaucracy, the institution of the
military, and the intelligence agency are its most powerful elites. These elites are
East Bankers known as the “Old Guards,” whose power and influence enables
them to impact decision-making and state policies. With their power they can
constrain every reform attempt, including the King’s timid steps towards
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liberalization and to end riots and turmoil; as they consider reforms a threat to
their political privileges and economic benefits (Al-khalidi, 2011).

Elites’ Political Culture: Values, Beliefs, & Attitudes
According to Beatty (2003): “It is [elites] who at once shape the values,
beliefs, and attitudes…who set standards…mold public institutions…formulate
demands and maintain the flow of communications within the system, and who
enact, interpret, and enforce the rules that govern us.” Therefore, elites are
considered vitally interested in the theory and practice of shaping and changing
other people’s values, beliefs, and attitudes (p. 4).
According to Putnam (1971) the relationship between elites’ attitudes and
the different situations can be understood if plugged in an equation. He explains
it is a push-pull relation: the stronger the attitudinal press, the less the need for
situational stimuli, and vice versa. Thus, Putnam (1971) argued that elites’
attitudes could be examined through investigating their opinions on current
political topics to understand the significance of their views, and what they
favor, in order to assess their attitudinal press in different situations (p. 651-2).
Putnam (1976) argued that understanding elite behavior requires an
understanding to how their opinions specifically fit in the broader pattern of
beliefs.
Thus, understanding elites’ attitudes requires understanding and defining
their values and beliefs. Values are the beliefs that guide the behavior of an
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individual and their decision-making process that are expressed through words
or actions. The value occurs in the heart, while the belief initiates in the mind.
Basic values may move to the subconscious level of the individual’s mind, and
only when these values are translated into decisions do they become challenged
by others, and their importance is recognized. A value is what the individual
considers important to oneself; a belief is the way the individual thinks things
are or should be; and an attitude is what the individual thinks and feels, which
leads to a behavior. So, values and beliefs provide guidance and direction for
one’s attitudes and behavior.
Notwithstanding, the enclosed definitions of values and beliefs in previous
value studies by different behavioral sociologists muddled the definition of
‘values’ with the definitions of ‘beliefs’ and ‘attitudes.’ Hutcheon (1972)
highlights the changing prominence of values from Durkheim and other
sociologists until 1959, and reveals a number of disturbing tendencies in their
studies, one of which, considering values as a non-empirical study, but having
fundamental religious roots. Also, during the 1960s several sociologists had a
tendency to assume that society is antecedent to the individual and they
emphasized an imbalance in value theory based on the assumption that values
are independent variables. Moreover, other sociologists had the tendency to
stress on conformity and minimization of the role of reason and the selective
perception in human action, such in the over-socialized view of man and the
over-integrated view of society (p. 174). Another tendency discussed the
confusion in the value concept that made some define it as norms, cultural
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ideals, assessments of action, beliefs, objects, value orientations, behavior
probabilities, and as generalized attitudes (p. 177). Yet Rokeach (1960) reflected
a different approach in defining values and beliefs. His cognitive and
experimental approach was a convergence of several theoretical orientations that
emphasized structure rather than content. As a result, Rokeach defined values as
the most important components of the belief system (p. 447).
Scheibe (1970) provided a distinction between behavior, values, and
beliefs, gestating behavior as ‘what the person does,’ and values and beliefs as
‘what the person wants to do’ according to what they believe is true (p. 21).
Scheibe operationalized these concepts and noted that when the question asks
about ‘what the person did or will do,’ it is an attitude question. When it asks
about ‘what is good,’ it is a value question. But, when it asks about ‘what is
true,’ it becomes a belief question (p. 41).
Almond and Verba (1963), describe civic culture as the Anglo-American
tradition, and refer to it as a gift to the world. They state that “every political
system is embedded in a particular pattern of orientations to political
action…the political culture.” Thus, political culture can be defined as “…the
specifically political orientations; the attitudes towards the political system and
its various parts; and attitudes towards the role of the self in the system” as it
underpins all systems of governance (Almond, 1956, p. 3). In later work, Verba
(1966) defines the political culture as “the subjective orientation to politics” or
the “system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols, and values that define the
situation in which political action takes place" (p. 513).
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The stability of the political system, according to Almond and Verba is
contingent to its supportive value and belief system. In 1963, the authors ran a
study on five different countries and their political systems. They considered
Britain the best example of a stable civic culture based on their conducted study
on one-thousand British individuals. They deduced from the responses of the
interviewees that there is a high magnitude of cultural homogeneity, consensus,
and respect among the British people for their government institutions. The
results of the study indicated how the individuals’ shared values towards their
parliamentary rules and government decisions. The social trust between the
individuals and their political institutions is an important association that is
required for the success of civil society. In other words, this association is
between individuals’ behaviors and the state’s behavior. Nevertheless, the
aforementioned policies of the regime in Jordan that, for the most part, resulted
in containing just one sect of the society and passing over the larger sect would
impact the level of democracy in Jordan and the stability of its political system,
which renders this theory unfeasible to be applied on the Jordanian case.
Putnam (1971) defines the set of politically relevant values, beliefs and
habits of political leaders as the political culture. Understanding elites’ political
culture requires skills in interpreting their ideologies, in characterizing
operational codes, and in defining the spirit and calculations that lie behind
high-risk political behavior (p. 651). The political leaders’ attitudes are a
function of the environmental situations in which they find themselves, where
they bring their psychological predispositions to these situations. Putnam
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considers the political culture approach illuminating and informative as it
provides information about the nature of people in general, if evil or good; the
society if harmonious or conflictual; what politics is all about; the importance of
the social and political differences; and about how these differences should be
dealt with. Besides, he considers the political culture approach useful in
providing answers to various questions about politics, political issues, and
political problems, as well as it is adequate for presenting solutions to these
problems (p. 652).

Political System: Democracy, Governance, and Development in Jordan
The monarchical authoritarian regime of the Hashemite Kingdom of
Jordan. In a study on Jordan’s monarchy, Lucas (2004) suggests that since its
establishment, the Jordanian monarchical system has taken the lead in molding
the country’s national identity that suits its regime. The monarchical regime of
Jordan has built a new state around itself rather than reconstructing an already
existing state. In his study, Lucas mentions two common types of Middle
Eastern monarchies: dynastic and linchpin; Jordan’s monarchy is a linchpin
monarchy. Contrary to the dynastic monarchy, the members of the ruling family
of the linchpin monarchical system do not participate in the political institution
of the monarchy or fill positions in the state bureaucracy except rarely.
However, the King in Jordan does not rule alone, but forms a coalition and stays
at its center. Hence, pluralism is allowed at a certain degree within the regime
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coalition. Even opposition is legalized, which maintains the country’s political
and social stability, because quiescence and political stability are vital for the
endurance of the monarchical regime (p. 106).
Moreover, Jordan and its neighboring countries offer ample opportunities
for the study on authoritarianism through their powerful national security
apparatus. Jordan’s national security apparatus, or the “Mukhabarat,” has
enjoyed fairly wide usage since the establishment of the state, and controls all of
its activities (Hudson, 2001, p. 801). Similarly, Lucas asserts that linchpin
monarchies encourage social pluralism and mobilize it along vertical lines to
participate in the governing of the state, as long as all the activities are
controlled by the national security apparatus, or the “Mukhabarat” (p. 108-9).
This type of linchpin monarchy and social pluralism is seen in the rule of the
Hashemites. During the era of King Hussein, Jordan’s most popular King,
several scholars wrote about the Hashemites’ popularity. King Hussein was
extremely capable through his personal relations with key power figures
internally and within the region and beyond, to establish an unchallenged
institution of monarchy. His charisma and wisdom in making policy had
augmented the recognition of the Hashemite monarchical rule among
Jordanians, many Arabs in the region, and the world (Shlaim, 2007; Snow,
1972; and, Kechihian, 2008).
Lucas (2004) describes Jordan as a regime-led state ruled by a monarch on
the basis of kinship and hierarchy, as he sees a blurry line between the regime
and the state of Jordan. “Regimes” are defined by Keohane and Nye (as cited in
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Krasner, 1983) as “sets of governing arrangements that include networks of
rules, norms, and procedures that regularize behavior and control its effect” (p.
2). Susan Strange (as cited in Krasner, 1983) defines regimes as, “the
government of a society by an individual, dynasty, party or group that wields
effective power over the rest of society.” Strange contends that the concept of
the “regime” is usually tied with authoritarianism, and believes that the “regime
is biased towards authoritarian political structures” (p. 344).
Authoritarian political systems, according to Juan Linz (as cited in Linz,
2000, p. 159) have four characteristics: (1) limited not responsible political
pluralism, which constrains political institutions; (2) a basis for legitimacy for
accepting the regime as a necessary evil; (3) neither extensive nor intensive
political mobilization, such in the use of the ventilation method that allow the
masses to vent only during controlled demonstrations; (4) a formally ill-defined
executive power that is often shifting. These four characteristics describe a
political system that rules by using a mixture of austerity and forbearance
strategies. A further elaborated study by Robert Bianchi (1986) describes the
Middle Eastern political systems as hybrid, eclectic, and alterable political
structures.
According to Bianchi’s study, the authoritarian regimes of Middle Eastern
countries have promoted corporatist associations as instruments of social control
while avoiding high levels of repression and simultaneously perceiving interest
group politics as inadequate attempts to replicate the classic democratic AngloAmerican models. Bianchi based his theoretical perspective on the two
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coexisting paradigms of Philippe C. Schmitter of corporatism and pluralism in
the ‘Third World.’ Bianchi argued that within the same political system, the two
concepts of corporatism and pluralism coexist and do not collide. Austerity and
stringency coexist with forbearance and clemency, but in changing proportions
and the two strategies interact in various ways.
The previous Latin American political structures are corporatist, robust,
and stringent regimes. Schmitter (1982) defines them as systems of interest
representation with units organized into limited numbers of singular,
compulsory, non-competitive, hierarchically-ordered, and functionally
differentiated categories; recognized and created by the state; and granted a
deliberate representational monopoly within their respective categories in
exchange for observing certain controls on their selection of leaders and
articulation of demands and supports. Conversely, he defines the pluralist
political structure as a constituent unit of pluralism, organized into unspecific
numbers of multiple, voluntary, competitive, non-hierarchical, and self
determined categories. The units of the pluralist political structure are not
controlled or created by the state and do not exercise monopoly of
representational activity (Bianchi, 1986, p. 507).
Accordingly, under the heterogeneous nature of political systems, a
mixture of corporatist and pluralist interest of representation play key and
enduring roles. Yet, neither paradigm is considered permanent, especially in the
systems of ongoing tensions and competition between pluralist and corporatist
that promote periodic and cyclical fluctuations in the predominant mode of
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representation. This theory is found pertinent to the authoritarian regime in
Jordan as it imposes inconsistent austerity measures, while concurrently
allowing some pluralism. Thus, the political system of Jordan is known for its
hybrid political structure that does not entirely impose rigid authoritarian
policies, or totally eliminate pluralism. As put by Bianchi, it is a political system
that has “opted for strategies of corporatization that are far more tentative,
partial, and inconsistent” (p. 509).
Pettygrove (2006) describes the regime in Jordan as patriarchic with
traditional leadership. Hudson (1977) also argues that the patriarchic traditional
ideology is adopted by the regime to inculcate an ideological legitimacy that
counteracts anti-royalist doctrines. Hudson warns that authoritarian regimes’
legitimacy crisis can only be avoided by implementing reforms and enhancing
the transition movements to achieve liberal democracy. This warning was taken
seriously in Jordan when King Hussein overcame the crisis of 1989 riots by his
liberalization attempt (p. 209).

Political Development: Political Liberalization and Democratization
There are a number of issues that are important in Jordan and the entire Arab
region, all of which deal with the delayed development. In 2006, the Center for Strategic
Studies (CSS), at the University of Jordan undertook a survey of public opinion in
various Jordanian governorates. The study was conducted in cooperation with the Arab
Democracy Barometer that was established in 2005 by scholars and research centers in
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the United States and several Arab countries under the leadership of University of
Michigan and Princeton University.
The project aims to create a database of opinions held in the Arab world
concerning politics, society, religion, and culture. Additionally, this project measures a
number of specific issues organized under five sections; views of democracy, focus on
citizenship, the place of religion in public and private life, views of public institutions and
confidence in their efficiency, and international and Arab affairs. This study will refer to
some of these results in Chapter 4.
Most popular and academic discussions use the two terms of political
liberalization and political democratization interchangeably, while they are in
fact different. Political liberalization, as defined by Brynen, Korany, and Noble
(1998), “involves the expansion of the public space through the recognition and
protection of civil and political liberties,” such as the ability of citizens to
engage in free political discourse and to freely organize in the pursuit of
common interests. Political democratization is the expansion of political
participation, such as providing citizens with a degree of real and meaningful
collective control over public policy (p. 3).
In its modern history, Jordan witnessed two liberalization movements in
1959 and 1989. The constitution of 1952 was an attempt to set forth the essential
elements of a constitutional liberal democracy in Jordan. It stated the right of
citizens to set up and join political parties and during that time, Jordan had
active parties and held parliamentary elections that led to a coalition government
formed by the whole of the country’s political spectrum. Yet, in 1959, King
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Hussein instructed his government to impose severe authoritarian measures on
political parties, restrict civil activities, and empower the investigation apparatus
that surrounds and protects the regime, which interrupted the liberalization era
by restrictive legislations that banned political participation for thirty years,
(Majed, 2005, p. 15).
Similarly, in 1989, after thirty years of government’s austerity measures,
wide riots erupted in Jordan. These incidents triggered the King to adopt the
second liberalization and socioeconomic development movements in order to
keep the country under control. Kamrava (1998) and Mufti (1999) described
Jordan’s liberalization movement of 1989 as one of the most significant
experiments in political liberalization in the Arab world despite the ultimate
power of its unelected king and appointed officials. King Hussein’s
liberalization strategies entailed several governments to become engaged in
initiating and implementing reformation policies at all levels, which made
Jordan more liberalized and developed than any other Arab country in the region
Mufti (1999).
As a result to the 1989 liberalization movement and its political reforms,
and for the first time since 1967, a parliamentary election was held, martial law
was rescinded, political parties were re-legalized, censorship was abolished, new
press legislation was introduced, and a ‘new National Charter committing the
country to political pluralism and democracy was adopted. The parliamentary
election of that year was the fairest and freest election in Jordan’s history. It
allowed the only opposition party, the Islamic Action Front (IAF) to participate
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in the elections. However, the results were unexpected to many liberals in the
country. Out of 80 parliamentary seats, 33 were won by Islamist candidates, 22
of which were for the IAF, and 12 were won by liberal leftists. As a response to
these results, the King appointed Tahir Al-Masri as a premier, who is known to
be a liberal leftist. Al-Masri formed a committee from the most prominent
intelligentsia members to put together the National Charter (Brynen, 1998, p.
75-79).
The King’s decision of 1990 to appoint a Royal Commission in order to
draw up the National Charter was significant in two respects: first it represents a
consensus statement between the King and the parliamentarians, tribal notables,
urban elites, East and West Bankers, conservatives, liberals, leftists, and
Islamists on the political rules of the game under liberalization. Second, it is
more elaborative and explicit in endorsing democratic politics than the
constitution. The National Charter declares that the system of government in the
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is parliamentary, monarchic, and hereditary and
it calls for strengthening the democratic process on the supremacy of law and
political pluralism bases. The Charter begins with a historical introduction
followed by eight chapters of substantial details that lead to political, social, and
economic developments in Jordan. The first chapter is a detailed rationale on the
democratic choice followed by a detailed chapter on political pluralism and rule
of law system. The rest of the chapters deal with particulars on national security;
economy; the social aspect including culture, education, and science;
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information technology; Jordanian-Palestinian relations; and Arab, Islamic, and
international relations (The Jordanian National Charter, 1990).
According to Al-madhoun (2010), the Charter has been the subject of
national consensus and acquired a unique status subordinate to the constitution,
but no mechanisms or procedures were formulated to implement it. Since the
issuance of the National Charter it became the model for national reconciliation
and it has been present in the political and intellectual meetings, discussions, and
writings of the Jordanian intelligentsia. Among those benefits are the
reconciliation among Jordanians, the termination of martial law, and the
restoration of constitutional rights for political participation through elections
and political party affiliations, which are all substantial issues for Jordan’s
stability and development. Drafting the National Charter has benefited all
Jordanians although its implementation proceedings and mechanisms remained
absent (p. 3-7).
The National Charter attempt was frustrated by some ruling elites. The
government and the regime enforced a series of preemptive measures and
defense mechanisms designed to help the ruling elites maintain their privileges
by thwarting this liberalization and democratization movement, which, had it
been approved, would have moved Jordan many steps forward in its transition
towards liberalization, democratization, and development (Brynen, 1998).
Wiktorowicz (1999) claims that Jordan’s liberalization attempts remained
stalled, due to the regime’s manipulation and exercise of power through legal
codes and political repression, a situation that benefits the incumbent elites by
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perpetuating their political control. In his study of the limitations of democracy
in Jordan, Wiktorowicz refers the floundering towards liberal democracy to the
lingering authoritarianism. He describes what has been going on in Jordan since
1989 as just a “façade of democracy” with only symbols, such as political
parties, elections, and civil society organizations. These symbols have become
common; yet, they did not lead Jordan to liberal democracy (p. 607).
Hitherto, it has been possible to have some of the elements of political
liberalization without having political democratization. As explained by Brynen
et al., allowing some liberalization relaxes the political repression without
expanding political participation, which assimilates the earlier theory of the
mixed political system of interest representation by Bianchi. Also, this
accommodates Linz’s ventilation method used by authoritarian regimes to
prolong their rule, and therefore proves that even a modest amount of
liberalization under the control of the state guarantees, protects, and preserves
the status quo for both the political system and political elites. Yet, as Brynen et
al. confirm, political freedom remains essential for enabling citizens to
participate effectively and choose a political alternative. Expanding political
participation by elections under repression, highly distortional systems of
electoral representation, or electoral fraud does not provide citizens with
effective say in political decision-making.
Cheema (2005) argues that the political systems are not marked liberal and
democratic for only holding fair and free elections. If democracy is defined in
terms of elections, then it is possible to have an “illiberal democracy,” but the
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democratic political system enforces rule of law, separation of powers, and
protection of its citizens’ basic rights. Jordan’s liberalization movement of the
1990 slowed down and its efforts to achieve democratic governance fell in a
state of stagnation. There is a need for serious implementation of reforms that
guarantees the success of liberalization and democratic governance. The process
of achieving democratic governance entails the coordination of “complex
mechanisms, processes, relationships, and institutions through which citizens
and groups articulate their interests, exercise their rights and obligations, and
mediate their differences by allocating and managing all resources to respond to
collective problems” (p. 5). By good governance Jordan will be able to eliminate
corruption by imposing a rule of law system that enforces transparency,
accountability, and other democratic principles.
Cheema asserts that democratization responds to a universal human
yearning for freedom and life with dignity, undiminished by our cultural
diversity and ethnic differences. Jordan needs a serious implementation of
reforms managed by democratic governance. He also goes on to explain that the
democratization process in developing countries does not slow down because
democracy is inapplicable due to their political cultures, but because
authoritarianism interrupts the progress of their liberalization and
democratization movement.
Moreover, according to Jreisat (as cited in Jabbra, 1989), public
administration in Jordan is crucial for the implementation of reform and
development policies. However, confrontational issues, such as tribalism,
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remain challenging for the achievement of administrative development. The
tribal loyalties have been more powerful than loyalties to the state, as well as
centralism, clerkism, nepotism, incompetence, and corruption (p. 99). These
challenges are frustrating to the implementation of administrative reforms that
most elites confirmed have not been effectively managed.

Social Development and Civic Engagement
Civil society, according to Wiktorowicz (2000), is an essential component
of democratization. It is viewed “as a mechanism of collective empowerment
that enhances the ability of citizens to protect their interests and rights from
arbitrary or capricious state power.” The expansion of civil society requires
several transitions to democracy, but under authoritarian rule the activities of
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) remain under state control. In Jordan,
all NGOs, such as women’s organizations, journalists’ associations, professional
associations, and cultural societies are continuously challenged by the state.
Keeping their activities under state control avoids the destabilization of the
regime by limiting civic engagement and social empowerment. Jordan witnessed
an expansion in the number of civil society organizations after 1989. However,
the opportunity for creating new civil society organizations remained limited. As
described by Wiktorowicz, once these organizations were created, they became
embedded in a web of bureaucratic practices and legal codes that allow the state
to monitor and regulate their collective activities. This strategy rendered civil
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society organizations in Jordan as an instrument of state social control rather
than a mechanism of collective empowerment (p. 43).
According to Al-Attiyat (2005) and Pettygrove (2006), increasing women’s
participation and empowerment is significant to the social development and
modernization in Jordan. Pettygrove believes that civil society organizations dedicated to
women’s issues have blossomed. Relatively, the participation of women has been
empowered through several efforts, for example, the gender equality protection clause
within the Jordanian constitution, which has led to many legislative advances in regards
to women’s rights, and women’s suffrage. Further, while the percentage of universityeducated women is as high as it is for men, the government yet organizes campaigns and
training programs to raise women’s rights awareness, empower women in business and
politics, and encourage women’s participation in all sectors of the workforce (p. 4).
However, in spite of these advances women’s civil society organizations inhibit
their decision-making roles, which hampers their abilities to achieve empowerment. In
addition, family and religious social structures, including gender roles in Jordan,
remained resistant to change. These social structure and social value systems serve as
obstacles to women’s political empowerment, along with the Islamic value system that is
manipulated in its interpretations to intentionally hinder women’s participation at all
levels; political, social and economic (p. 22-5).
Moreover, Kamrava (1998) describes the authoritarian nature of the
Jordanian regime as restrictive, because it frustrates all reform implementations
by constraining the meaningful political participation and development of an
effective civil society. This restrictive nature is also emphasized by Wiktorowicz
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(1999) who elaborates on the regime’s use of political repression in order to
channel any mobilization or political participation within its formal and statedelineated institutions. The repressive barriers of the state still exist since the
social movements, and political activists and actors prefer to mobilize through
the grassroots voluntary organizations.
Currently, the activities of all types of NGOs are restricted and monitored
by the government, including the ones that are concerned with human rights,
democracy, the sentiment value of Jerusalem, and Islam as cultural activities.
For instance, the government politicizes the cultural and religious activities of
most NGOs in Jordan and has created clashes over the definition of their
activities. The politicization of cultural and religious activities is intended by the
regime to prevent, limit, or forbid any mobilization outside the formal channels.
The government issued two laws to govern civil society and their activities; Law
33 was issued in 1966: “to provide social services without any intention of
financial gains or other personal gains, including political gains.” The second is
the political party law: Law 32 of 1992 that stipulates: “The use of the premises,
instrumentalities, and assets of associations, charitable organizations and clubs
for the benefit of any partisan organization, shall be prohibited” (Wiktorowicz,
1999, p. 610). In Law 33, for instance, there is no explicit requirement that says
all volunteers and administrative board members must be approved by the
“Mukhabarat” or the security department and the public security of the interior,
though all types of public activities in Jordan must first be cleared by the
security apparatus and other state agencies (Wiktorowicz, 2000, p. 50). By the
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same token, Bayat (2002) argues that Jordanian NGOs are established to remain
charity-driven organizations and to fulfill basic needs, which does not lead to
social development.
Brynen (1998) states that prior to 1989, the professional associations in
Amman represented the main vehicle for political discussions, but other civil
institutions in Jordan showed little independence or politicization, such as the
press that followed the exact direction of the government, chamber of
commerce, university campuses, and trade unions. All these institutions and
associations were thoroughly under the government’s control. After 1989, the
number of civil society associations and organizations has grown tremendously,
although the process of modernizing these organizations was deficient. Thus, the
institutionalization process did not progress to match the growth in the number
of NGOs. Brynen illustrates this problem by explaining how the government
owns the media, even after the royal decree of 1997 that modified the press law,
but later resumed their control and continued to limit freedom of expression.
Also, most organized groups have remained passive and incapable of impacting
the broad political agenda. This failure in modernizing and liberalizing civil
society institutions was referred to a myriad of reasons. In addition to the
government’s limitations, bureaucratic complexities, and the “Mukhabarat,”
there were other reasons behind the passivity of civic engagement, such as tribal
and clan connections that lessened the importance of the formal associational
groups, the excessive involvement of royal members, former and current cabinet
ministers in the social organizations, and the activation of the parliament and
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political parties. This expanded the formal mechanisms of political participation
and caused some associational groups to drop their memberships or active
participation, and to lose the political reason for their existence. The dilemma
caused a conflict between the government and some opposition groups including
leftist minorities and the IAF who endorsed the call for boycotting the 1997
parliamentary elections. Additionally, the legalization of political parties did not
rotate power or create political elites. Ironically, the party that significantly
gained support of the southern region was “Al A’ahd” party, meaning the
Jordanian Pledge party. It is still headed by a strong East Jordanian advocate of
the regime. “Al A’ahd” party has entered a coalition with eight other political
parties to strengthen their support to the regime. Thus, the political party
institution in Jordan did not meet the consideration of a fundamental mechanism
for political participation, nor did it ensure political pluralism (Brynen, 1998, p.
84-89).

Tribalism vs. Jordanian Nationalism
Tribalism can be a double-edged sword. It promotes loyalty, unity, and
cohesiveness among tribal members who share kinship relations; while
simultaneously, it spreads prejudice and favoritism because it discriminates
against others who do not have similar kinship affiliations. According to the
Blackwell Dictionary of Political Science, tribalism can be defined in two ways:
“the anthropological meaning of the term refers to the type of society which
preceded the primitive state where groups of pastoralists linked by kinship,
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formed regular organizations in which chieftainship would later develop and
these might be called clans or tribes. The term is also used to describe a sort of
political system in which nepotism and clientilism predominate. Hereditary
political families are prominent, programmatic and ideological conflict is still
not intense. Policies tend to be implemented by trading favors” (p. 326).
In fact, the dichotomy and fluctuation in the concept of tribalism has
caused Jordan more confusion on local and national levels regarding how the
state system should work through its institutions. Jordan is not a highly
tribalized country according to a recent tribalism study conducted by USAID
(2010) that evaluates the relationship between traditional and modern
institutions in Middle Eastern countries.
According to Oudat and Alshboul (2010) the relationship between the
state and the traditional institution of tribalism, or the ‘asha’eriyah’ in Jordan is
very special due to the security strategy that harnesses the traditional institution
of tribalism to work as a defense mechanism for the regime. Retrospectively, the
tribes have been the foundation on which the Jordanian government is grounded,
as they form the fundamental part of the Jordanian army and the security
apparatus that keeps the regime protected without relating the ‘tribe’ or the
‘ashirah’ to the importance of the nation state (p. 70). On the contrary, the
regime defends the tribal honor and the institution of the monarchy as one entity,
rather than defending the concept of the nation-state, which created an alliance
between the regime, tribes, and the institution of monarchy that is represented in
the slogan of “Jordan First” that enables the state system of political authority to
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make use of the traditional political authority by promoting tribal loyalties
towards the monarch and his regime. Hence, the regime has gained control over
the tribes through its reliance on their support and loyalty that was promoted
towards the monarch, not the state. Yet, this alliance has produced incompatible
and ill-assorted situations relevant to the issue of loyalty that has never included
the Jordanian nation (p. 77, 83-85).
Additionally, the authors highlight very important points; firstly, they
warn from the consequences of the regime’s strategy of “Jordan First” and the
recruitment of the traditional institution of tribalism, as they do not consider this
strategy patriotic. The authors assume that the negative impact of tribalism on
Jordanian nationalism and development will backfire; specifically in the strategy
of “Jordan First.”
Secondly, they emphasize that the regime’s defense strategy has not
brought Jordan any stability. It is anticipated that this strategy will encourage
more opposition and trigger radical movements, widen the gap between the
regime and the society, and weaken the traditional power of tribalism
characterized by solidarity, social cohesion, power, and pride, among others.
Accordingly, the regime’s presumption of “Jordan First” defense strategy has
been failing; it has neither empowered the traditional institution of tribalism, nor
provided the regime with protection.
Thirdly, contrary to the regime’s presumption, this strategy is becoming an
instrument of modernization, as the new generations are beginning to define
themselves according to their personal achievements rather than being defined
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by a tribal affiliation. Thus, according to Oudat and Alshboul (2010) this
strategy is the new beginning for political liberalization in Jordan.

Economic Liberalization and the State of Rentierism
According to Knowels (2005) the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is one of
the most vulnerable countries to the external political, economic, and security
events. The country has been rocked by the effects of the regional instability and
its numerous events including the ongoing Israeli/Palestinian conflict, the wave
of the radical revolutions during the 1950s-1960s, the civil Lebanese war of
1974, various Gulf wars, the invasion of Kuwait, and the invasions of
Afghanistan and Iraq. More recently, though Knowels’ study reflects up to 2005,
it is yet relevant to the ongoing war in Syria. The regional crises diminished
Jordan’s subsidies from the oil producing countries and placed further pressures
on the economy as the country received hundreds of thousands of refugee
influxes from each of its neighboring countries.
The government in Jordan struggles to meet the requirements and high
demand of commodities and services, due to its scarce resources, and
particularly since Jordan is classified as a rentier state. Rentier theory has been
used since the 1970s to attempt to explain the political economy of Middle
Eastern countries (Knowles, 2001). The rentier or semi-rentier states are
dependent states on exogenous sources, since these states derive revenues from
external resources rather than depending on domestic production or taxation
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(Greenwood, 2003). Jordan is characterized by aspects of rentierism since its
establishment in 1921.
Brynen (1992) blames rentierism for social and political factions in
Jordan; it has deeply divided the population in Jordan and played a key role in
weakening the national integration by primarily directing state resources at East
Jordanian elites. As a semi-rentier country Jordan has an average GNP, and
lower-middle income levels with great disparity between its “haves” and “havenots.” The state revenues in Jordan depend on the international market, not on
domestic production. Its available financial resources support the country’s
authoritarian regime, which renders the legitimacy of the government less
important.
In a later analysis by Brynen, Korany, and Noble (1998), they criticize the
allocations and distributions of the financial resources by the government. They
assert that the regime uses these resources to support the coercive apparatus of
the state and to sustain massive social welfare programs that fuel powerful
neopatrimonial networks based on family, the tribe, and proximity to the ruling
elite. Also, under such circumstances coercion becomes less important for the
regime when political legitimacy can be “purchased” through economic rewards.
The rentier social contract is one in which the state provides goods and services
to society such as subsidies on basic commodities without imposing economic
burdens, while society provides state officials with a degree of autonomy in
decision-making and policy. Legitimacy rests upon the ability to enhance quality
of life rather than democratic principles (p. 15).
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According to political economy scholars, Jordan was one of the world’s
fastest-growing economies, as a result to the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. The
increase of oil prices, increased remittances, and oil-producing Arab countries’
assistance contributed to Jordan’s economy and GDP growth of the 1970s. This
economic rise continued through 1984 with low unemployment and poverty
rates, and high per capita GNP and GDP levels to rise. However, Jordan did not
maintain this economic growth, and the increment in revenues was mainly used
by the regime to enhance its position among its patronage and East Bank
constituents. Thus, the economy began to fall, especially with the aftermath of
the economic crisis that befell the country in the 1990s; see Appendix B, Table
2.1 Jordan GNI per capita/PPP from 1989 to 2012 in.
Lipset’s theory (1959) classifies the following most important
prerequisites for achieving development and political democracy: the steady
increases in Gross National Product (GNP) per capita; the legitimacy of the
government and its ability to strengthen its citizens’ beliefs in the
appropriateness of their existing political institutions for the society; the
effectiveness and efficiency of the political system to maintain political stability
that enhances the economic development and sustains democracy;
industrialization; urbanization; and citizens’ high educational levels. The
positive linear relationship between the levels of socioeconomic development
and democratic development leads to a steady increase in the overall wealth of a
society. Fulfilling these prerequisites enabled the Western democratic societies
to achieve political and economic developments (p. 75).
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In order to achieve political stability and maintain an average level of
socioeconomic development in Jordan, the regime found refuge in the
International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) and World Bank’s stabilization methods.
The international organizations’ economic reform plans are designed to
overcome economic deterioration manifested in low growth, high inflation rates,
foreign exchange shortages, and budget deficits.
However, the economic reform is not a one-shot deal, but should be
viewed as a stage-by-stage process (Barkey, 1992). It starts with a stabilization
stage and continues in a structural adjustment stage. In the stabilization stage the
imbalance gets remedied, such as balance of payments, budget deficits and high
inflation rates, by devaluating the currency and increasing the prices of imported
goods and domestic products that contain foreign inputs. Meanwhile, the second
stage is more complicated as it requires an institutionalization process. In fact,
most Middle Eastern countries fear the stabilization measures because they can
harm the tenure of their regimes. This fear makes these countries delay the
stabilization stage, which sets back the whole process of economic reform (p. 3).
The principle sources of Jordan’s hard currency earnings are based on
several different resources and industries: its mineral resources, such as
phosphate, potash, and fertilizers; the tourism sector and other services that
include healthcare, pharmaceutical, and the cosmetic sector; and finally,
overseas remittances, and foreign aid. Nevertheless, the foremost obstacles of
Jordan’s economy are its regional instability, water scarcity, and complete
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reliance on oil imports for energy (See Appendix B for more information on
Jordan’s largest export sectors and Human Development Index).
As a result, the Jordanian government has taken wide steps towards rapid
privatization. Privatization is the process of “converting state-run industries and
firms into private ones” (Stiglitz, 2003, p. 54); particularly that Jordan attracts
investments on a large scale. It has six special economic zones: Aqaba, Mafraq,
Ma'an, Ajloun, the Dead Sea, and Irbid.
Jordan’s success in privatizing state-owned enterprises (SOE) is discussed
in the World’s Bank report (2012), and used as an example for other
governments in developing countries to overcome their citizens’ fears of
privatizing stemming from many scopes: employees’ expectations to lose
benefits; consumers’ worries about price increases; and voters mistrust in
government officials. During the period from 1998 to 2008, the government of
Jordan has successfully privatized fourteen fully SOEs in the following
industries: telecommunications, electricity, air transport, mining and other
sectors. According to the World Bank, privatization strengthened Jordan’s fiscal
position and supported its macroeconomic stability by generating $2.3 billion in
sales proceeds, supporting the reducing debts from 100% of GDP in 2000 to
89% in 2004 and 60% in 2008.
Although Jordan is mostly an arid desert land with limited water
resources, and depends on external sources for the majority of its energy
requirements, the World Bank has recently classified Jordan as an “upper middle
income country.” Jordan’s annual GDP growth between 2010 and 2011,
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according to UNDP (2013) report was 3.1% and the GDP per capita is 0.9%.
The IMF expects an economic growth to accelerate and expand by 3.5% and
reach 4.5% in 2017. The UNDP per capita Gross National Income (GNI) rate is
$4,380. According to IMF, Jordan’s GDP per capita/Purchasing Power Parity
(PPP) for 2012 is estimated by 5,977 (See Appendix B, Figure 2.3 for GNP
growth rate, and Figure 2.4, for Jordan’s Economic Liberalization and Freedom
Index, 2013).

Congruence Theory
The relationship between the authority patterns of Jordanian elites with the
Monarch on one hand, and the citizens of Jordan on the other, are relevant to
Eckstein’s congruence theory (1998). The core of the congruence theory
consists of two hypotheses. The first finds pertinence to Jordan’s political
system and pertains to the congruence between the authority patterns of the
political system and the authority patterns of other units of society. The viability
and well performance of the political system is measured on the basis of this
congruence; high performance requires high congruence. Thus, it is the
capability of the political system to be in agreement and broadly correspond to
different social organizations, agencies, and units. Predominantly, the units of
the society are such institutions and organizations that include political parties,
unions, businesses, professional societies, community and voluntary
associations, schools and universities, film production teams, sport team
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leagues, religious worshiping associations, hospitals, social clubs, and families;
these are the social units where the elites of the society are drawn from. The
social units are subunits that directly affect and differ from the state in their
scale and complexity, and require governance. Thus, governments perform well
if their authority patterns are congruent with the authority patterns of other
social units (p. 5).
The second hypothesis of the congruence theory is not separate from the
first, but an extension of it. It suggests that in addition to the congruence
condition, high performance will be satisfied if the political system is capable to
make a balance among its disparities. This requires the ability to have mixedauthority relations. The effective transition towards democracy and the stability
of the political system requires balanced interactions and relationships among all
conflicting and consensual parties, or active and passive ones. This conductive
environment, according to the theory, enhances the stability of the political
system; while the authoritative or totalitarian authority patterns hamper the
transition towards democracy and the stability of the political system (p. 10- 12).
According to Eckstein, the high performance of governments also pertains
to how well a polity can do in preserving the following conditions and criteria:
its durability over time; keeping a civil order and avoiding the existence of
violence and coercive channels in the society; legitimacy of the regime and how
much its members consider it worthy to them; and the government’s decisional
efficacy in carrying out policies in response to political demands and challenges
(p. 13).
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The application of the first hypothesis of congruence theory to Jordanian
elites, who are drawn from different social units within the society, indicates that
congruence is always apparent between the authority patterns of the regime and
the authority patterns of particular social units, but not all social units. The
Jordanian authority pattern of Eastern elites for instance, remains responsive to
only a minority of constituencies, particularly with the unrepresentative party
system that does not allow devolution of power or recruitment of elites. This
creates disparities within the Jordanian society, as this congruence is only
representative to the minority of elites. As far as the second hypothesis of the
congruence theory in terms of the ability of the political system to establish a
balanced relationship with its disparities in the society, and in order to establish
a consensual environment among all parties, the Jordanian political system has
lately proven its ability to do so. After the eruption of the Arab Spring, the
change in the regional political milieu planted the seed for some change in the
Jordanian political system, in terms of responding to reforms. Relatively, the
King acknowledged the demand for political reform, and yielded to the wish of
certain Parliament members to select the Prime Minister. Therefore, the
Jordanian political system proved that it can create a consensual environment
and avoid coercion and disagreements.
However, the performance of the government and political system will be
measured in terms of its ability to maintain civil order, legitimacy, and its
efficacy in carrying out policies in response to political demands and challenges.
But, the Jordanian political system lacks for governmental durability, and has
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used coercive and astute measures to keep civil order and enforce balance in the
society, which impacts the transitional movement towards liberalization and
democratization that has been slow and remained as a “form” rather than a
“norm.” These enduring conditions are constraining the progress of liberal
democracy in Jordan.

Cautious Liberalism
John Locke’s political theory does not guarantee an inevitable progress
of human communities, as he deems the political order precarious. Locke’s
political theory is joined with a constant anxiety about a possibility of political
degeneration caused by change. John Locke’s political theory has two
tendencies that are not very harmonious. On one hand Locke seems reluctant to
change and inclined towards preserving the political order, due to believing that
change might be for the worse; this tendency expresses conservatism. On the
other hand however, Locke rejects tyranny and abuse and regards them as a state
of war. In this rejection Locke expresses radicalism, as he urges that citizens
should stay watchful and ready to act in order to oppose abuse before it is too
late. Therefore, Locke tends to encourage what he calls “cautious liberalism,” to
avoid changes in the political system and government, which he believes might
lead to political degeneration.
Rooted from the value of liberalism, John Locke theorized that in order to
establish a legitimate rule, every society must approve consent among its
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members on the bases of freedom and equality. A citizen’s entitlement to be free
and equal enables them to come to consensus, and maintain legitimacy, avoiding
any infringement on their rights. Further, a legitimate political authority must
have separated powers, certain institutional arrangements that enable the polity
to elect an assembly, and must replace traditionalism with constitutionalism in
order to ensure the continuation of stability. Locke’s liberal theory obeys
legitimate authority, while allowing resistance against illegitimate power and
tyranny. Therefore, power must be exercised within reason as a means for a
legitimate end, and only then will the public good be served (Grant, 1987, p.
204).
Applying Locke’s “cautious liberalism” theory to the analysis of the
collected data on Jordanian elites’ political culture will indicate whether
Jordanian elites’ values, beliefs, and attitudes are ambivalent towards
liberalization, democratization, and development. This study will provide a
description on elites’ values, beliefs, and attitudes towards change and the
implementation in reforms in Jordan’s political, social, and economic orders as
depicted in their responses to the survey questions of this study. Further, the
analysis of their responses allows me to describe them as “cautious liberals” in
terms of this theory, as they provide signs of acceptance for liberalization,
democratization, and development, but simultaneously illustrate timid attitudes
towards accepting change in their political order, fearing potential instability.
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Chapter 3: Methods
The core of the literature review suggests that what actually matters is
what Jordanian elites appreciate, believe in, and want to act towards.
Accordingly, this chapter explains the methods that were used in describing
elites’ political culture that consists of their values, beliefs, and attitudes. It
examines the three types of values, beliefs, and attitudes questions of the survey
questionnaire that were designed to respond to the study’s four research
questions and their two hypotheses.
Four research questions and two hypotheses were developed to describe
the political culture of Jordanian elites that consists of their values, beliefs, and
attitudes towards liberalization, democratization, and development; measure
significant differences between the means of the three groups of elites; illustrate
the values, beliefs and attitudes of Jordanian elites concerning the center of
power in Jordan; and explain if Jordan’s current political regime congruent with
the values, beliefs, and attitudes of Jordanian elites. The two hypotheses were
tested in terms of significant differences between the means of the three groups
of elites as well as the congruence between the regime and elites’ political
culture. The following are the four research questions and their two hypotheses:
Q1:

What is the political culture that consists of Jordanian elites’ values,
beliefs, and attitudes towards the processes of liberalization,
democratization and political, social, and economic developments in the
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan?
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Q2:

Are there significant differences among the values, beliefs, and
attitudes of the three groups of Jordanian elites?

H1:

There are significant differences among the values, beliefs, and
attitudes of the three groups of Jordanian elites towards political,
social, and economic development.

Q3: What are the values and beliefs of Jordanian elites concerning the
center of power in Jordan?
Q4:

Is Jordan’s current political regime congruent with the values,
beliefs, and attitudes of Jordanian elites?

H2: The regime is congruent with Jordanian elites’ political culture.

The following sections in this chapter illustrate and describe the data
collection and analysis methods used in this research. The main data collection
method for this study was a face-to-face survey, administered to three different
groups of Jordanian elites. This data was collected during 2008, during the time
I received the Sasakawa Young Leaders Fellowship Fund (SYLFF) scholarship
and stayed in Jordan for one academic year. This chapter describes the
following:


Study population



Sample selection procedure



Survey administration procedures



Survey questionnaire



Data analyses approaches for both quantitative and qualitative data
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Study Population
The target population of this study is the elites in Jordan. As noted in the
previous chapter, according to elite theorists, (Berry, 1989; Parry, 2005; Putnam,
1976; Tachau 1975) elites are a small minority that plays an exceptionally
influential part in political, social, and economic affairs. The target population of
this study is therefore, the most influential minority in the Jordanian society. The
political elites include the highest governmental officers and policymakers, who
currently occupy, or have occupied in the past, the highest rank positions in the
government and public sector. The elites also include business owners and
corporate CEOs from the Jordanian private sector; considered as economic
elites. An assortment of intelligentsia members of thinkers, writers, and
professors, as well as members of the prominent tribal groups are also covered
within the study and considered as social elites. Traditionally, the King granted
several social and economic elites high rank positions in the government, due to
their prominent social and economic statuses. Therefore, frequently many
political elites are also social or economic elites.
In this study the three groups of elites are identified based on the following
titles and positions:
1.) The political elite group, consisted of those who held high governmental
positions such as, former and present Prime Ministers and Ministers, former and
present Parliament representatives from both the lower and upper houses,
political party leaders, and the under secretaries, trustees, administrative
executives, and general managers of ministries and public agencies.
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2.) The social elite group consisted of secretary generals of unions and
syndicates, leaders of nonprofit organizations, and members of the intelligentsia,
such as university professors and writers.
3.) The economic elite group included the private sector business owners,
who are CEOs and chairs of companies that contain large numbers of
shareholders.

Sample Selection
The study sample was selected with the help of the Center for Strategic
Studies (CSS) at the University of Jordan. The CSS is a well-known research
center highly recognized among University of Jordan’s professors that have
been providing the government bodies and organizations in the public and
private sectors with high-impact social, economic and political studies on the
local, regional, and foreign policies in Jordan. Since Jordan’s democratization
process was initiated in 1989, the CSS has been expanding its scope of activities
to include planning and research in several other relevant fields. Their research
areas include political pluralism, gender studies, and democratic governance. In
addition, the CSS works in cooperation with other research centers in the region
to present a variety of political, economic, socio-economic and environmental
analyses. Projects by CSS are accompanied by extensive efforts to develop and
launch an Arab academic and research network (http://www.jcss.org).
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This center (CSS) was regarded as a reliable information source for
researchers and decision-makers by Sasakawa Young Leaders Fellowship Fund
(Sylff) organizers, who grant researchers scholarships to conduct data collection.
The University of Jordan (UOJ) is a Sylff institution; thus, when I arrived to
Amman, Jordan, I contacted the Sylff representative professor at UOJ, who
introduced me to the CSS researchers. The center is located on campus and
provides researchers and students with academic training, access to its library,
and allows them to participate in workshops and activities.
Through CSS, I obtained a list of Jordanian elites’ names that were used as
a sampling frame for selecting the sample for this study, containing six-hundredsixty-eight (668) names. This list contained names of prominent political, social,
and economic figures in the Jordanian society. However, the social and
economic prominent figures can be granted political positions by the King. For
instance, many tribal influential figures serve as Prime Ministers and Ministers
if chosen by the King to fill these positions. These social and economic figures
would in most cases identify themselves as political rather than social or
economic elites. This offers an explanation as to why the number of political
elites is doubled and why the proportions of the three groups of elites in the
sample are: 65:23:12 (political: social: economic).
Moreover, the appointment of Prime Ministers by the King is usually confined to
a pool of a few prominent influential tribal figures, where in some cases some Prime
Ministers have served in more than three governments. Similarly, the political elite
stratum includes certain prominent figures that filled a variety of positions and are still
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part of the government, including elites with more than one affiliation according to the
three elite categories, yet identify and introduce themselves as political verses social or
economic. The sample of this study is affected by all these reasons. In addition, according
to CSS researchers, the sample is representative, as the disproportions in the sample are a
reflection of the disproportions in the population.
A systematic random sampling method was used to select one hundred
(100) study participants. A table of random numbers was used to locate the
initial sampling point. The following describes steps taken during the sampling
procedure.
The total numbers of the list of names (668) were divided by the sample
size (100). The derived number 668/100=6.68 (approximately 7) provided the
justification for the researcher to select every 7th person from the randomly
identified starting point.
The number 3 was selected, picked randomly between 1 and 10, in order
to locate the initial sampling point. The selection process began by highlighting
every third name as the starting point for the count, and every seventh name
down the list was then highlighted for selection until achieving a list of onehundred-ten (110) names.
The extra ten names were selected and reserved for replacement purposes
in case someone declined to participate in this study, or asked to be removed
from the list of participants before or after the interview. Only one elite asked to
be removed, and was replaced by one from those ten names.
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Using the contact information in the verified list of office addresses and
phone numbers provided by CSS, I contacted each one of the hundred (100)
people identified through the sampling procedure described above, by phone.
The phone contact was made mainly to solicit their participation in the face-toface survey. After the elite who asked to be removed was replaced, all the
contacted elites agreed to participate in the study.

Survey Administration and Interview Procedures
Initial phone contacts. Initial contacts with the study participants were
made by phone to solicit their participation to the face-to-face survey. Prior to
the phone contact, CSS staff members trained me to follow a certain protocol
necessary for dealing with and talking to Jordanian elites. For instance, the
Jordanian elites have certain designated titles endowed by the King. According
to Jordanian protocol, it would be considered inappropriate to address the elites,
who were designated by “His Majesty,” without acknowledging their
designation.
The main purpose of the phone contact was to describe the research and to
introduce the researcher, develop a rapport with the study participants, solicit
their participation to the face-to-face survey, and make appointments for
conducting the interviews. Efforts were made to establish friendly and trustful
relationships with the participants during the phone contact. The phone
conversations began with a summary of the purpose of the study. In the
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conversations, I emphasized the academic nature of the study, assured
confidentiality of the identity of the participants, and informed them of Portland
State University’s Informed Consent.
Elites were extremely concerned about their confidentiality, which was taken
seriously due to their political environment. According to the blogs of Premium Data
Processing & Survey Research (http://www.sentenium.com/), confidentiality means only
the researcher, who is conducting the survey, knows the respondents who are taking the
survey, without any disclosure of that information. The notion of confidentiality and
anonymity was raised and discussed with all interviewees prior to their participation in
the interviews. Confidential research cannot be conducted; researchers have a duty to
report on the findings of their research and they cannot do so if the data they collect is
confidential. The researcher’s duty is to report on the findings of the research; this duty
cannot be fulfilled without revealing the collected data. Therefore, I ensured the
interviewees to try my best to protect their identities through various processes designed
to keep their identifiable information anonymous. So, all the potential participants, who
were contacted by phone accepted to participate in this study, but their acceptance was
conditional on guaranteeing them that their responses will not be linked to their names
and identities.
During this phone contact, I discussed some key aspects of the Jordanian
elites’ power through their positions. We touched on the abilities of Jordanian
elites through their influential positions in the public, private, and nonprofit
sectors, and their role as intelligentsia. The confidentiality of identities was the
most common concern emphasized by most elites. I assured them that this
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concern would be taken very seriously with complete understanding to their
political environment and to the pressures coming from their authoritarian
monarchical regime. Many elites were concerned about this study’s association
with any local or international media. I emphasized that although I had
knowledge of the surveyed participants, the identities of the respondents, and
any associated names within the information shared with me was in complete
confidence. The participants were also noted that they would receive a copy of
the “Informed Consent” in the Arabic language before beginning their
interviews.
In addition, the participants were informed that this research was
supported by a grant from Sasakawa Young Leaders Fellowship Fund (Sylff) for
the students pursuing graduate studies. It was clarified that Sylff is not
responsible for the content of this research. I also noted that CSS is providing
assistance to this research with the identification of the study participants. At the
end of the phone conversation, all potential participants accepted to participate
in this study, under the condition that I guarantee the confidentiality of their
names and identities.
The initial phone contact provided the study participants a chance to ask
questions about me and other concerns they have about the study. This step
turned out to be an important part of the data collection that had a psychological
impact on elites. It allowed those who occupy the senior positions to stay in
control of the interview situation and gave them the opportunity to ask questions
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to maintain this sense of control. It also removed any concerns about the
research prior to the face-to-face survey/interviews.

Written and oral wording of survey questions. Initially, the survey
questions were sketched in English with emphasis on their linkage to the
objectives of the study. However, after consulting with question-crafters from
the CSS, the questions were translated into standard Arabic. The design and
wording of the questions followed the standardized survey questionnaire of
Converse and Presser (1986) that stresses the effectiveness of keeping most
questions short and choosing simple, clear, and precise vocabulary. According
to Converse (1984), the wording was free of ambiguity and unnecessary
adjectives and adverbs. Efforts were exerted while wording the questions in
order not to choose any vocabulary that leads to assumptions. The consultation
with the CSS question-crafters was important for the face-to-face questions
during the interviews, in order to avoid the chatty, over-familiar language, and
maintain professionalism and accuracy. In addition, consulting with the CSS
question-crafters was essential for the appropriateness of the language that was
used to address prominent political, social, and economic interviewees in the
Jordanian government and society.

Face-to-face survey administration and interview. The face-to-face
format was a suitable data collection approach for this study as it allowed me to
elicit information from a group of former and present prominent elites.
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Questioning elites in a face-to-face setting led to collecting more accurate
information and improved the quality of the obtained data. Whenever
respondents’ comments sounded elusive, irrelevant, or contradictory, I was able
to ask follow-up questions to clarify the information. There were several reasons
behind the elusiveness or irrelevance in elites’ comments; first, as I learned from
the local researchers at CSS, there is a tendency in the Jordanian media of
falsifying any statistics on lagging behind situations on the social or economic
levels in Jordan. In fact, the media proclamations reflect the official position of
the government, a position that is complemented by the lack of accountability
and transparency. Therefore, giving responses that contradict with this official
stand can cause agitation, which drives some elites to evade from giving
straightforward responses.
Second, Under the Jordanian monarchical system, there is a certain
protocol for addressing ministers, under secretaries, chairs, and other high
governmental officers. Each elite might have an additional title, which in formal
settings he/she are addressed with. The additional titles are usually granted by
“His Majesty” the King. For example, the Prime Minister is always addressed by
“Ma’aleek” or “Your Highness,” but sometimes the King might address a
minister by “Ma’aleek” which makes it politically incorrect to address that
particular minister without the prefix which he/she was granted by the King. The
Jordanian under secretary is usually addressed by “Otooftak” or “Your
Kindness,” a chair must be addressed by “Sa’adtak” or “Your Honor,” and a
high governmental officer sometimes must be addressed by “Siyadtak” or
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“Your Excellency” before his/her name. The CSS question-crafters were
consulted about the importance of including the additional titles in the orally
repeated questions, such as “why, Sa’adtak, do you believe…?” or “how,
Siyadtak, do you consider...?” According to CSS question-crafters these titles
are important to be used while addressing most elites and might impact their
reluctance verses willingness to answering the questions. Therefore, the
additional titles were studied and added to all the face-to-face interviews, as well
as while communicating with them over the phone. Learning titles was an
essential step that took place prior to contacting any of the elites, as mistakes in
addressing Jordanian elites could negatively affect the process of data gathering.
When respondents made elusive or irrelevant comments on questions
pertaining corruption, or levels of poverty or unemployment, I repeated the
question and challenged the succeeding answer by including statistics or other
published facts within the question, which indicated my knowledge supported
by evidential facts regarding the issue. This technique was useful to solicit
answers that were more factual and direct. Thus, the face-to-face setting made it
possible to use this approach and to collect more accurate responses and avoided
a process of collecting politicized, terse, or generic media-based information and
data. Finally, the face-to-face interviewing method minimized the “I do not
know” and the “No response” answers.
Mail survey was not used for this study in order to avoid the discretion of
the secretaries and office managers, who might forget, delay, or ignore the
surveys. It was also not used in order to minimize the possibility of rejection to
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participate by projected participants, due to any misinterpretation or
misunderstanding to the purpose of this survey. The uncertainty of the local
postal system, according to its reputation among locals residing in the city of
Amman, was another reason for not using the mail survey approach.
During the survey, strict attention was paid to the fact that this study was
being conducted under an authoritarian monarchical system, and its participants
were elements of the monarchical system. As VIPs of a monarchical system, the
Jordanian elites had high expectations for receiving a favored treatment, which
was expected in advance. Therefore, I learned the local protocols and formalities
that met these elite’s expectations to be treated with special care and courtesy.
At the beginning of the face-to-face survey session, all interviewees were
handed a copy of the Informed Consent Form translated into Arabic (see
Appendix C for an English copy of the Informed Consent Form). I reemphasized
the information already shared over the phone prior to our meeting, and insisted
on the academic purpose of this study. The procedures required for data
collection by Portland State University were also communicated. In addition, in
order to minimize any hesitations that might occur, the confidentiality factor was
further stressed. Through this agreement, due to the sensitivity of the
interviewees’ positions and potential jeopardy of what their answers may lead
to, the request for their signed endorsements was discarded, as many of elites’
feedback expressed the question of how truly anonymous their identities would
remain.
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Subsequently, each interviewee was handed a printed hard copy of the
Arabic Informed Consent Form for their reference, and the survey questionnaire,
so he/she could read and follow each question during the interview process. All
interviewees saw the survey questions for the first time at the face-to-face
interview session.
High response Rates. As mentioned in the Literature Review, the reasons behind
the high responding rates to this study can be explained by the participation of Jordanians
in other studies, such as their participation in the Arab Barometer study, which was
conducted in Jordan in 2006 and had a poll that included a sample of 1200 residences and
had a high response rate of 95.4%, as only 55 households refused to take part. Likewise,
this study has a high participation and responding percentages among its selected elites.
The high responding rates are a precursor for the researchers in the field to overcome the
previous research limitations. The ability to gather an abundance of data and to defeat
different research limitations is an optimistic indication that heralds a new era for the
researchers, who are concerned with filling the gap in the literature and for those who are
interested in understating the centers of influence and elites in the Middle East.
Mishler (1986) defines the interview as a pattern of interaction in which
the role relationship of interviewer and respondent is highly specialized; it has
specific characteristics that is affected by the purpose and character of the
interview (p. 8). In accordance with this definition, the authoritarian
monarchical political culture and environment of Jordan had a vivid impact on
the character of these interviews; hence, the researcher’s familiarity with the
political culture and environment of the country and the interviewees was
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substantial for achieving the purpose of these face-to-face interactions. For
instance, during the interviews it was important to sense the sensitivity of certain
political issues and to pay special attention to respondents’ actions and reactions
to certain subjects. The communication during the interviews was consistent
with these actions and reactions, which kept the flow of collecting clear and
valid responses with less skepticism and few hesitations.
Despite the regime’s recent endeavors of allowing some freedom of
opinion, several elites remained reluctant or hesitant to answer a number of
questions that asked about the King’s absolute powers, authoritarianism, or
corruption, either because they did not believe that the regime was serious in its
endeavors of implementing change, or because they were loyal to the regime. By
the same token, lack of knowledge about certain questions’ subjects, or the used
terminologies, being unaccustomed to speaking up, or remaining skeptical about
confidentiality were among the reasons that were taken under consideration,
because they caused reluctance and hesitation to give direct responses.
I directed several follow-up questions to the respondents who showed
negative reactions to any of the questions. I used several different approaches in
a feedback form, such as repeating, restructuring, explaining, or delineating the
original question. In fact, the face-to-face settings made it possible to use these
approaches, as it allowed me to both hear and see the verbal and non-verbal
responses and reactions. Thus, the setting enabled me to interfere whenever
respondents portrayed negative reactions and to use different approaches that
suited the different situations. As a result, I gathered an abundance of candid
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information and more accurate data since the respondents had adjusted it during
the interviews.
For example, some questions were rephrased to include explanations or
delineations about the question’s subject or to explain the terminology. In some
cases responses or comments were repeated, suggesting to the respondents that I
had not understood what they meant, which triggered them to clarify their
response and provided me with a more accurate one. Occasionally, there were
some awkward situations when respondents would say or make irrelevant
comments on questions, and where certain patterns of techniques were
employed in response. For instance, my reactions to these situations were
hypersensitive, as some elites, whose political environments were influenced by
their positions in the society and/or the government, had to be treated carefully
by using an indirect rephrasing of the question. The indirect rephrasing of the
question was a successful technique, as it avoided any embarrassment to these
respondents. Yet, whenever the questions needed to be rephrased, effort was
made to maintain the intent and integrity of the original questions.
Other situations were treated differently, for example, if the respondent
used nonverbal body language or gestures to answer a question instead of
making a verbal response, I recorded the response accordingly. Also, in some
cases the respondents answered sarcastically with either a “yes” or “no,” while
they have nodded their heads to mean the opposite, the responses were recorded
to reflect the true intentions of the respondents.
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Additionally, when the respondents showed hesitation due to a question
regarding the King’s absolute powers, authoritarianism, or some newly enforced
laws to eliminate corruption, it was noted that they were still skeptical and
doubtful about confidentiality. I dealt with these cases by reassuring them that
their confidentiality will be preserved; however in most cases, rephrasing the
question was still necessary to solicit an answer. In this case, the question was
reworded orally by framing it more broadly after reading it from the survey.
Generally, verbally rephrasing the written question allowed the opportunity to
ask the same question indirectly, by providing specific scenarios and examples,
which gave the interviewee the confidence in answering the question, implying
the same answer to the directly stated written question. Once an answer was
provided from the indirect rephrased situational approach, I reverted back to the
direct survey question and indicated parallelism in the question and answer
discussed, which at this point, the respondent confirms.
In addition, personal family relations have played an important role in
facilitating the gathering of data. The success behind the initial phone calls with
potential participants and their acceptance to participate in the face-to-face
interviews was in part due to the researcher’s family name and relations. As a
Middle Eastern country, Jordan has a culture that values the concept of family
honor. For instance, expectations such as having low participation levels among
elites and collecting brief, “no,” or “I do not know” responses were overridden.
Elites’ perceptions of the quality, worthiness, and respectability of the researcher
and the data gathering process relative to this study were further affected by this
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factor. Particularly, the researcher’s family relation with Dr. Rima KhalafHunaidi, the Executive Secretary for United Nations Economic and Social
Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA); listed in the Financial Times among
the top fifty people who shaped the decade. She held several high-ranking
ministerial positions in Jordan, including the Minister of Industry and Trade
(1993–1995); the Minister of Planning (1995–1998); Deputy of Prime Minister
and Minister of Planning (1999–2000); Assistant Secretary-General and Director
of the Regional Bureau for Arab States (RBAS) at the United Nations
Development Program (UNDP) from 2000 to 2006; and she has also served as
the Chairperson of the Advisory Board of the United Nations Democracy Fund
(2006–2007). These prominent positions held by Dr. Khalaf-Hunaidi directly
strengthened the researcher’s position and had a positive impact on the data
gathering process.

Survey Questionnaire
A survey questionnaire with thirty-five questions, including both closedended and open ended-questions, was developed for this study (see Appendix C
for the survey questionnaire). The questions in this survey questionnaire were
designed to assess respondents’ political environment, and to collect data that
would address the aforementioned two research questions of this study.
The survey questions were designed to collect data about the respondents’
perception of the political system, culture, and environment of Jordanian elites.
This set of questions provided me with a set of standardized and structured
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quantitative data. On the other hand, the open-ended, free-response questions led
to an abundance of qualitative data. The open-ended questions triggered the
respondents to give more information and elaborate on the questions in their
own words. In addition, the open-ended questions gave me an opportunity to ask
follow-up questions for clarification and elaboration.
In designing this survey questions the political environment of the
respondents was taken into consideration. By following up a closed-ended
question with an open-ended question, allowed the respondents to elaborate and
explain their answers when the question touched on the sensitive issues in the
Jordanian politics. Appendix C is the English version of the survey form.
The survey questions were constructed to assess 1.) values, 2.) beliefs, and
3.) attitudes. In order to differentiate between the three types of questions of the
survey, the definitions of values, beliefs, and attitudes according to Sheibe’s
(1970) theory were considered. As previously mentioned in the literature review,
each of the three has different attributes, which affected how each question was
differentiated from the other. For example, when the question asks about “what
is good,” it is a value question; as how “good” something is, or how “good” a
matter is to a person is a means of value to them specifically. When the question
asks about “what is true,” it is a belief question. The belief system is based on
how much truth a person thinks there is in what he/she believes in. Finally, when
the question asks about how the person views, thinks about, or did/will do
towards a specific matter, it is an attitude question. Accordingly, the questions
of the survey were classified and labeled.
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Based on Sheibe’s theory, the three types of survey questions were labeled
and are displayed in the three following tables (Table 3.1, Table 3.2 and Table
3.3). The first table of the closed-ended/values questions is preceded with more
explanations on how these questions were labeled.
Closed-ended ‘value’ questions. Values are identified as empirical
elements in human behavior that arise out of human experience, invoked in
social interaction to evaluate the behavioral goals or modes of action; thus
became mainly defined as social norms, or as attitudes anchored in groups of
norms and assumed to be central to the cognitive organization of the individual
and to serve as a basis for the formation of beliefs, opinions, and attitudes
(Hutcheon 1972, Rokeach 1970, 1973).
In reference to all these theories, question (103), as a ranking question,
was designed to investigate the importance of certain values to respondents; the
question of identifying oneself with an ideological affiliation indicated how
much this person values the characteristics of this ideological affiliation and
thought of it as ‘good.’ Question (108), asked about the effectiveness or the
goodness of a particular law; and question (112) asked about the suitability of
one out of four political systems, indicating which system is the most valuable
or suitable according to the respondents. Question (115.a) rates the support of
women’s participation across the three fields of development. Question (117)
defines elites’ reason for lobbying, indicating how much they value lobbying.
Question (121) results express how elites value the campaigning culture during
parliamentary elections, particularly regarding campaign mottos, and vision and
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mission statements. Finally, question (129) inquires about elites’ affiliations
with nonprofit organizations, and if the activities of nonprofits were considered
as a value to them, or not. The measurement of values in this survey follows the
ranking and rating model of Alwin,and Krosnick (1985). See (Table 3.1) below
for the closed-ended value questions:

Table 3.1
Q#
103

Closed-ended ‘Value’ Questions

Q. Type
Value

Q. Structure
How would you rank the following values in terms of their
importance to the reformation and the current development policies?
(1 = Extremely unimportant; 2 = Unimportant; 3 = Somehow important;
4 = Important; 5 = Extremely Important)

105

Value

Describe yourself ideologically:
1. Liberal
2. Independent
3. Conservative

108

Value

How do rate the effectiveness of the ‘declaration of liability’ law to
ensure accountability and transparency?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

112

Value

Extremely ineffective
Ineffective
Moderately effective
Effective
I don’t know
No Response

The following are models for political systems of some countries
in the Middle East. Pick the most suitable for Jordan and rate its
suitability on the below scale from 1-6:
(1 = Not suitable; 2 = Somewhat suitable; 3 = Suitable; 4 = Very
suitable; 5 = don’t know; 6 = No response):
1. Parliamentary system that allows the nationalist, Islamic, and
left and right wing parties to compete in transparent and
impartial parliamentary elections

81
2. Parliamentary system that allows only the Islamic parties to
compete in parliamentary elections
3. Authoritarian system controlled and ruled by an ultimate
power and authority without consent or consideration for
opposing views
4. A system ruled by Islamic Shari’ah without any type of
elections or political parties
115.a

Value

Rate your support or opposition to women’s participation in the
political, social, and economic development:
(1 = Strongly oppose; 2 = Somewhat oppose; 3 = Moderately support; 4
= Strongly support; 5 = don’t know; 6 = No response)

117

Value

What were your reasons for lobbying?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

121

Value

How do you describe the mottos, mission and vision statements of
political parties and the parliamentary election campaigns in Jordan?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

129

Value

To implement important changes
To pursue my democratic values
To support pluralism
To participate in policymaking
All the above

Appealing and engaging to most Jordanians
Appealing and engaging to some Jordanians
Neither appealing nor engaging
Used as campaign propaganda
I don’t know
No response

Do/did you have an affiliation with any of the following nonprofit
or civic organizations?

Closed-ended ‘belief’ questions. Scheibe (1970) defined the belief
system by a set of functional disposition, nature, or character; beliefs are the
implicit expectations concerning what leads to what (p. 39). Accordingly,
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political beliefs reset the culturally defined goals for political processes;
therefore they play a major role in determining the operation of the political
process. This group of questions was categorized as belief questions, as they
asked about “what was true.” See the closed-ended belief questions in the below
table (Table 3.2):
Table 3.2

Closed-ended ‘Belief’ Questions

Q#

Q. Type

101

Belief

Q. Structure
Do you think you currently have or have had any impact on policymaking in Jordan?
(0 = No; 1 = Yes)

102

Belief

As a policy maker, or as someone who has/had an impact on
policymaking, to what extent do you believe that your political goals
are/were achieved?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

104

Belief

Not at all
To a little extent
To a moderate extent
To a large extent
Don’t know
No response

How would you rate the current administration’s performance on
implementing the following reforms?
(1 = Very poor; 2 = Poor; 3 = Standard; 4 = Good;
5 = Very good; 6 = Excellent)

110

Belief

Institutionalization is a required stage in administrative development.
Do you think the institutionalization process in Jordan has been
successful?
(0 = No; 1 = Yes)

118

Belief

“Pluralism” is the participation of all political forces in governance.
Does pluralism exist under Jordan’s authoritative monarchical
political structure?
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(0 = No; 1 = Yes)
125

Belief

Is it true that parliament members stay connected with their constituencies
after the elections?
(0 = No; 1 = Yes)

126

Belief

In what way do you think tribalism impacts the political and social
developments in Jordan?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

128

Belief

‘The values, beliefs, and attitudes of Jordanian elites are influenced by
their tribal affiliations;’ how much do you agree with this statement?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

130

Belief

Belief

Strongly disagree
Disagree
Agree
Strongly agree
I don’t know
No response

The government interferes in the affairs of nonprofit organizations.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

132

Positive
Negative
Positive at times and negative at others
Don’t know
No response

Never (Go to Q. 132)
Always
Sometimes
Don’t know (Go to Q. 132)
No response (Go to Q. 132)

Do you think economic and political developments should go together or
should one of them take precedence in order for the other to be achieved?
1. The economic development should take precedence
2. The political development and civil liberties should
take precedence
3. Both developments should occur simultaneously
4. Neither, both are imposed by external powers
5. Don’t know
6. No response

134.a

Belief

Do you believe the Prime Minister should be elected from the Parliament
majority?
(0 = No; 1 = Yes)
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Closed-ended ‘attitude’ questions. An attitude, according to Rokeach
(1970), is relatively an enduring organization of beliefs around an object or
situation predisposing one to respond in some preferential manner (p. 112). So,
it is a person's feeling towards an object or event, accompanied with an
evaluation of this object or event. The components of an attitude, according to
several researchers are emotional, cognitive, and behavioral, which makes
individuals react differently towards any situation. According to Allport (as
cited in Rockeach, 1970), different people react differently to the same situation
(p. 112). Also, elites’ attitudes, according to Putnam (1971), can be examined
through investigating their opinions on current political topics to know how they
view matters, what they favor, and how they think about certain issues in order
to assess their attitudinal press in different situations (p. 651-2).
In other words, ‘attitude’ is usually assessed by defining its direction and
measuring the intensity of the direction. For example, if the direction is on the
positive side, that would respond to the ‘what’ factor in Putnam’s theory;
however, that is not a full assessment since we can still assess the ‘how’ factor;
or how much positivity or negativity the attitude has by defining the intensity of
the direction. This is how attitudes were measured in the analysis of this study;
by their directions and intensities. The following table, (Table 3.3) displays all
the closed-ended ‘attitude’ questions from the survey questionnaire:
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Table 3.3

Closed-ended ‘Attitude’ Questions

Q#

Q. Type

106

Attitude

Q. Structure

On a scale of 1-6, how do you favor the implementation of the
following reforms by the Jordanian government?
(1 = Very unfavorable; 2 = Unfavorable; 3 = Neutral;
4 = Favorable; 5 = don’t know; 6 = No response)

107

Attitude

In Jordan the relationship between the public and private sectors and
civil society in the delivery of public services is lagging behind.
1. Strongly disapprove
2. Uncertain
3. Strongly approve

116

Attitude

Have/had you ever practiced formal or informal lobbying to influence
members of Parliament?
(0 = No; 1 = Yes)

119

Attitude

Are you affiliated with a political party?
(0 = No; 1 = Yes)

124

Attitude

The one-person, one-vote law empowered tribalism at the expense of
the partisan structure of the parliament and weakened political party and
Parliament institutions. Please indicate your level of agreement:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Strongly disagree
Disagree
Agree
Strongly agree
Don’t know
No response

Open-ended ‘value’ questions. Questions (109) and (120) are the only
two open-ended value questions. Question (109) is designed to gather free
information on elites’ values concerning the administrative development reform.
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It asks them to mention the three most important administrative reforms that
enhance efficiency, effectiveness and productivity in all their organizations.
In question (120), the respondents are indirectly asked about their political
party affiliations. This indirect design is suitable for this type of questioning, due
to the negative heritage of political party affiliation in Jordan. Therefore, the
focus of the question is on the most dedicated political party leadership, rather
than focusing on respondents’ personal affiliations.
The indirect design is more encouraging and it triggers respondents in
some situations to provide more information. The coding and analysis of the
open-ended questions follows the model of Boyatzis (1998) of thematic analysis
and the development of codes. The below table, (Table 3.4) displays the two
open-ended value questions in the survey:

Table 3.4

Open-ended ‘Values’ Questions

Q#

Q. Type

Q. Structure

109

Value

Can you mention the three most important administrative reforms
that would lead to higher efficiency and productivity levels?

120

Value

Which political party, do you think, has most dedicated leadership?

Open-ended ‘belief’ questions. By responding to the two open-ended
questions (113) and (114), the respondents explained in their own words how
the political system, which they had chosen in a previous question, enhances the
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democratization and development processes. So, the two questions examined
elites’ beliefs in their chosen political system by asking them how this suitable
political system would solve Jordan’s political problems that impede democracy
and political and administrative developments. At the same time, how they think
this suitable political system would eradicate poverty and lower the
unemployment rate.
By the same token, questions (115.b), (122), (127), (133), (134.b) were
designed to gather more data on preceding closed-ended questions. A lot of data
was gathered from these open-ended questions on several issues, such as
women’s political, social, and economic participation, political party activities,
tribalism impact, and the economic and political developments. The open-ended
design of these questions gave the respondents good opportunities to explain and
elaborate on their structured responses from all those questions. Following some
of the closed-ended questions with open-ended ones suited the political
environment of the respondents and led to collecting more in depth information.
The below table, (Table 3.5) displays all the open-ended belief questions of the
survey questionnaire:
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Table 3.5

Open-ended ‘Belief’ Questions

Q#

Q. Type

Q. Structure

113

Belief

Can you mention how your choice of political system would
enhance democratic governance and accelerate the political and
administrative developments in Jordan?

114

Belief

Can you mention how your choice of political system would
enhance the country’s economic development, improve living
standards in the suburbs, and find solutions for the high
unemployment and poverty levels?

115.b Belief

If you support women’s participation in any of the three fields,
why do you think women in Jordan are lagging behind?

122

Belief

What are the reasons behind the weakness of political parties
in Jordan?

127

Belief

Why?

133

Belief

Why do you think this is a better development plan for Jordan?

134.b Belief

Why, or why not?

Open-ended ‘attitude’ questions. Questions (111), (123), (131), (135)
were preceded by closed-ended questions that asked about the
institutionalization process in Jordan, political party laws, and civil engagement
and NGOs’ activities. As open-ended questions they resulted in gathering more
detailed data on the attitudes of the respondents. The free responses on the above
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issues enriched this data gathering with more information. Open-ended attitude
questions would help the analyses, because the collected responses would be
supplemental for identifying the problems and suggesting solutions.
To wrap up, the final survey question was designed to collect free
responses and information about elites’ views on how they see the practice of
democracy in Jordan. Hence, it is considered an attitude question, as it
investigated elites’ opinions on a current political topic, which is the
democratization process. This question contributed in figuring out how
Jordanian elites view their democratization process, whether they favor it or not,
and how they think about it. In its design, this question aims to assess elites’
attitudes during this transitional period by triggering them with a definition for
real democracy and asking them about the democratization process in their
country. As shown in the below table, the question underlines the main
characteristics of democracy, which are still hindered by the regime, such as the
empowerment of citizens; practicing all freedoms and citizens’ rights; having a
rule of law system; and the occurrence of regular, competitive, transparent, and
fair elections.
With their own words, the respondents answered this question by giving
free responses on how they viewed democracy. They discussed their feelings
and thoughts, and how those feelings were directed. Designing this question as a
final open-ended question posed as a wakeup call for most respondents,
providing them with an opportunity to have more realistic attitudes; particularly
those who remained skeptic.
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In their own words, the respondents defined the directions and the
intensities of their attitudes towards the subject of this question, which bundles
up all the other issues that the survey questions inquired about earlier. So, this
final question made respondents aware of the void they might have previously
created when responding unrealistically to some questions. Finally, this question
highlighted the gap between reality and the rhetoric of government officials,
which would be emphasized in the discussion section of this study. The
following table, (Table 3.6) displays all the open-ended attitude questions:

Table 3.6

Open-ended ‘Attitude’ Questions

Q#

Q. Type

Q. Structure

111

Attitude

If not, what should the government do in order to achieve
administrative development
through the process of institutionalization?

123

Attitude

Name three elements that would activate the party system and
empower political parties.

131

Attitude

Tell me about the government’s interference in the affairs of
nonprofit organizations?

135

Attitude

Democracy is not merely a motto; it is a way of life that serves and
empowers citizens under a rule of law system. It assures freedoms,
protects citizenship rights, and guarantees the occurrence of regular,
competitive, transparent, and fair elections while practicing the two
freedoms of choice and press. According to the above definition of
democracy, how do you view the practice of democracy in Jordan?
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Data Analysis Procedure
The collected data from the Jordanian elites through the face-to-face
interviews were analyzed to address the two main research questions of this
study. There were two types of analyses that were conducted in this study:
quantitative and qualitative. The responses of the closed-ended questions were
subject to a series of statistical analysis, while the responses of the open-ended
question were subject to a qualitative thematic analysis.

Statistical analysis. All responses for the closed-ended questions were
entered into SPSS version 19. After examining the descriptive statistics, a series
of One-way ANOVA analysis were conducted to ascertain the differences in the
values, beliefs, and attitudes among the three groups of Jordanian elites. Prior to
the statistical analysis, the raw data was subject to a series of data cleaning and
organizing processes.

Qualitative thematic analysis. Responses to the open-ended questions
that were designed to gather elaborated information on the values, beliefs, and
attitudes of Jordanian elites were analyzed using thematic analysis approach.
Qualitative data analysis followed the following steps: segmenting, coding,
thematic categorization, sorting, and identifying themes.
The first step, of segmenting data, according to Johnson and Christensen
(2008), involves dividing the data into meaningful analytical units. First, by
reading the gathered data carefully, such as the respondents’ answers, notes, and
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comments; and second, by searching for specifics and meanings that lead to
defining different meaningful units. The process of segmenting is important for
data analysis because it facilitates the process of defining similarities,
differences, and relationships among the gathered words, sentences, and
paragraphs (p. 534). By applying the segmentation of data to all responses from
open-ended questions, the raw data was filtered, segmented, and organized into
themes. Some survey questions, for instance, are answered by three steps, such
as [What are the reasons behind the weakness of political parties in Jordan? 1...,
2…, 3…]; or, [State three elements that would activate the party system and
empower political parties]. These questions gathered an abundance of
information, and in order to be analyzed, they needed to be filtered by
segmenting and organizing them into meaningful units. The filtering of data
minimized repetitions, redundancy, and wordiness, and segmenting added
articulation by creating divisions and subdivisions to the gathered data. Finally,
the organization stage included arranging and systemizing the data to prepare it
for the coding process.
The second process of qualitative data analysis involves coding.
According to Johnson and Christensen, it is the process of marking segments of
data with symbols, descriptive words, or category names; “codes are tags or
labels for assigning units of meaning to the descriptive or inferential information
compiled during a study,” (p. 534). For instance, the analytical meaningful units
that shared descriptive words or category names were compiled and labeled
together. Therefore, the segmented data resulted in several categories of
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connotations, which were classified as the meaningful units, and each of these
units were coded by certain descriptions or themes. The coding process for this
study was originally done in Arabic language since both data gathering and note
taking were done in the country’s formal language. After these steps were
accomplished a codebook was then established.
The codebook captured the whole range of the meaning of the numerical
code assigned to the open-ended responses. Also, the codebook served as an aid
for locating data. Since all the responses were gathered and written in the Arabic
language, the coding was also done in the Arabic language.
During this thematic categorization process, the data is compiled and
grouped in terms of meanings and gets labeled in themes. All the themes that
stem from the same original theme have one core theme. So, each core theme
has more than one subordinate theme. The core theme in the thematic
categorization is the source theme, or (Theme 1); while (Theme 2), and (Theme
3) are the subordinate themes that spring or emanate from the core. First, the
researcher reviewed all responses and identified key themes. These initial main
themes were used as a starting point to code the open-ended responses (Theme
1). As the researcher analyzed the data, sub-themes under the larger categories
of Theme 1 had emerged. These subordinate themes were captured as Theme 2.
When there were further subcategories under Theme 2, these themes were
captured as Theme 3. Overall, the three levels of themes emerged, and were
used to code the qualitative data.
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Once all the data coded by themes were entered into Microsoft Excel, it
was sorted by themes. Sorting the data allowed the researcher to assess the
frequency of each theme appearing in the open-ended responses. The table
below is an example from the Excel spreadsheet. These responses were given by
one of the respondents on this survey’s open-ended questions. The table displays
how the data was compiled and grouped into three levels of themes (Table 3.7):
Table 3.7

Example from the Survey: Thematic Categorization: Core &
Subordinate Themes

No.

Question Category

Theme Level 1

Theme Level 2

109

Administrative
Development

Improving
Individuals'
Performance

Training

109

Administrative
Development

Applying the
Codes & Conducts
of the Hiring
System

Merit System

109

Administrative
Development

Improving
Individuals'
Performance

Incentives &
Motivational Rewards

111

Administrative
development

Implementing
Reforms

Amending Statutes

111

Political/ Admin.
Development

Enforcement of
Democratic Values

Equality

113

Political
Development

The 1st political
system is
extremely suitable

Holding Officials
Accountable

114

Econ. Dev. &

Liberal Economic

Privatization

Theme Level 3

KSAs

Compliance
With the
Constitution
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114

Liberalization

System

Econ. Dev. &
Liberalization

Significance Of
Work Value

115.b Social Development

Obsolete Customs
& Traditions

Authoritarianism

Centralized
Monarchical Political
System

Powerful Old
Guards &
Security
Apparatus

Political
Development

Top Authority
Institutional
Empowerment

Reinstatement of
Institutional Freedom

Implementing
Change

127

Social Development

Negative Impact
on Political
Development

Impedes Fair
Elections

127

Social Development

Negative Impact
on Rule of Law

Weakens the Legal
System

131

Social Development

Great Interference
Security Reasons

Ensuring Security

133

Econ/Political
Development

Both
Developments
Simultaneously

Protective against
Globalization

134.b

Political
Development

The Prime Minister
Should Be
Appointed

135

Political, Soc., &
Econ. Development

Decreasing the
Authoritarian
Power

122

123

Political
Development

Eliminating Security
Apparatus Discretion
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Chapter 4: Results
A one-way ANOVA design, cross tabulation, Chi-square, and thematic analysis
were all conducted to evaluate the values, beliefs, and attitudes of Jordanian elites
towards liberalization, democratization, and development. The result of the analysis will
provide information for the researcher to answer the four research questions and respond
to their two hypotheses. The results provide analyses of data in four areas: description of
elites’ values, beliefs, and attitudes; variations among the three groups of elites’ political
culture; center of influence; and the regime’s congruence with elites’ political culture.
Two hypotheses were developed and will be reported in this section. Qualitative data will
also be included in this chapter followed by a discussion of the results.

Statistical and Thematic Analysis
This chapter presents findings from both analyses of open- and closed-ended
questions that asked the respondents about the three domains of political, social, and
economic developments. Quantitative and qualitative data analysis will be coupled
together according to subject relevance, in order to answer the four research questions
related to describing elites’ political culture; variations among the three groups’ values,
beliefs, and attitudes; the evaluation of elites’ political culture concerning the center of
power in Jordan; and the congruence level between the regime and the values, beliefs,
and attitudes of Jordanian elites. In addition, two hypotheses were developed. These
hypotheses analyzed the data in the areas of differences among the three groups’ political
culture and the regime’s congruence with elites’ political culture.
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The two hypotheses are:
(H1: There are significant differences among the values, beliefs, and
attitudes of the three groups of Jordanian elites towards political, social,
and economic development).

(H2: The regime is congruent with elites’ political culture).

The results of political development questions will be organized under the
following topics: the type of political system and democratic governance; rights and
freedoms; public sector reform; and political participation including: lobbying, political
parties, and elections. Similarly, the main topics of social development consisting of
women empowerment; tribalism; civic engagement; and economic liberalization will be
the main topic of economic development.
Each one of these topics will represent more than one question from the survey,
thus the reporting of results will be combined under the main abovementioned topics. The
results of quantitative and qualitative data are reported in the following section. All
survey questions are in Appendix C, Survey Questionnaire. Tables and figures are
displayed in serial numbers in Appendix D.

Political Development
Elites’ Political Culture towards Jordan’s Political System
Elites’ values in question (112) are assessed by using a 4-point scale (1= not
suitable to 4=very suitable) of the suitability of the subsequent political systems for
Jordan: 1) pluralistic parliamentary democratic; 2) parliamentary Islamic; 3) authoritarian
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system ruled by an ultimate power; and 4) religious non-democratic ruled by Shari’ah
law. See Appendix D, Figures 1 and 2.
According to the cross tabulation results, 72% of all elites deem the pluralistic
parliamentary political system “very suitable” for Jordan. A total of 5% deem it “not
suitable.” However, 0% of all elites deem the authoritative monarchical political system,
which represents the current political system in Jordan as “very suitable,” while a total of
96% of them deem it “not suitable;” see Appendix D, Table 5 for the N (%) cross
tabulation for the suitability of all four political systems, and Figures 1 and 2.
Most elites valued the suitability of the pluralistic parliamentary democratic
political system, and did not value the other political systems, including the authoritative
that is ruled by an ultimate power. By running one-way ANOVA tests, there are no
significant differences between elites, indicating the following results, excluding the
parliamentary Islamic that could not run the model: the pluralistic parliamentary system,
F (2, 97) = .224, p=ns; the authoritarian ruled by an ultimate power, F (2, 97) = .549,
p=ns; and the religious non-parliamentary, F (2, 97) = .265, p= ns. For more details on
ANOVA, means, and standard deviations see Appendix D, Tables 1, 2, 3, and 4.
Thus, H1 is not supported, indicating no significant difference between the three
groups of elites in the average means of their values, in terms of suitability of the four
political systems. The current authoritarian monarchical political system is the opposite
what the majority of elites value. This implication suggests that there is a lack of
congruence between the regime and the values of its elites. The regime is not congruent
with elites’ political culture; therefore, the results do not support H2.
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As designated by the responses of the open-ended question (113), the majority of
elites appreciate the pluralistic parliamentary democratic political system for its ability to
present solutions for the problem of corruption in Jordan. Thus, the results assert that
most elites value the pluralistic democratic political system as the most suitable for
Jordan. See Appendix C for the Survey Questionnaire.
The enforcement of rule of law under the authoritative monarchical political
system is rated in question (104.2) on a 6-point scale (1= very poor to 6= excellent). A
concrete rule of law enforcement is fundamental for development, however the majority
of elites believe that there is a “standard” rule of law enforcement by the Jordanian
government is only a one.
The one-way ANOVA test indicated the following result: F (2, 97) = 1.94, p =ns.
There is no significant difference between elites. Thus, H1 is not supported. For more
details see Appendix D, Figure 3 and Tables 6 to 8.
Most elites believed that the government’s lack of seriousness in implementing
reform policies remains the main reason behind Jordan’s tardiness in the supremacy of
rule of law. They criticized the consecutive Jordanian governments for their tardiness in
implementing this reform, while ignoring the fact that they themselves are part of the
current or any of the previous governments. The result indicates that there is congruence
between the regime and elites’ beliefs Thus, the result supports H2.
Democratic governance and the cooperation and coordination among the public,
private, and nonprofit sectors were tested in questions (106.3), (106.4), and (107). The
responses of the first two questions show elites’ passive attitudes towards the
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coordination and collaboration among the three sectors; 57% of their attitudes are
“neutral” towards the government’s reform policies that ensure cooperation between the
public and private sectors, and 50% of their attitudes are “unfavorable” towards their
government’s implementation of reforms that ensure cooperation between public and
nonprofit sectors. Similarly, 58% remained “uncertain” while 39% “strongly approved”
of the question statement that “the relationship between the public and private sectors and
civil society in the delivery of public services is lagging behind.” Accordingly, the results
of all three questions expressed traditional attitudes, conventional beliefs, and confirmed
elites’ cautious liberalism. See Appendix D, Figures 4 through 6 for more details.
The results do not support H1, as the two one-way ANOVA results indicate no
significant difference between elites’ attitudes: public/private: F (2, 97) =.089, p=ns;
public/nonprofit: F (2, 97) =.962, p=ns; and Chi-square result for coordination among the
three sectors: χ2 (4, N=100) =2.44, p=.654. For more details see Appendix D, Tables 9 to
14.
The majority of elites’ responses on the three democratic governance questions
were “unfavorable,” “neutral,” or “uncertain.” The higher percentages of unfavorable and
nonaligned attitudes towards the government’s reform policies to achieve democratic
governance indicate that most elites agreed that democratic governance in Jordan is
lagging behind. The results of these three questions are congruent with the regime, which
supports H2.
Moreover, elites’ beliefs in pluralism were assessed from their responses to the
dichotomous question (118). A majority by 73.7% of elites believed that pluralism is
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absent in Jordan, versus 26.3% believed the opposite. Chi-square results do not indicate
significance, χ2 (2, N=99) =2.33, p=.312, thus do not support H1. For more details, see
Appendix D, Figure 8 and Tables 18 and 19.
Most elites admitted that there is an absence of real pluralism in Jordan, which
indicates the regime’s congruence with elites’ beliefs; thus, the results support H2.
The dichotomous question (134.a) and the open-ended question (134.b)
investigate elites’ beliefs in electing the Prime Minister of Jordan, who is traditionally
appointed by the King, as one of His prerogatives. The question also triggers responses
touching on the absence of a Parliamentary majority in the Parliament structure. Elites’
beliefs in this change were assessed, and the results of (134.a) were 51% “no” and 49%
“yes” for the election of the Prime Minister. The majority of elites do not yet believe in
making this change; see Appendix D, Figure 7 and Table 15 and 16.
H1 is not supported as Chi-square, as the results do not show significance,
χ2 (2, N=100) =1.77, p=.414.
The majority of elites did not believe in the significance of this reform to the
transitional movement. These unprogressive beliefs indicate that the majority of elites are
approving of their regimes’ policies. Accordingly, the regime is congruent with elites’
political culture. Therefore, the results support H2.
Likewise, elites’ elaborations on electing versus appointing the Prime Minister
underlined their beliefs that “democracy in Jordan has not matured yet” or “not ready” for
implementing such changes to its political system. The most frequent three themes in
responding to the open-ended question (134.b) do not exemplify progressive beliefs. For
more details on thematic analysis see Appendix D, Table 17.
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Finally for this section, elites’ attitudes towards the seriousness of the
democratization process in Jordan are assessed in the open-ended question (135). For
details on the thematic analysis see Appendix D, Tables 20 and 21. The most frequent
themes are displayed below:

Table 4.1

Qualitative Analysis of the Jordanian Democratization Process
Deficiencies: Percentages of Elites’ Attitudes
Core Themes
Political Elites
Social Elites
Economic Elites
(N=65)

(N=23)

(N=12)

Rule of law system

42
64.6 %

14
60.9%

7
58.3 %

Social change

32
49.2%

16
69.5%

11
91.6%

Political development

27
41.5%

11
47.8%

6
50.0%

The three core themes are substantial for achieving a successful transition towards
democracy. The majority of political elites believe that Jordan still lacks for the rule of
law system, while the social and economic elites believe that the democratization process
is deficient because it lacks for a real social reform. The absence of the core themes
represents the void in the democratization process in Jordan. In order to overcome this
hindrance the Jordanian government must account for the implementation of rule of law,
allowing social change to flourish, and encourage political participation and political
development.
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The quantitative results for this section are summarized in the following table:

Table 4.2

H1:
Significant
Difference

Summary of Quantitative Data Analysis Results: Elites’ Political
Culture towards the Efficiency of the Political System
King’s
Prerogatives/
P.M. Election
vs.
Appointment
Not
Supported

Evaluating
Political
Systems

Rule of
Law
System

Democratic
Governance

Pluralism

Not
Supported

Not
Supported

Not
Supported

Not
Supported

Supported

Supported

SupportedSu Supported

Not
H2:
Congruence: Supported
Regime with
Elites’
Political
Culture

Elites’ Political Culture towards Freedoms & Civil Rights
The question (101) measures elites’ self-determination. Of those who believe in
having self-determination, 90.9% said that they are able to impact policymaking, while
only 9.1% said they do not. Chi-square results indicate significant differences: χ2 (2,
N=99) = .008, p < .05. For more details see Appendix D, Tables 22 and 23.
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Figure 4.1

Marginal means for elites’ self-determination and liberty
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According to cross tabulation table, there is a significant difference between the
social and political elites. Thus, the results support H1.
Elites’ beliefs in their self-determination and abilities to participate directly or
indirectly in policymaking are not unexpected under Jordan’s authoritarian regime and
government.
Therefore, the regime is congruent with elites’ political culture and the results support
H2.
Question (103.1) assesses the importance of the civil rights and freedom value in
the making of reform policies on a 5-point scale (1= extremely unimportant to
5=extremely important). The two highest ratings on the scale of 15% “extremely
important,” and 43% “important,” sums up to 58% of elites, and gives weight for this
value in the making of policies.
All elites’ values are similar according to one-way ANOVA indicating, F (2, 97)
= .194, p=ns. This result does not support H1. For more details, see Appendix D, Figure
10, and Tables 25 and 26.
Thus, the value of freedom and civil rights is considered “important” by the
majority of elites. These results of elites’ political culture suit the nature of the Jordanian
regime that is congruent with elites’ value of freedoms and civil rights; thus the result
supports H2.
The implementation of reform policies that allow having free access to
information is assessed in question (104.3) on a 6-point scale (1= very poor to 6=
excellent). The results indicate that 72% of the ratings were distributed among the highest
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three ratings: 28% “good,” 35% “very good,” and 9% “excellent.” Further, one-way
ANOVA indicates: F (2, 97) = .056, p=ns, with no significant difference between elites,
rejecting H1. See Appendix D, Figure 11, and Tables 27 and 28 for further details.
There is no blocking of certain cites or social media in Jordan. The majority of
elites believe that Jordan is relatively is a free country, and believe in the freedom of
information; therefore, the results support H2.
The ideological affiliations are evaluated in question (105) on a scale of three
ideologies: “liberal,” “independent,” and “conservative.” The majority of elites, 61%
described themselves as “liberal,” 20% “independents,” and 19% “conservatives.” For
the distribution of values, see Appendix D, Tables 29 and 30. Elites’ responses reflect
their liberal values ideologies.
Chi-square result: χ2 (4, N=100) = .032, p < .05. The results support H1. For more
details and descriptive statistics see Appendix D, Tables 32 and 33. The significance was
found between the political and social elites, as shown in the mean plot figure below.
Furthermore, the results indicate the importance of ideological freedom to elites.
There is no coercion under Jordanian political system. Despite the endeavors of some
influential elites to impose the ideology of “Jordan First,” Jordanians remain free to
affiliate themselves with other ideologies. This explains how the results indicated the
high percentage of liberals among the respondents. The results support H2, as the regime
is congruent with Jordanian elites’ values.
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Figure 4.2
ideological

Marginal means for liberal, independent, & conservative elites’
backgrounds with liberals being the highest
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The results of the findings of this section are summarized in the following table:
Table 4.3
Summary of Quantitative Data Analysis Results: Elite’s Political
Culture
towards Freedoms & Civil Rights under the Jordanian
Political Systems
Elites’ SelfDetermination

H1:
Significant
Difference

Supported

H2:
Congruence:
Regime with
Supported
Elites’
Political
Culture

Civil
Rights &
Freedoms
Value

Free
Access to
Information

Freedom of
Opinion:
Ideological
Affiliation

Not
Supported

Not
Supported

Supported

Supported

Supported

Supported

Elites’ Political Culture towards Public Sector Administrative Reform
The following group of questions measure elites’ attitudes towards the policies of
public sector reform, by rating the government on its implementation of a series of
reforms on a 4-point scale of (1= very unfavorable to 4= favorable). The first question
(106.1) measures the implementation of reform policies that ensure transparency and
accountability, and the second question (106.2) measures reforms of corruption control.
Cross tabulation results for transparency and accountability indicate a majority of
49% of attitudes that are “unfavorable” of this reform.
Besides, there is a majority of 52% of “unfavorable” attitudes towards the policy
of corruption control.
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The one-way ANOVA results indicate a significant difference: F (2, 97) = 5.21, p
< .05. Hence, a Chi-square was run to confirm this significant difference: χ2 (6, N=100)
=13.74, p = .033. There is a significant difference between the attitudes of political and
social elites towards transparency and accountability. Thus, H1 is supported.
Also, one-way ANOVA indicates a statistical significant difference between the
attitudes of the political and economic elites towards the policy of corruption control in
question (106.2): F (2, 97) = 4.52, p < .05. By running Chi-square test the significance is
confirmed: χ2 (6, N=100) = 15.55, p= .016.
Therefore, H1 is supported. For more details on these two significant results see
Appendix D, Tables 34 to 41.
The implementation of transparency and accountability and corruption control
was not taken seriously by the government; thus the absence of laws that regulate them
impaired the administrative and political development. The majority of elites demanded
the government to be more decisive in corruption control. Although elites’ criticism
expresses reformist attitudes, it confirms the negligence of those who occupy the high
incumbents in the Jordanian government. Therefore, the regime’s negligence is congruent
with elites’ attitudes towards transparency, accountability, and corruption control. The
results of all three questions support H2.
The following two figures of mean plots (Figure 4.3) and (Figure 4.4) display the
differences between the means of elites’ attitudes towards these two reform policies:
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Figure 4.3

Transparency and Accountability
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Figure 4.4

Corruption Control
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The result of question (106.5) indicates a majority of 43% of elites’ attitudes that
are “unfavorable” towards fighting nepotism. Besides, question (106.6) indicates a
majority of 58% of “neutral” attitudes towards implementing a merit system. For more
details see Appendix D, Figures 15 and 16, and Tables 42 to 45.
According to one-way ANOVA the result of fighting nepotism indicates: F (2, 97)
=.442, p=ns. And for enforcing a merit system: F (2, 97) =.229, p=ns. Both results from
both questions (106.5) and (106.6) do not support H1.
The nepotism in Jordanian public sector needs to be curtailed by enforcing a merit
system, but the government’s lack of seriousness in implementing reforms triggered elites
to criticize their government for letting this problem prevail. The results indicate
congruence between the regime and elites’ attitudes; thus, the results support H2.
According to question (108) results, the majority of elites do not value the
effectiveness of the “Financial Disclosure” corruption control law, as 45.2% rated this
value “ineffective” and 19.4% said it is “extremely ineffective.” This claimed
ineffectiveness exemplifies that elites’ possess more progressive values that would lead
to a real reform.
The one-way ANOVA result indicating no significant difference between the
means of elites’ values is: F (2, 90) = .113, p=.ns. This result does not support H1; for
more details see Appendix D Figure 17, and Tables 46 and 47.
These results are another confirmation on the government’s lack of seriousness in
imposing laws to end corruption. Most elites did not value this lack of seriousness, yet
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they remain responsible for it; therefore their values were found congruent with the
regime. The result supports H2.
Furthermore, results from the qualitative question (109) on administrative
development indicate that the most frequent theme across the three groups is “Improving
the individual’s performance,” “Applying the hiring codes and conducts,” and “Enforcing
transparency and accountability.” All elites agreed on these themes without any
significant differences. Elites’ elaborations are focused on improving the performance,
efficiency, and effectiveness of administrators and other public and private sector
employees by exposing them to new techniques and modernizing all procedures.
Therefore, this result indicates that most elites have reformist values. See Appendix D,
Tables 48 to 50, for more details on the qualitative thematic analysis.
The dichotomous question (110) of institution-building provides responses
indicating that it is either absent or incomplete. An equal percentage of 42.9% “no” and
42.9% “incomplete” is displayed in Appendix D, Tables 52 and 53.
Chi-square result: χ2 (4, N=100) = 10.93, p < .05confirms the significant
difference; 34.9% political verses 83.3% economic elites believe that institution-building
is incomplete. Thus, these results accept H1, as displayed in Figure 4.5.
The equal percentages of the “yes” and “no” answers, and the responses that were
in between, reduced the percentage of those who do not agree; hence this means that
there is congruence between the regime and elites’ political culture. The results support
H2.
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Figure 4.5

Institution-building
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In the qualitative question (111), asking elites what should be done in terms of
institution-building; the most frequent three themes are “seriousness in implementing
reforms,” “decreasing Royal Court authority,” and “enforcing democratic values.” For
more details, see Appendix D, Tables 54 and 55 for qualitative thematic analysis. The
lack of seriousness in implementing reforms can be the main reason behind the Royal
Court’s encroachment on other institutions in the political structure, which reflects the
dominance of non-democratic values and attitudes. These results confirmed that
institution-building is incomplete.
The results of the findings of this section are summarized in the following table:

Table 4.4

Summary of Quantitative Data Analysis Results: Elites’ Political
Culture towards Public Sector Administrative Reform
Transparency &
Accountability

H1:
Significant
Difference

Supported

H2:
Congruence
Supported
Regime
with Elites’
Political
Culture

Corruption
Control

Nepotism Merit
System

InstitutionalBuilding

Supported

Not
Supported

Not
Supported

Supported

Supported

Supported

Supported

Supported
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Elites’ Political Culture towards Political Participation: Political Parties,
Elections, and Lobbying
The effect of the previous political culture that banned political party activities is
assessed in the belief question (104.6) on a 6-point scale (1= very poor to 6= excellent).
The result indicates that there is still no change in encouraging political party affiliations
or activities by elites. The majority of elites are still holding on to the old culture; 52% of
their responses rated this reform “very poor” in addition to 35% “poor,” adding up to
87%; the total of elites who believe that the government’s reform policy of political party
activities is not constructive.
The one-way ANOVA indicates: F (2, 97) = .095, p=ns. There is no significant
difference between the means of elites’ beliefs. This result does not support H1; see
Appendix D, Figure 19, and Tables 55 to 57.
The majority of elites expressed a state of stagnation in regard to political parties
without expressing any interest in modernizing and reforming the institution of political
party. This political culture goes in harmony with the regimes’ policies that restrict the
activities of political parties. The regimen in this case is congruent with elites’ political
culture. Thus, the result supports H2.
The affiliation with the political party dichotomous question (119) indicated that
majority of elites do not value the political party affiliation. The cross tabulation test
indicates the following results: 89% “no” and 11% “yes.” See Appendix D, Figure 20 and
Tables 58 to 59.
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There are no significant differences between elites’ means according to Chisquare results confirmed this insignificance, indicating: χ2 (2, N=100) = 3.8 p=ns. Thus,
the results of elites’ attitudes do not support H1.
However, these attitudes agree with keeping the institution of political party in
stagnation. The regime policy and elites’ attitudes are in congruence; thus, these results
support H2.
The campaigning culture of political party and Parliament elections is assessed in
the value semi-structured question (121). The results indicate that 39.4% believe that the
used rhetoric during election times, which consist of slogans, mission and vision
statements are only “accepted by some people” and another 39.4% believe that this
rhetoric is a mere “propaganda.” Most elites were critical; they expressed disapproval of
the campaigning culture.
There is no significant difference between elites’ means. The one-way ANOVA
result indicates: F (2, 96) = .159, p =ns. This result does not support H1; see Appendix D,
Figure 21, and Tables 60 to 62.
The majority of elites criticized the campaigning culture and did not believe in its
effect or seriousness, claiming it as “mere propaganda” and “deceptive.” The result
confirms the lack of congruence between the regime and the majority of elites’ political
culture; thus, does not support H2.
The open-ended question (122) measures the reasons behind the weaknesses of
political parties. The most frequent three themes are “authoritarianism,” “absence of
programs,” and “past failures.” In their elaborations on these core themes, most elites
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expressed subordinate themes that explained their forward-looking perspectives, by
denouncing authoritarianism and its consequences, and representing a ‘reformist’
outlook. The political culture reflected in this question sounded progressive and liberal.
See Appendix D, Tables 63 and 64 for further details on the thematic analysis on the
weakness of political parties.
Likewise, the open-ended question (123) asked what attitudes should be taken
towards empowering and activating the institution of political party. Elites’ most frequent
core themes are: “reforming political parties,” “legislative amendment,” and “raising
awareness levels.” Most responses included liberal and democratic changes that were
never translated into real programs. See Appendix D, Tables 65 and 66 for further details
on the thematic analysis on strengthening political parties.
The one-man, one-vote law is an unprogressive law used by the government as
one of the tools to prevent the majority of the population from gaining political power in
proportion to their numbers. Elites’ beliefs in this traditionalistic law are measured in
question (124), on a 4-point scale of (1=strongly disagree to 4=strongly agree). The
majority of elites; 78.8%, strongly agreed that this law is traditionalistic. For more details
see Appendix D, Figure 22 and Table 67 to 69.
However, the one-way ANOVA indicates an insignificant difference: F (2, 96) =
.787 p=ns, which does not support H1.
The one-man, one-vote law empowered tribalism, and those who agreed with this
notion were the majority of the respondents, as 79% of elites consider this policy a

119

reactionary one imposed by the regime. Hence, the regime is not in congruence with most
elites’ political culture. The result does not support H2.
Elites’ attitudes are assessed towards lobbying in the dichotomous question (116).
The results proved that most elites practice lobbying, despite the authoritative nature of
the political system, and indicate that 82% of elites practice what they called
“unorganized” lobbying, which reflects elites’ democratic ideas.
Moreover, Chi-square result confirms a significant difference, indicating χ2 (2,
N=100) = 9.45, p < .05. These significant test results are proved between political and
economic elites. Accordingly, these results support H1. See Appendix D, Table 70 for
more details.
The political system of Jordan lacks some of the main elements of democratic
practices; thus elites’ responses were found part of the pervasive democratic rhetoric.
This rhetoric liberal political culture is congruent with the regime. The result supports
H2.
The following mean plot displays the difference between the means of elites’
attitudes:
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Figure 4.6

The practice of lobbying
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In a coupled semi-structured question (117), the respondents are provided five
democratic purposes: “to implement important changes;” “to pursue my democratic
values;” “to affirm pluralism;” “to participate in policymaking;” and “all the above.” The
total number of respondents for this question is 82; (N=82). The results indicate that
64.6% of the 82% of elites specified their reason by “all the above.”
There is no significant difference between elites’ means according to the one-way
ANOVA, indicating: F (2, 79) = .738, p=ns. The results do not support H1. For more
information see Appendix D, Figure 24 and Tables 71 and 72.
Elites’ responses confirmed their rhetoric liberalism that is congruent with the
regime. The result supports H2.
The results of the findings of this section are summarized in the following table:

Table 4.5

Summary of Quantitative Data Analysis Results: Elites’ Political
Culture towards Political Participation
Political
Party
Affiliation

Campaign
Culture

One-man
One-Vote
Legislation

Not
Supported

Not
Supported

Not
Supported

Supported

Not
Supported

H2:
Congruence:
Regime with
Supported
Elites’
Political
Culture

Not
Supported

Not
Supported

Supported

Supported

H1:
Significant
Difference

Lobbying

Lobbying
Reasons
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Social Development
Elites’ Political Culture towards Tribalism
The respondents used a 5-point scale of (1= extremely unimportant to
5=extremely important) to answer question (103.5). The results indicate that 64% of
respondents ranked the importance of tribal values in the making of policies “extremely
important.” Also, there are 17% of respondents who ranked this value as “important,”
which means that this traditional value undermines modernity, and is substantial for
policymakers.
The one-way ANOVA results indicates: F (2, 97) = 2.16, p=ns. The insignificant
difference between the means does not support H1. See Appendix D, Figure 26, Tables
76 to 78.
Tribalism has been used by the regime as a tool to pursue political agendas;
hence, policymakers that consider tribalism as a significant factor does not reflect a
progressive stance. The results support H2, as the regime in this case is congruent with
elites’ values.
The impact of tribalism on development is measured in question (126) on a 3point scale (positive; negative; and positive at times, negative at others). The majority of
elites believe that tribalism has a negative impact on political and social developments by
46% and 41% believe its impact is positive at times and negative at others.
The difference between elites’ beliefs is insignificant; as indicated by Chi-square
result:
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χ2 (4, N=100) =.659, p <ns. Thus, the results do not support H1. For more information
see Appendix D, Figure 27, and Tables 79 to 81.
Elites’ beliefs were not in favor of tribalism in this question. There were more
believers among elites in the negative impact of tribalism than the ones who believed in
its positive impact. The regime is not congruent with elites’ beliefs; thus the results do
not support H2.
Also, see Appendix D, Tables 82 to 84 for information on the open-ended
question (127). The tables display the thematic analysis of elites’ beliefs explaining why
tribalism impacts development in a certain way, and their responses revealed an
unprogressive political culture.
The influence of tribalism on elites’ political culture is evaluated in question
(128). Elites ranked their agreements on this influence on a 4-point scale: (1=strongly
disagree, 4=strongly agree). The results implied that 39.4% of the respondents answered
by “agree,” and 39.4% by “strongly agree,” to the statement of the question. Thus elites’
political culture is influenced by traditionalistic affiliations, which emphasizes their
cautious liberalism.
There is no statistical significant difference between the means of elites’ beliefs in
the tribal affiliation influence, as indicated by the one-way ANOVA: F (2, 96) = .436,
p=ns, which rejects H1. See Appendix D, Figure 28, and Tables 85 to 87.
Agreeing that tribalism influences the political culture of elites means that the
fluctuation in elites’ responses from previous questions can be explained on the basis of
their responses to this question. According to most respondents, tribalism impacts the
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making of policies, and elites agree that it does not have a positive impact on
development. Tribalism influences elites’ political culture; thus, the results from previous
questions as well as this question suggest that the regime is congruent with elites’
political culture, and supports H2.

Elites’ Political Culture towards Women Empowerment
Elites’ support verses opposition to women’s participation is measured in
question (115.a) on a 4-point scale (1=strongly oppose to 4=strongly support). The
strongly supportive are 78% for women’s political participation, 84% for women’s social
participation, and 81% for women’s economic participation. The empowerment of
women in Jordan is considered advanced, according to UNDP studies. For details on
these values see Appendix D, Figures 30 to 32 and Tables 91 to 94.
The one-way ANOVA results indicating; political participation F (2, 97) = .100,
p=ns; social participation, F (2, 97) = 1.24, p=ns, and economic participation (F (2, 97) =
.309, p=ns. None of the three results are significant; therefore, the results do not support
H1.
Elites’ responses about women empowerment and how women can be empowered
under the authoritative system and a Patriarchic society are not different from the
government’s policies. Therefore, the discrepancies in elites’ responses about women’s
participation in the three fields of development agree with the regime’s policies of
empowering women. The results show congruence between the regime and elites’ values;
thus the results support H2.
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More details are illustrated in the open-ended question (115.b). There are three
frequent themes that can negatively impact women’s empowerment: traditionalism, social
underdevelopment, and unconstructive media. There are no reformers among elites who
suggested a development plan to push the social development wheel and implement
changes to achieve higher levels of women empowerment and participation. See
Appendix D, Tables from 95 to 98 for further details on the thematic analysis on
women’s empowerment.

Elites’ Political Culture towards Participation in Voluntary
Organizations
Volunteerism is tested in question (104.5) on a 6-point scale of (1= very poor to
6= excellent). Government’s reform policy in the field of civic engagement and
volunteerism is ranked “poor” by 36% and “very poor” by 9% of elites. See Appendix D,
Figure 33.
The one-way ANOVA indicates: F (2, 97) =.041, p=ns. The insignificant results
confirm elites’ cautious liberalism, which in this case does not support H1. For more
information see Appendix D, Tables 99 to 101.
The majority of elites’ believe that the government hinders civic engagement and
issue laws that restrict all NGO activities, 45% of elites condemn this restriction and they
want their government to allow civic engagement, yet no actions were taken by elites to
minimize the interference of the security apparatus in the affairs and activities of NGOs.
These responses are in congruence with the regime; thus elites’ beliefs support H2.
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The following dichotomous question (129) assesses civic engagement by asking
elites’ about their involvement in nine different types of voluntary organizations:
(philanthropic organizations; syndicates; youth clubs; cultural institutions; sports clubs;
religious organizations; family associations; cooperative groups; and national or
international foundations). Involvement with cultural institutions registered the highest
percentage of 67%, followed by national and international foundations reaching 63%,
then the philanthropic organizations reaching 62%.
Thus, over 50% of elites are involved with some kind of nonprofit organization,
whether passively or actively as donors or participants. Jordan has a developing civil
society and the involvement degree and civic engagement is considered above average,
which represents a good level of “activeness” in the Jordanian society in spite of the
authoritarian political system. See Appendix D, Figures 34 and 35.
Only two affiliations tested statistically significant: the cultural institutions and
the national and international foundations, as Chi-square result: χ2 (2, N=100) = 11.091,
p < .05 for the cultural organizations, and Chi-square result: χ2 (2, N=100) = 9.809, p <
.05. Chi-square
for the national and international foundations, which support H1. See Appendix D, Table
103.
Elites’ affiliation with cultural, and national and international organizations was
expected to be high due to their positions. Elites’ affiliation with the cultural and national
and international organizations did not trigger any changes in laws that restrict civic
engagement in Jordan. The regime is congruent with elites’ political culture, and support
H2.
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Figure 4.7

Elites’ Involvements with Cultural Institutions
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Figure 4.8

Elites’ Involvement with National and International Foundations

There is no serious reform implementation to liberate civic engagement due to
authoritarianism and interference by the security apparatus. However, the results from
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question (130) specify more “no” responses to interference, than “yes” responses. Yet,
the 37% of “yes” responses added to 23% of “sometimes” responses equate to 60% of
elites approving of some kind of government interference in the affairs of the voluntary
organizations. Chi-square result: χ2 (4, N=100) = 4.883, p < ns, thus the results do not
support H1, but they support H2. See Appendix D, Figure 36, and Tables 104 and 105.
In addition, this interference is confirmed by results from the open-ended question
(131) demonstrating a one and only core theme of “authoritarianism and security
apparatus interference” by 56% of elites. In their responses, most elites asserted that
NGOs are not sovereign organizations due to several restrictive laws to their activities
and the interference of the security apparatus in the type of activities they do.
The results of the findings of this section are summarized in the following table:

Table 4.6

H1:
Significant
Difference

Summary of Quantitative Data Analysis Results: Elites’ Political
Culture towards Social Development
Importance
of
Tribalism

Tribalism
Influence

Women
Empowerment

Not
Supported

Not
Supported

Supported

H2:
Congruence:
Regime with Supported
Elites’
Political
Culture

Civic
Affiliation

NGOs
Sovereignty

Not
Supported

Supported

Not
Supported

Supported

Supported

Supported
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Economic Development
Elites’ Political Culture towards Economic Liberalization and Prosperity
Elites’ beliefs in prosperity are assessed in question (103.6) on a 5-point scale
(1=extremely unimportant, 5= extremely important). Elites’ responses imply that the
value of prosperity is 42% “important” and 25% “very important” for policymakers; a
total of 67% of importance. This value is expressed in the enthusiasm towards economic
liberalization in Jordan.
The one-way ANOVA confirms the insignificant difference indicating F (2, 97)
=.812, p=ns. The result does not support H1. See Appendix D, Figure 37 and Tables 106
and 107.
The Jordanian government encourages economic liberalization policies, but the
majority of elites elaborated on the economic liberalization question by emphasizing
Jordan’s high poverty and unemployment rates; particularly, in the suburbs. In their
responses most elites criticized their government on its economic liberalization policies
that did lead to ameliorating the standards of living in Jordan, which indicate that there is
lack of congruence between the regime and elites’ political culture. Thus, the results do
not support H2.
The economic liberalization is measured in question (104.4) on a 6-point scale of
(1= very poor to 6= excellent), through elites’ beliefs in the seriousness of the
implementation of economic reforms that lead to economic liberalization. The highest
percentage of responses is 42% “very good,” but 17% believe it is “excellent” and 23%
believe it is “good.” This implies that a total of 82% of elites believe that economic
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reform policy and economic liberalization are on the right track. See Appendix D, Figure
38.
There is no significant difference in the results of the one-way ANOVA indicating
F (2, 97) =.823, p=ns; thus, the result rejects H1. See Appendix D, Tables 108 to 109.
Most elites believe that the policies of economic liberalization and privatization
have led Jordan to economic development, which agree with what the Jordanian
government claims about the success of the economic liberalization policies.
Accordingly, the regime is congruent with elites’ political culture; therefore, the results
support H2.

Elites’ Political Culture towards Economic Development vs. Political
Development
Elites’ political culture towards the precedence of economic
development verses political development is tested in the semi-structured
question (132). The majority of Jordanian elites’ showed advanced attitudes
towards some of the government’s economic reforms that give economic
development precedence over political development. These attitudes are
demonstrated in the 67% of elite’s that are in favor of the “both developments
should occur simultaneously” option. See Appendix D, Figure 39 and Table 112.
The result of one-way ANOVA indicating no significance; F (2, 97) =.939, p=ns,
thus the result undermines H1 and H2; see Appendix D, Tables 113 and 114.
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Elites’ political culture towards economic liberalization and development is
enhanced in the open-ended question (133) that inquires about the chosen development
plan and gave the respondents a chance to elaborate on Jordan’s economic development
in general. Elites’ most frequent three core themes are (political and economic stability;
reinstatement of freedoms, and economic development). See Appendix D, Table 115 for
themes’ frequencies.
Accordingly, 64% of elites believed that when both developments occur
simultaneously they enhance each other and ensure growth and the achievement of higher
productivity, as some elites added in their elaborations. This enhancement will lead the
country to political and economic stability. Elites’ core and subsequent themes reflect a
reformist view. See Appendix D, Table 116 for the thematic analysis of core and
subordinate themes, and Table 117 for the frequency of the core themes distributed in
percentage.
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The results of the findings of this section are summarized in the following table:

Table 4.7

H1:
Significant
Difference

Summary of Quantitative Data Analysis Results: Elites’ Political
Culture towards Economic Development
Prosperity
Value

Economic
Liberalization

Economic
Development
Policy

Not
Supported

Not
Supported

Not
Supported

Not
Supported

Not
Supported

H2:
Congruence: Not
Regime with Supported
Elites’
Political
Culture

134

Discussion
This section addresses the issue of whether research findings add to or change the
understanding of Jordanian elites’ political culture by discussing findings from the
analyses of the four research questions: 1) The description of Jordanian elites’ political
culture; 2) The significant differences among the three groups of elites; 3) The centers of
influence among Jordanian elites; 4) The congruence level between the regime and elites’
political culture.
Elaborated data was gathered in response to the open-ended questions;
particularly for the neutral, standard, or uncertain responses to some closed-ended
questions. During the interviews, the abundance of data that was registered was taken
under the researcher’s consideration to be used in the analyses, which helped in making
the studied inferences that guided the discussion of the results.
The findings in the first section of political development portray elites’ values,
beliefs, and attitudes towards a number of political development issues: The type of
political system; the supremacy of rule of law; democratic governance; pluralism; and the
election of the Prime Minister.
In their evaluations for the different political systems, the majority of elites
expressed their inspirations and enthusiasm towards constitutional monarchy. They
claimed to value the parliamentary democratic political system rather than their
authoritative system that is ruled by an ultimate power. They also emphasized their
beliefs in the supremacy of rule of law, real pluralism, and democratic governance.
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Despite the claims made by most elites about their incompatibility with their government,
elites’ political culture was found congruent with the regime.
Elites’ denunciation and criticism of the regime and their government’s policies
were expressed throughout the interviews, particularly while answering the open-ended
questions.
Thus, in their elaborations on the open-ended question (135) elites comments and
elaborated explanations benefitted both the data gathering and data analysis processes.
Most elites, particularly the ones who participated in the National Charter Convention
(1990) condemned the government for paralyzing the National Charter, which had it been
applied, Jordan would have witnessed serious implementation of reforms and a great
enhancement to all developmental activities.
The Arab Barometer study (2006) indicated that there is a high percentage of
73.5% of respondents who agreed to the following statement: "The democratic system
has its problems, but it is better than any other." Also, in the Arab Barometer study, only
12.3% disagreed to the same statement.
In addition, most elites elaborated on the government’s deficiency in achieving
democratic governance and for lagging behind in achieving successful coordination
processes that delay the delivery of social service in the country.
Similarly, the results confirm the absence of real pluralism, as most elites said that
they did not believe that forces like the political parties, entrepreneurships & businesses,
NGOs, unions, decision making groups, pressure groups, and powerful personalities can
participate in governance. Jordan is a regime led state, as described by Lucas (2004).
Thus, the regime maintains the exclusive right to define pluralism and decides which
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forces should be restricted and deemed outside the boundaries of its accepted pluralism.
The government’s pluralism is coherent with Linz’s theory of authoritarianism (1964),
which suggests pluralism under authoritarian regimes is only social pluralism.
Nevertheless, the results from the question that inquired about the King’s
prerogatives indicated that the pattern that took place at the very beginning of data
gathering was contradicted with elite’s responses on this particular question. Most elites
justified their positions of not sounding liberal in answering this question by emphasizing
that democracy in Jordan has not matured for implementing this particular reform. Thus,
their expressed beliefs that the King must practice all his prerogatives including the
appointment of the Prime Minister underline Wiktorowicz’s argument of the façade of
democracy (1999). More importantly, these beliefs were found to go in coherence with
John Locke’s theory of “Cautious Liberalism” stating that revolutionary and progressive
values, beliefs, and attitudes that lead to major changes in the political structure can cause
political degeneration and major changes in the status quo of the holders of power under
that political system.
The result of the qualitative questions confirmed the values, beliefs, and attitudes
of elites which they expressed about the type of political system and its characteristics
which they mainly criticized and considered non-democratic.
In summary, most of the quantitative and qualitative results in the first section
indicate that Jordanian elites’ values, beliefs, and attitudes towards the type of political
system, rule of law, democratic governance, and pluralism suggest that they have a liberal
political culture. Yet, in order for them not to jeopardize their tenures or security, they
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stayed guarded in regards to the implementation of one of the most important issues that
cause political underdevelopment.
The analyses of the second group of political development responses indicate that
elites’ political culture has appreciation for freedoms and civil rights. The results indicate
that Jordanian elites appreciate having self-determination that enable them to make or
impact policies, freedoms and civil rights; access to information; and freedom of opinion
and ideological affiliation. In addition, the results support the fact that they highly value
civil rights and the liberal ideologies. They were also hopeful in having more freedom
and access to information. Jordanian elites showed interest in expressing their ideological
backgrounds that were different from the regime’s ideology of “Jordan First,” which was
adopted by very few elites.
Democracy exists if citizens are free and their rights are not restricted or violated,
and vise versa; although on one hand, some of these results do not agree with the
Freedom House rating that considers Jordan “Not free.” On the other hand, Jordanian
elites took liberal stances by showing their eagerness to accomplish more advances in the
realm of freedoms and civil rights, in order to keep Jordan ahead of its neighboring
countries. More importantly, elites expressed a liberal political culture that is coherent
with the democratic rhetoric of the regime. By the same token, the Arab Barometer study
(2006) shows that 38.8% of Jordanians believe that disrespecting human rights for the
sake of security is "not ever justified" and rejected the encroachment by the security
apparatus, whereas 12% said it is "justified to a large degree." These results emphasize
the government’s encroachment on human rights; for the sake of security.
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The third section discusses the results of elites’ political culture towards public
sector reform. This section measures the quantitative and qualitative results of elites’
political culture towards transparency and accountability, corruption control, nepotism,
merit system, administrative development, and institution-building. According to
Transparency International Index, the overall perception of corruption in Jordanian public
sector has worsened; it rated 46/177 and fell to 66/177 in 2013. These results are also
confirmed by Jreisat (as cited in Jabbra, 1989) explaining the obstacles that hinder
administrative development in Jordan. Elites’ attitudes towards enforcing transparency
and accountability, as well as corruption control were “unfavorable” towards the
government’s implementation of this reform. Elites expressed criticisms of the
government’s enforcement of the Financial Disclosure law. There is value in the expected
consequences of this law, as it was ratified to hold administrative officials accountable
and maintain transparency, yet the lack of seriousness in its enforcement rendered this
law an ineffective tool in the combat of corruption. Likewise, most elites’ attitudes were
“unfavorable” towards the implementation of reforms that end nepotism. The majority of
elites denounced the rampant phenomenon that is known as “Wasta,” which means
nepotism, cronyism, favoritism, and patronage.
Institution-building is another reform that was assessed through the political
culture of elites who expressed reformist values, beliefs, and attitudes in what ought to be
done to accomplish a complete and successful institution-building process in Jordan.
Most elites’ comments on the open-ended question regarding institution-building
elaborated on the empowerment of institutions that takes place by enhancing their system
of equilibrium of rules, norms, and beliefs and improving their capacity in the
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implementation of reforms. Furthermore, they emphasized the need for a public
administration strategy to strengthen the Jordanian institutions and to increase efficiency
levels in order to meet the requirements of Jordan’s transitional period which is still
deficient in Jordan. Wiktorowicz (1999) blamed authoritarianism for the deficiency of
institution-building. Similarly, the majority of elites referred this underdeveloped
situation of institution-building to the nature of the monarchical regime and the different
roles which the institution of the Palace and the Royal Court play, as they believed that
these institutions infringe on all other institutions in the country and interfere with their
equilibrium that affects their development. The process of institution-building in Jordan
is struggling to develop.
The qualitative results and elites’ elaborations emphasized the significance of
several enterprising values, which notes that their absence lowers the efficiency levels of
all workers. They showed eagerness in fighting corrupt norms in all their organizations,
such as “Wasta.” The low efficiency levels in the public and private Jordanian
organizations can be treated by the following reform plan: the assignment of training
programs for improving the performance of individuals; strict enforcement of a merit
system to hire on the basis of KSAs, codes, conducts, and by-laws; and for transparency
and accountability to hold officials accountable to the public. In the open-ended question
on institution-building, the result indicated that most elites have shared the following
themes: seriousness in implementing reforms, decreasing Royal Court authority, and
enforcing democratic values. Again, the seriousness in implementing reforms remains
critical to the development process.
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The fourth section is concerned with political participation and Jordanian political
parties. The Jordanian parties have been undeveloped institutions since their
establishment. The parties have been unacceptable political institutions in Jordan and
were never supported by the regime that claims parties as obstacles to democratic
development. The Jordanian political parties are conflicted with alleged tendencies and
they are centered on personalities rather than programs. Most elites and the Jordanian
public are still averted with this reputation. The results display a high percentage of elites
who avoid having any affiliation with political parties. Elites’ beliefs in having
affiliations with political parties are considered illiberal, submissive, and reactionary,
since the party affiliation among elites has remained extremely low. Further, the party
institution is considered incapable of forming effective parliamentary blocs, which has
negatively reflected on the parliamentary elections and their campaigning culture. Most
elites refused the campaigning rhetoric; as it is considered propaganda, or used to serve
the interests of some individuals. The campaigning culture is discouraging to the
Jordanian intelligentsia and to the younger generation; therefore, responding by selecting
the abovementioned two options is considered progressive due to the importance of these
options to the reformation process.
The legislations of organizing political parties and parliamentary elections are
another important factor for controlling and restricting these institutions. The one-man,
one-vote law is a traditional and conservative law imposed by the regime to empower
tribalism and to keep the institutions of political party and the Parliament weak and
incapable. The Arab Barometer (2006) study results revealed that there are differing
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levels of confidence among Jordanians in their public institutions. The results indicated
that 56% of the people are "confident to a large degree" in the General Security forces,
followed by the courts at 40%, then the Prime Minister at 27%, and the Parliament at
19%, and finally political parties with only 10 percent. Similarly, this study’s results did
not show high levels of confidence among elites in the Parliament and political parties.
Lobbying is a democratic practice that is informally performed by Jordanian elites
who believe in its effect, although they operate under an authoritarian political system.
The majority of elites said that they practice lobbying to participate in policymaking,
influence the policymakers, and to pursue democracy.
The qualitative results defined elites’ beliefs in the reasons that contribute to the
weakness of political parties and their attitudes towards reforming and activating the
party institution in Jordan. According to elites’ beliefs, the weaknesses of the party
institution are: authoritarianism, absence of programs, and political parties past failures
that led to their destructive reputation. Political parties remain the best way to deliver
democracy; therefore, elites were asked to elaborate on a reform plan. However, most
respondents were focused on the deficiencies of the available political parties and did not
have a reform plan that can activate the dysfunctional party institution due to the
authoritarian regime that restricts freedoms, and the absence of the royal decree that
allows the reformation process. The core themes of reform, as mentioned by elites are:
reforming the party institution, empowering democratic values to allow political
participation and guarantees freedoms and rights, amending legislations to negate the
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flawed party legislations, raising the public awareness levels about the party institution,
and allowing parties to have programs, recruit efficient leaders, and build popular bases.
Collectively, the political parties and the Parliament in Jordan remain weak
institutions. This policy is described by Brynen as a step toward liberalization without
real political development. Keeping the institutions of Parliament and political parties
under the control of the state hinders democratization and political development (1998).
Jordanian elites have expressed very liberal values and their responses were focused on
criticizing the government, yet they are part of the government and part of the regime that
they were criticizing. It can be inferred that Jordanian elites’ political culture could not
help them to get rid of their fears. Thus, they were described as cautious liberals.
The results of social development are discussed in three sections. First, the
importance and consideration of tribal values in the making of policies; tribalism is
another sensitive issue that generates inconsistencies in elites’ responses. As displayed in
the one-man, one-vote legislation, tribal values are very important not only to the regime,
but also to the most influential elites. Oudat and Alshboul (2010) state that tribalism has
been used by the regime as a tool to serve some Jordanians and their political interests;
thus, those elites who emphasized the negative impact of tribalism express a progressive
political culture. Using tribalism to serve a certain political agenda is an undemocratic
practice that leads the society to conflicts.
The most frequent core themes on tribalism’s effect on development are: causing
degeneration and regression, causing confusion in loyalties, and enhancing development
by playing a role in protecting the national security. Two themes underlined the negative
effect of tribalism, while the third theme was positive. However, the positive theme was
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the less frequent theme, which confirms that using tribalism as a tool to pursue certain
political agendas by the regime has a negative impact on development.
The second section under social development is women empowerment. There was
no opposition to women’s participation in the political, social, and economic fields
among Jordanian elites. However, most elites supported women’s social and economic
participation more than their political participation. The level of women’s political
participation in Jordan was 7 percent to 16.9 around the world. Therefore, Jordan depends
on the quota system to raise women’s representation in the Parliament. Women’s quota
has been recently raised to 12 percent. Nevertheless, the UNDP studies on Jordan
consider the participation of Jordanian women in the three fields is restricted by
numerous obstacles and challenges. The qualitative results from elites’ elaborations on
this issue confirm the impact of tribalism and traditional social norms on women’s
participation. In addition, the Jordanian society, particularly in the suburbs, is
Patriarchical and hierarchical. This impacted the social identities of women who tend to
be more dependent on male figures in their family relations. These challenges affect the
policymaking under Jordan’s political system that is described by Hudson as a patriarchic
and traditional political system (1977). The status of women is taken under the
consideration of different international studies on Jordan. Several elites referred to these
studies and disagreed with their findings. They do not consider women in Jordan to be
less liberated than other women in the world. One of their core themes referred to the role
of destructive media as a reason for any alleged deficit in women’s participation.
Although volunteering is carried out through nonprofit organizations, it is also
valuable for governments. Volunteerism supplements several services that governments
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provide. It is necessary for several communities in Jordan, but the lower incomes and
standard of living makes volunteers look for paid jobs instead of seeking volunteer
opportunities. The result that assessed elites’ value of volunteerism points out their
inflexible outlook towards this value. Particularly, the lack of governmental subsidies
illuminates any urgency in taking steps to promote volunteerism or to allocate budgets to
fund volunteer programs. Financial hardship is present among both the government and
the population in general, which limits peoples’ will to volunteer. These results were not
expected from the majority of elites who were responding as liberal activists through the
survey because through voluntary organizations activists can mobilize the grassroots of
the society (Wiktorowicz, 1999).
In their assessment for the sovereignty of their nonprofit organizations, most elites
condemned their government for its interference in the affairs of the governmental
organizations. As a matter of fact, in accordance with Kamrava’s theory, the
authoritarian government of Jordan and its security apparatus politicize the activities of
most NGOs in Jordan in order to put restrictions on most of their activities (1998).
Hence, Jordanian elites realize that the nonprofit sector in Jordan is not considered free.
As they also know that the only permissible activities are the charitable ones. Yet,
Jordanian elites’ political culture does not indicate their willingness to amend the policy
that restricts NGOs’ activities, or to activate civic engagement that creates social
harmony and builds social trust.
Elites’ values, beliefs, and attitudes towards economic development confirmed
their appreciation for economic growth to achieve prosperity and higher living standards.
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Therefore, the results indicated their enthusiasm to liberate their economy and achieving
economic liberalization. Although Jordan has taken bigger steps than other countries in
the region towards economic liberalization, the government’s economic reform policies
have lagged behind. According to the Human Development Index (HDI) Jordan’s
current economic status has not achieved better poverty and unemployment rates and
most Jordanians do not have a prosperous living.
Therefore, most elites condemn their government on its economic policies. They
criticized the privatization policies that led to privatizing Jordan’s most important
national resources. Most elites critiqued the government’s policies of economic
liberalization that lack for regulations and laws that should be promulgated to protect the
national economy, as most elites consider the absence of government surveillance in the
government’s economic liberalization policies led did not lead the country to economic
liberalization, but widened the gap between the haves and have-nots and increased the
levels of poverty and unemployment.
The third issue is the policy of economic development. This assessment
essentially measures elites’ beliefs in the interconnected relationship between economic
and political reform. The majority of elites believe in the interconnectedness between
these two developments. They emphasized that neither form of development should be
separate of the other. This is because underdeveloped economic issues impact political
development, and political underdevelopment can in turn hinder any economic growth.
Although Jordan has grown economically, due to a lack of democracy and political
participation in decision-making, economic development remains threatened. Freedoms
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remain to be a vital factor for both forms of development to succeed to their full
potential. If freedoms and rights are guaranteed under the Jordanian political system, the
poverty and unemployment levels would drop and the economic growth rate would in
turn rise.
Accordingly, most elites denounced the precedence of economic liberalization
over the political liberalization. In response to the first research question, the results of
elites’ political culture on economic development contrast with the regimes economic
liberalization policies, as they ruthlessly criticized their government for the privatization
of several public sector entities. However, elites’ criticisms of the government’s
economic policies have remained rhetoric.
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Chapter 5: Main Conclusions
In response to the four research questions and their two hypotheses, this chapter
offers valuable insights into Jordanian elites’ political culture. It provides illustrations on
elites’ most crucial challenge, imposed by the centers of influence that impacts their
values, beliefs, and attitudes and their pursuits of achieving liberalization,
democratization, and development. It displays the main conclusions and inferences from
the analyses by describing the political culture of Jordanian elites; explaining the scarce
significant differences among elites’ three groups; elucidating the centers of power
concerned with elites’ political culture; and defining the regimes’ congruence with
Jordanian elites’ political culture.
In consummation, the limitations of this study will be discussed, and the
following three areas will be addressed in the implication section: to decide whether
theory, research, and practice of the findings are consistent with selected theoretical
framework or not; if the study helps in advancing the research methodology, issues of
measurement, and research design; and finally, on the practical level, how the findings
are anticipated to add to this field and to lead for changes in interviewing elites in
authoritarian political systems.

1) Description of elites’ political culture
In response to the first research question, the results indicated a certain pattern in
elites’ political culture. In the first section of questions on political development, most
elites expressed democratic, progressive, and advanced values, beliefs, and attitudes
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towards a type of political system, supremacy of rule of law, democratic governance, and
pluralism. All the results that were inferred from the analysis of this group of questions
indicated that elites’ political culture contrasted with the reform policies of the regime or
the approaches which the regime adopted in the implementation of reform policies. For
example, continuously criticizing the government on its lack of seriousness in reform
policy implementation and explaining with much elaboration the reasons behind their
criticisms showed the difference in the way they think versus the reality of the stagnant
political development in Jordan. Many aspects of political development such as the
supremacy of rule of law can be superseded by tribal laws, which defeats one of the main
pillars of a modern state. The analysis of the last quantitative question in this section that
inquired about the King’s prerogatives confirmed that the majority of Jordanian elites’
liberalism on which they elaborated appeared to be more timid than progressive in certain
areas. Unfortunately, this particular reform remains vital for the transitional movement
towards liberalization, democratization, and development. This is because the transition
from an authoritative monarchical political system to a constitutional monarchical
political system contradicts with the notion of the ultimate power that accompanies
authoritarianism. However, Jordanian elites’ beliefs revealed a sentiment of fear of real
change and they showed inability and weakness in achieving a constitutional monarchy
that is anti-royalist and anti-ultimate power. Therefore, on the basis of these results,
Jordanian elites can be described as cautious liberals whose political culture does not
really vary from the pervasive democratic rhetoric of Jordan.
In the second section of the analysis, Jordanian elites responded by evaluating a
number of freedoms and rights such as the freedom of self-determination, civil rights,
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freedom of access to information, freedom of choice, and freedom of affiliation with
certain ideologies. The analyses show that elites’ values, beliefs, and attitudes were
inconsistent with liberalism. They expressed a dynamic ability in affecting policy-making
in Jordan, in considering the value of civil rights and freedoms in the policy-making,
maintaining Jordan’s leading position in the freedom of accessing information, and more
importantly in their ability to express their ideological affiliations despite the regime’s
endeavors to emphasize its ideology “Jordan First.” The results of the ideological
background question indicated that the majority of Jordanian elites described themselves
as liberals.
In the third section of the analysis, the Jordanian elites’ political culture towards
public sector reform followed a reformist pattern on all questions in this section. All of
the results indicated that Jordanian elites were capable of diagnosing one of the most
important deficiencies that can cause underdevelopment on the political, administrative,
economic, and social levels which is corruption. Elites showed a progressive political
culture in fighting this developmental ailment as well as fighting nepotism and the
absence of transparency, accountability, and a merit system. This reformist stance most
elites took accentuates their liberal values, beliefs, and attitudes and their eagerness to
have serious implementation of reforms on the political, administrative, and social levels.
This inference stems from the analysis of their responses to all the questions in this
section.
Moreover, elites’ attitudes towards institution-building reform reflected their
understanding of the requirements necessary to achieve serious reforms that would lead
to development. Most authoritarian regimes take bits and pieces of the reform plans and
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avoid the institutionalization of these reforms in order to delay any possibility of a change
in their status quo. Nevertheless, the majority of Jordanian elites’ political culture
towards institution-building emphasized the presence of a progressive political culture.
The fourth section assesses elites’ political party affiliation, evaluates the
weakness of political party institution, political party reform, the one-man one-vote
election law, the practice of lobbying, and elites’ reasons for lobbying. The analysis of
this section on political development puts more emphasis on Jordanian elites’ liberal
political culture that can be better described as rhetorical liberal culture. It is known that
political parties and parliament institutions are the vehicles for political participation
under the democratic political systems. However, the political party institution under the
authoritative political system of Jordan was paralyzed and put under austerity measures
that banned all their activities for decades. As mentioned in the literature review chapter
of this study, Jordan represents a mixed system of representation that uses pluralism to
stabilize authoritarianism as pluralism eases the pressure in society by allowing the
masses to vent. The austerity measures of the ruling regime buttress an invisible form of
authoritarianism. Therefore, the institutions of political parties and parliament are to
remain weak institutions through the promulgation of laws that restrict their activities or
hinder democracy such as the one-man one-vote law. Furthermore, such laws promote the
campaigning culture that enhances the democratic rhetoric and façade.
By the same token, the practice of lobbying under the authoritarian regime of
Jordan is another example of superficial democratic practices in an atmosphere that lacks
political parties, parliament majorities, and fair and free elections. Therefore, Jordanian
elites’ political culture towards political development highlighted many symptoms that
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hinder liberalization, democratization, and development due to the fact that this political
culture is deficient and incapable of implementing real reforms.
Likewise, Jordanian elites’ political culture towards the importance of tribalism as
a value for policy-makers and tribalism influence on political and social development,
women empowerment, civic affiliation, and NGO sovereignty also indicated a similar
cautious political culture that underlined the problems of underdeveloped social situations
without presenting any solution. For instance, Jordanian elites’ values, beliefs, and
attitudes condemned the regime’s use of tribalism as a tool to pursue certain political
agendas, yet they would consider filling the gap that the regime created by curtailing the
activities of political parties by tribes and tribal affiliations. In addition, some elites
consider tribalism to be a substantial phenomenon for political and social stability. The
analysis shows that Jordanian elites expressed their political culture with modern and
liberal language, yet they simultaneously reveal traditionalistic and conventional
thinking.
In the field of women empowerment, liberalism and modernity followed the
conventional mentality that is proportionate to the regime’s policies of women
empowerment. Their ideas are suitable for the regime’s policies; however both men and
women after all, are Jordanian citizens ruled by the same authoritarian political system. If
men are not empowered, then women are not empowered. Under an authoritarian
political system, all citizens are not empowered because political participation remains
restricted. Therefore, Jordanian women will remain only empowered to a certain extent
under the current authoritarian regime.
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Civic engagement and the affiliation with cultural national and international
organizations are subject to several restrictive rules enforced by the government to curtail
and restrict all the activities of the nonprofit organizations and keep them under the
control of its security apparatus. The abundance of nonprofit organizations in Jordanian
society can be confusing to some because to have over 6,000 nonprofit organizations in a
lightly populated country is alarming. However due to the lack of democracy and strict
supervision of the regime and security forces, these nonprofit organizations will remain
toothless; particularly with cautious liberal elites.
The analysis of the economic development field underlined a political culture that
sounds radical, yet incapable of enforcing and implementing real economic liberalization
that would tighten the gap between the haves and have-nots in the society and help
ameliorate the economic situation in Jordan. Elites’ political culture sounded extremely
enterprising and reformist, but the majority of elites expressed that unless change comes
from the institution of the palace, there will be no real implementation of reforms.

2) Significant Differences
The purpose of this analysis and the hypothesis testing was to look for different
patterns among elites’ values, beliefs, and attitudes to assess whether the three groups of
elites are different in their political culture or not. The analysis of results concluded that
there are very few significant differences between the means of the three groups of elites.
The first section of the analysis on political development indicated no significant
differences between the means of the three groups. However, the second and third

153

sections contained some significant differences between the political culture of one group
and the political culture of the other two groups.
The absence of significant difference stresses the similarity among the values,
beliefs, and attitudes of the three groups of Jordanian elites, which implies that there is a
strong consensus among the values, beliefs, and attitudes of the political, social, and
economic Jordanian elites towards liberalization, democratization, and political, social,
and economic development.

3) Jordanian Elites Political Culture Concerning the Centers of Power in
Jordan
Most of elites’ responses to the open-ended questions consisted of a repeated term
of the “Old Guards.” There is a strong belief among Jordanian elites that the main culprit
for the country’s stagnant state of development is the influence and power of the Old
Guards whose grip on the country and all its institutions has been tightened and supported
by the institution of the Palace. Most elites believe that the monarchical system
guarantees the political and social stability in the Jordanian society that has a greater
majority of Palestinians. Thus, most elites believe monarchy balances both components
of the society believe it should be sustained.
Some East Bank elites expressed their beliefs very loudly by criticizing the most
influential elites who are in the center of power and considered them the most responsible
for the deterioration of the liberalization and development movement.
The Old Guards are mainly the army generals, highly ranked security apparatus
officers, some of the ex- Prime Ministers, and other influential tribal members who
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occupy high incumbents in the government and the Royal Court. These influential
figures are in the center of the Jordanian elites’ strata; they were criticized and
condemned throughout the interviews for all the deterioration and stagnation in Jordan.
The Old Guards hinder the progress of development through their positions in the
security forces. According to the majority of elites, they are the ones to be blamed as they
thwart any endeavor of serious reforms that might weaken their influence and powerful
grip.
Some of the literature that studied the Jordanian case explained who the Old
Guards are and how they have become since the establishment of the state in the center of
power. The patron-client relationship has taken place between the Old Guards and the
King through a series of bargains and mutual interests that resulted in a similar situation
for both sides. Each side depends on the other, and each side defends the existence,
strength, and legitimacy of the other. Using tribalism as a tool for the pursuit of certain
political agendas, the empowerment of the East Bank Jordanians, the discrimination
against the West Bank Jordanians, emphasizing the political culture of “Jordan First,” and
the creation of social factions are methods used by the regime for enhancing the power
and influence of the Old Guards over the rest of the society. This political culture is
justified by the Palace and is considered the backbone of Jordan’s social and political
stability.

4) The Congruence between the Regime and Elites’ Political Culture
The analysis of these results indicated that most Jordanian elites have expressed
criticism of the government’s reform policies and lack of seriousness in the
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implementation of reforms which led to the deterioration of the liberalization,
democratization, and development. Most of the elites, who condemned the regime and
the Old Guards for the stagnant situation in Jordan, are themselves responsible for this
deterioration, as they occupy the highest incumbents in the government and army.
Additionally, some of them were Ex-Prime Ministers or Ex-security apparatus highly
ranked officers.
The criticism did not provide alternatives or agendas for correcting
underdevelopment, but rather illuminated all the flaws without a plan or mechanism for
improvement. This criticism was destructive and did not offer any solutions for how the
country can aim to get on the right track for liberalization and democratization. Whether
these figures who made critiques of the situation where legislators, ministers, political
party leaders, or CEOs in the private sector, they are all actually the participants who play
the main role in Jordanian governance. At the beginning of each interview, each of these
figures expressed that they enjoy their self-determination and ability to make policies or
impact policy-making; hence their criticism suggests that they themselves are the culprit.
Conclusively, this is the reason why the analysis suggests that the regime is
congruent with the political culture of Jordanian elites and in most cases, H2 was
supported. This confirms that Jordanian elites are weak legislators, explaining why they
are cautious liberals and reformers. The passivity of their stances implied great fear in
any change to the political system which would jeopardize their positions in the
government or negatively affect their rankings.
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Limitations
One of the potential limitations of this study is in its methodological premise. In
accordance with Putnam’s (1971) study on elite political culture and ideology, this study
underlines the sophisticated and complex political belief systems of political leaders that
cannot be justified by crude techniques of survey research design. The cruder techniques
of a survey design, for instance, cannot do justice in perceiving the subtleties and nuances
in elites’ responses to various political issues. This becomes critical when analyzing and
understanding their philosophies. Everything they say adds weight to the precision of
critiquing their values, beliefs, and attitudes. This is the reason why elite theorists who
studied elites’ political culture reflected on the consequent methodological difficulties
and provided a solution for overcoming this difficulty by linking the problem to
psychoanalytic techniques. So the “true” insights and what demonstrably “feels true” can
create a validity dilemma. This necessitates a method of inquiry that is cable of drawing
these conclusions without doing any injustice to the validity of data. However, this
dilemma remained without a perfect solution.
Accordingly, the researcher’s fundamental methodological premise of this study
on Jordanian elites’ values, beliefs, and attitudes was to communicate with them
systematically by listening carefully to their responses and additional elaborations, which
they tended to make even while responding to the closed-ended questions. As explained
in Chapter 3 of this study, in an attempt to avoid any possible injustice to the validity of
the gathered data, the researcher used paraphrasing as a method to confirm respondents’
answers and additional comments by repeating their words back to them. This allowed
the researcher to receive feedback to confirm the internal validity of the gathered data.
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Furthermore, the nature of the Jordanian political environment that is subject to
the authoritarian government and political system is another potential limitation of this
study. The limitations that are a consequence of this nature made it difficult for elites to
criticize the regime and its policies. This resulted in having to design the questionnaire
according to this political environment. The consequences of designing the questionnaire
this way presented themselves in both the closed- and open-ended versions of the
question. This is because operating under an authoritarian regime comes with
implications that high governmental officials approve of the regime’s approach to
governance. Thus, elites were hesitant at first when voicing true thoughts and beliefs
about the government. They persistently required confirmation that their identities were
to remain anonymous for this study and that their names would not be published in any
work.
The very first question in the survey asked elites if they personally have any
impact on policymaking. The purpose of designing the survey so that this question was
asked first was to measure their self-determination in making and implementing policies.
The goal was also for them to define their own responsibilities. Formulating the questions
and translating them from English to Arabic as suggested by Jordan University’s Center
for Strategic Studies (CSS) aided in ensuring the reliability and internal validity of the
research. The accuracy and precision of the data were heavily taken under consideration
of the researcher through the coding process of qualitative data.
When the following questions asked about the administration or the government,
it was implied that the questions asked the elites about themselves personally, as they are
the policymakers who are representing the government. Designing some of the survey
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questions indirectly aimed to prevent elites from responding with “I don’t know” or
rejecting the question altogether.
The imbalance among the three groups of elites, as explained in Chapter 3, is not
a limitation, but it is due to an imbalance in the population. The numbers of elites who
belong to the three groups were 65/23/12. This imbalance was uncontrollable and had its
reasons, as the governmental incumbencies were granted by the King to certain
intelligentsia members or to prominent economic elites. In this case, the prominent
economic elites who have become members of the Senate would classify themselves as
political elites rather than economic elites. Therefore, the disproportionate sample of this
study represents the disproportionate distribution in the population.
Another limitation is that when elites were asked dichotomous questions that
could be answered with “yes” or “no,” many strayed away from these two options and
instead would answer with “sometimes.” Similarly, when they were asked to describe a
situation as “positive” or “negative,” many would respond with “sometimes negative and
sometimes positive.” Because of the high frequency of receiving this middle-point
response, this option was added to all surveys and considered in the scale during the
analysis.
In terms of the external validity of this research, this case study of political culture
of Jordanian elites who operate under the monarchical authoritarian political system can
be generalized to other elites’ political cultures operating under presidential or sheikhdom
political systems in the Arab region. Whether the country is under a presidential system
or a sheikhdom, they operate similarly to a monarchical regime. The other common
factor is authoritarianism which prevails in the Arab region. This is in addition to the
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similarity of the culture in general among all Arab nations which impacts the values,
beliefs, and attitudes of their policymakers. This creates a similar political culture for
Arab elites. Thus, this study does not lack for generalizability.
It can be argued that these limitations did not override the findings, including the
unexpected and insignificant ones. The sensitive issues and subjects under the
authoritarian monarchical regime highlighted the importance of activating the
liberalization and democratization transition by triggering the policymakers and people
who have the most influence on the progression of development in Jordan to take a more
assertive role.

Implications
The available literature on elites’ political culture provides minimal insight into
the values, beliefs, and attitudes of Jordanian elites. This study fills this gap by the
existing consistency between the selected theoretical framework and its results. It
provides answers for the research questions on the bases of its theoretical foundation. The
response of the first research question that is concerned with political elites describing
their political culture consists of their values, beliefs, and attitudes, and confirms all
inferences that strongly support Locke’s “cautious liberalism” theory.
First, on the basis of the theoretical foundation of this study, the instability of
political order in Jordan remains precarious; especially when considering the slow
process of liberalization, democratization, and development. Therefore, the regime,
particularly the “Old Guards,” or the East Bank elites who benefit from this stagnation
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are responsible for causing constant anxiety about the possibility of political degeneration
caused by change.
The lack of harmony in John Locke’s political theory echoes Jordanian elites’
values, beliefs, and attitudes which they expressed when responding to the survey
questionnaire. They answered with ambivalence due to their duel tendencies towards
change. In all of their responses to questions that presented a more developed political
system, elites were pro change and seemed extremely liberal; yet in response to questions
that discussed implementing prime changes, they expressed conservatism by showing
their reluctance to change. These types of passive-aggressive leaders who are more
inclined to preserve the political order are largely responsible for the delayed journey
towards liberalism and development.
For instance, the initial expectation that interviewing a group of conservative
elites would yield conservative responses was not met, as elites responded quite liberally.
The questionnaire consisted of certain sensitive questions which led elites to be critical of
the regime and the government of which they are affiliated. However, the successful
survey design enabled the researcher to overcome this limitation. As a result, the
researcher collected an abundance of data expressing a progressive and reformist political
culture, which did not meet the initial expectation. Nevertheless, the responses that
articulated liberal values, beliefs, and attitudes were altered when the questions asked
about changes in the King’s prerogatives or the issues that would lead to changes in the
political system. This alteration in the expressed political culture did not meet the second
expectation.
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Some of the elites were more liberal than others, while the conservative “Old
Guards” among them were the reluctant ones to any change in the political system. Those
elites from the Old Guards are the promoters of authoritarianism, tribalism, patriarchy,
the notion of “Jordan First” that deepens the social faction in the society, and intolerance.
Thus, they fight against any change in the regime or the political system because it will
lead to changes or put limitations in their privileges. They thwart reforms such as
corruption control and consider the endeavors of activating civil society organizations or
the institution of a political party an external or foreign interference that is threatening to
their national security. Therefore, these institutions get deactivated by the use of the
security apparatus suppression. As a consequence, the existence of the “Old Guards”
lowers the activists’ ceiling of liberalization and makes their mission more challenging.
In addition, the weakness of the state and its institutions remain the main reasons
behind elites’ apprehensions, feelings of insecurity, and ambivalence, as they fear what
change will bring them; including the more liberal elites. As a matter of fact, most liberal
elites in Jordan have been calling for a constitutional monarchy. There is a demand
among the Jordanian intelligentsia for ending authoritarianism. However, most liberals in
Jordan are not advocating for change in the monarchical system. On the contrary, they are
calling for altering the rule from an authoritarian monarchy, where the power is
ultimately in the hands of the King, into a constitutional monarchy ruled by rule of law.
Hence by valuing a political system that contradicts with their existing political system,
and ranking it “very suitable” was surprising, particularly after they expressed
conservative beliefs towards other reforms that would make such a change in their
political system possible.
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The conclusion can be drawn that Jordanian elites are cautious liberals, fitting
with Locke’s theory of ‘cautious liberalism.’ They opt for liberalism and democratization
and for changing the status of authoritarianism in their political system, but remained
fearful of the consequences of promoting changes in the political system, or expressing a
political culture that is anti-Royalist.
Further, the interpretation of the findings implies, on one hand, the type of
relationship between the authority patterns of the monarchical authoritarian political
system and its regime that is materialized in its elites. On the other hand, the authority
pattern of the various social units is incorporated in the general public and their different
institutions and organizations. This relationship reflects the level of congruence between
the two patterns of authority (Eckstein, 1998). The congruence theory contributes to
understanding the political culture of Jordanian elites by understanding their performance
level and their capability to be in agreement with their constituents from the general
public and their different institutions that require governance.
The elites are part of the executive organizations of the state; thus they participate
in making and implementing policies and are responsible for the achievement of good
governance. This, according to Cheema, entails the coordination of “complex
mechanisms, processes, relationships, and institutions through which citizens and groups
articulate their interests, exercise their rights and obligations, and mediate their
differences by allocating and managing all resources to respond to collective problems.”
If the authority patterns of the government are congruent with the authority patterns of all
other units in the society, the government performs well.
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Accordingly, achieving good governance would improve the congruence in the
relationship between two authority powers of the Jordanian state and society. The ability
of elites to defeat the obstinate and underdeveloped political culture will help Jordan in
this struggle and push the development wheel forward. This happens when all forces
coordinate and collaborate to achieve stability of the political system through balanced
interactions and relationships among all conflicting and consensual parties, or active and
passive ones. This conductive environment, according to the theory, enhances the
stability of the political system; while the authoritative or totalitarian authority patterns
hinder the transition towards democracy and the stability of the political system.
However, the findings from elites’ attitudes towards the lagging situation of
democratic governance and their criticism of the implementation of reforms that lead to
this accomplishment confirms the government’s low performance level. In other words,
the relationship between authority patterns of the state, government, regime, and their
Jordanian elites and the authority patterns of the society forces and institutions is lacking
congruence.
In capsulation, the state in Jordan, which is built on its regime, stabilized itself by
allocating privileges for East Jordanians and depriving the rest of the society from the
same privileges, creating disparities and factions. This contradicts with the second
hypothesis of the congruence theory that suggests that the government can achieve high
performance if its authority patterns are capable to make a balance among its disparities.
As mentioned earlier, the Old Guards are the most influential elites whose interests are
served by creating factions and disparities and by putting the spikes in the liberalization
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and democratization wheel. They are the conservative elites who carry reactionary
values, beliefs, and attitudes.

Conclusion

On the basis of these results and the theoretical foundation of this study, the
Jordanian elites’ cautious liberal political culture does not place enough urgency on
implementing serious reforms and changes to enable Jordan to achieve liberalization,
democratization, and development. In addition, the requirements for achieving good
governance are compound and multifaceted. The achievement of coordinated complex
processes remains the chief challenge that all Jordanian authority patterns of both the
state and society can face during the transitional period towards liberalization,
democratization, and development. The findings signified that Jordanian elites’ cautious
liberal political culture; the consensus among the three groups of elites due to the scarcity
of significant differences among them; the rhetorical liberalism of elites’ political culture
concerning the centers of power; and the congruence between the regime and Jordanian
elites’ political culture are all factors that contribute to the continuation of this stagnant
state, which Jordan has been struggling to end.
Further, these findings provide a new perspective that emphasizes on the mutual
relationship that exists between the most influential centers of power under Jordan’s
political system being, the King and the East Bank internal elites, and describes the
political culture of Jordanian elites, illustrating the discrepancies between their claimed
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values, beliefs, and attitudes and their real political culture that remains congruent with
the regime’s policies of liberalization, democratization, and development.
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Geographical Location & Map of Jordan
Map 1.1

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan
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Appendix B
Demographics: Social and economic statistic of a human
development

Figure 2.1

Population Growths in Jordan 2012-2013
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Transjordanian Tribes

Map 2.1

Origins of East Bank Elites
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Table 2.1

GNI per capita / PPP from 1989 to 2012

Country

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

Jordan

2,260

2,270

2,060

2,420

2,510

Egypt

2,180

2,310

2,410

2,540

2,620

Morocco

1,740

1,890

2,040

1,980

1,950

Syria

1,890

2,070

2,240

2,540

2,660

Country

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

Jordan

2,600

2,750

2,770

2,870

2,930

Egypt

2,760

2,920

3,090

3,280

3,400

Morocco

2,180

2,040

2,310

2,270

2,460

Syria

2,970

3,120

3,160

3,040

3,230

Country

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

Jordan

3,010

3,230

3,420

3,550

3,690

Egypt

3,590

3,810

3,970

4,020

4,160

Morocco

2,470

2,530

2,760

2,870

3,090

Syria

3,060

3,120

3,320

3,480

3,530

Country

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

Jordan

4,070

4,450

4,860

5,330

5,660

Egypt

4,370

4,630

5,210

5,540

5,940

Morocco

3,310

3,500

3,840

4,020

4,270

Syria

3,830

4,080

4,270

4,510

4,600

Country

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

Jordan

5,820

5,750

5,870

5,980
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Egypt

6,130

6,300

6,290

6,450

Morocco

4,410

4,580

4,840

5,060

Syria

4,760

4,800

5,120
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Figure 2.2

GNP Growth Rate
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Services: Tourism and Health Sectors

Tourism is one of the Kingdom’s largest export sectors. It enhances the national
economy and GDP rates. Tourism is Jordan’s second largest private sector employer and
the second highest producer of foreign exchange contributing more than $800 million to
Jordan’s economy and accounts for approximately 10% of the country’s GDP. Further,
the health industry is one of the most important in Jordan’s economy. According to
Jordan’s Private Hospital Association site, due to Jordan’s rapidly developing
international reputation for high quality, affordability and internationally competitive
healthcare costs, its medical tourism is on the rise. There are nine Joint Commission
International (JCI) accredited hospitals. Over 250,000 patients travelled to Jordan in 2012
and the number is growing each year.
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UNDP: Human Development Index (HDI)

United Nations Development Program (UNDP) tracks the economic health of a
country from a human development perspective using the human development index
(HDI); a composite of statistics of life expectancy, education, and income indices, and
introduces these indices to view the potential human development level by ranking
countries into different tiers. According to the UNDP report (2013), Jordan’s HDI level is
0.700, which comparatively ranks Jordan’s human development level as medium on a
global scale. However, in comparison to other Arab countries in the regions, Jordan’s rates
of education, literacy, and measures of social well-being are relatively high. The
macroeconomic stability that has been achieved since the 1990s is one of the most
important factors in the government’s efforts that contribute to the improvement of
Jordanian citizens’ well-being.
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Figure 2.3

Economic Liberalization and Freedom
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Appendix C
Human Subjects, Informed Consent, & Survey questionnaire

The Positions of the Survey Participants
The table below provides the list of positions held by the Jordanian elites, who
participated in the survey.
Table 1 Political, social, & economic elites’ positions
_______________________________________________________________________
Elites’ Positions

N

________________________________________________________________________
I. Political

65

I.1 High-level Governmental Positions
I.1. a) Present & ex-prime ministers & ministers

11

I.1. b) Present & ex-Parliament members

16

I.2. Political Parties
1.2) Leaders & Secretaries General

08

I.3) Administrations & Bureaus of Ministries & Divisions
I.3.a) Trustees & under secretaries

07

I.3.b) Administrative & Bureau Executives & G.Ms

11

I.4. Unions & Syndicates
I.4) Unions & Syndicate Secretary General

12

184
________________________________________________________________________

II. Social

23

II. Intelligentsia
II.1) University Professors

10

II.2) Writers

10

II.3) NGO Leaders

03

________________________________________________________________________
III. Economic

12

III Business
III. 1) CEOs
III.2) Business Chairs

Total

08
04

100

185

Informed Consent
You are invited to participate in a research study conducted by Laila Huneidi from
Portland State University, Public Administration and Policy. The researcher hopes to learn
about the centers of influence and elites’ political culture towards liberalization,
democratization, and development in Jordan. This study is being conducted in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for a doctoral degree, and it is under the supervision of a
specific faculty member at PSU. You were selected as a possible participant in this study
because you belong to the top officials in the Jordanian government.
If you decide to participate, you will be asked to sign an informed consent form,
answer oral interview questions, and answer a short closed-ended questionnaire. All the
activities can be done in one appointment if your time allows, or I can come back for the
interview. Your answers are extremely valuable to my study, which its result will benefit
the country in its transition toward democratization and will benefit all decision makers
in the country and the rest of the Jordanian public. I can come to your office when your
time allows for the interview and I will not take much of your time. I will take notes of
your answers and there will be no audio- or videotaping through the whole meeting.
While participating there will be no risks. All the activities will be anonymous and your
identity will be kept confidential through the whole study. There will be no obligation to
answer any of the questions if you chose not to answer.
Any information that is obtained in connection with this study and that can be
linked to you or identify you will be kept confidential, or otherwise in a paper, thesis,
dissertation, journal or newspaper article, on the web or in a presentation, a statement
must be added to that effect. If information will be released, it will be released for
educational purposes in a class lecture or for completion of a dissertation that will be
presented for a committee from Portland State University professors. There will be no
disclosure of names or identities and this information will be kept confidential during the
data collection and data analysis stages by using a special coding system that I have
created particularly for data storage procedures.
Your participation is voluntary. You do not have to take part in this study, and it
will not affect my PhD or my relationship with Portland State University. You may also
withdraw from this study at any time without affecting my PhD or my relationship with
Portland State University.
If you have concerns or problems about your participation in this study or your
rights as a research subject, please contact the Human Subjects Research Review
Committee, Office of Research and Sponsored Projects, 111 Cramer Hall, Portland State
University, (503) 725-4288 / 1-877-480-4400. If you have questions about the study
itself, contact Laila Huneidi at 0779930099.
Your signature indicates that you have read and understand the above information
and agree to take part in this study. Please understand that you may withdraw your
consent at anytime without penalty, and that, by signing, you are not waiving any legal
claims, rights or remedies. The researcher will provide you with a copy of this form for
your own records.
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Signature

Date
Survey Questionnaire

A Survey on the Values, Beliefs, &Attitudes of Jordanian Elites towards liberalization, Democratization
& Development
Application Number:
Interviewees Information
I. Interviewees
I.1. High-level Governmental Positions
I.1. a) Present & Ex-Ministers
I.1. b) Present & Ex-Parliament members
I.2. Political Party Leaders & Secretaries General
I.2.a) Arab Land Party
I.2.b) Al-Ahed Party
I.2.c) Jordan Communist Party
I.2.d) Jordan Green Party
I. 2.e) Mission Party
I.2.f) Islamic Center Party
I.2.g) The Islamic Action Front
I.2.h) National Action Party (Haq)
I.3. Ministries, Bureaus and Administration Divisions
I. 3.a) Under Secretaries & Trustees
I.3.b) Administrative Executives
I. 3.c) Bureau & Division General Managers
II.1. Syndicates
II.1.a) Syndicate Secretary General
II.2.b) Union Secretary Generals
II.3.c) NGOs Leaders
II.2. Intelligentsia
II.2.a) University Professors
II.2.b) Writers
III. Business
III.a) CEOs
III.b) Business Chairs
II. Interview Date
Research Procedures
Researcher Name : Laila Huneidi
Coding Date
:
Data Entry Date :
Interview Results:
1. Completed Interviews :
l___l
2. Rejected Interviews
:
l__l l__l
__________________

Date :

l___l l___l
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101. Do you think you currently have or have had any impact on policymaking in Jordan?
0.
1.
5.
6.

No (go to Q. 103)
Yes
Don’t know (go to Q. 103)
No response (go to Q. 103)

l__l

102. As a policymaker, or as someone who has/had an impact on policymaking, to what extent do you
believe that your political goals are/were accomplished?
1. Not at all
2. To a little extent
3. To a moderate extent
4. To a large extent
5. Don’t know
6. No response

l__l

103. As a policymaker how do you rank the importance of the following values in the making of reform
policies?
(1 = Extremely unimportant, 2= Unimportant, 3 = Somehow important, 4= Important , 5 = Extremely
Important)
Values Significance
Other Concerns
1. Civil rights & freedoms
1
2
3
4
5
98. Don’t know
l__l
________________________________
99. No Response

2. Social reform through schools curricula
1
2
3
4
5
_________________________________

98. Don’t know
99. No Response

l__l

3. Economic independence of women
1
2
3
4
5
_________________________________

98. Don’t know
99. No Response

l__l

4. Religious values
1
2
3
4
5
_________________________________

98. Don’t know
99. No Response

l__l

5. Tribal values

98. Don’t know
99. No Response

l__l

1
2
3
4
5
_________________________________
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6. Prosperity values
1
2
3
4
5
_________________________________

98. Don’t know
99. No Response

l__l

104. How would you rate the quality of the reform implementation by the current administration?
(1 = Very poor, 2 = Poor, 3 = Standard, 4 = Good, 5= Very good, 6 =Excellent)

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

Implementation Level
Reforming bureaucratic procedures (through modernizing the
administrative statutes)
1
2
3
4
5
6
_________________________________

Other Concerns
98. Don’t know
99. No Response

l__l

Supremacy of rule of law/ level of implementation
1
2
3
4
5
6
_________________________________

98. Don’t know
99. No Response

l__l

Free access to information technology
1
2
3
4
5
6
_________________________________

98. Don’t know
99. No Response

l__l

Economic liberalization
1
2
3
4
5
6
_________________________________

98. Don’t know
99. No Response

l__l

Empowering volunteerism
1
2
3
4
5
6
_________________________________

98. Don’t know
99. No Response

l__l

Unrestricted policies freeing political party activities
1
2
3
4
5
6
_________________________________

98. Don’t know
99. No Response

l__l

105. Describe yourself ideologically

1. Liberal
2. Independent
3. Conservative

l__l

189

106. On a scale of 1-6, how do you favor the implementation of the following reforms by the Jordanian
government:

Reforms
1.

Unfavorable
2

Neutral
3

Favorable
4

I don’t
know
5

NR
6

Transparency &
accountability

2.

Corruption control

3.

Cooperation with
the private sector
Cooperation with
the
Nonprofit
sector

4.

Very
unfavorable
1

5.

Fighting nepotism

6.

Merit system

LI
LI
LI
LI

LI

LI

107. In Jordan the relationship between the public and private sectors and civil society in the delivery of
public services is lagging behind.
1. Disapprove
2. Uncertain
3. Approve
l__l l__l

108. How do you value the effectiveness of the ‘Financial Disclosure Law’ to ensure accountability and
transparency?
1. Extremely ineffective
2. Ineffective
3. Moderately effective
4. Effective
l__l
5. I don’t know
6. No Response

109. Can you mention the three most important administrative reforms that would lead to higher efficiency
and productivity levels?
l__l l__l l__l
l__l l__l l__l
l__l l__l l__l
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110. Institutionalization is a required stage in administrative development. Do you think the
institutionalization process in Jordan has been successful?
0. No
1. Yes
2. Incomplete Process
5. Don’t know
6. No response

l__l

111. How does the institution-building lead to reform and development?
l__l l__l l__l
l__l l__l l__l
l__l l__l l__l

112. The following are models for political systems of some countries in the Middle East. Pick the most
suitable for Jordan and rate its suitability on the below scale from 1-6:
Not
Somewhat
Very
Don’t
No
Political Structures
Suitable
Suitable
Suitable Suitable Know Response
1
2
3
4
5
6
1. Parliamentary system that allows
the nationalist, Islamic, and left
and right wing parties to compete
in transparent and impartial
parliamentary elections
2. Parliamentary system that allows
only the Islamic parties to
compete in parliamentary
elections
3. Authoritarian system controlled
and ruled by an ultimate power
and authority without consent or
consideration for opposing views
4. A system ruled by Islamic
Shari’ah without any type of
elections or political parties

113. In light of your response to question 112, can you expand on your views regarding the political system
that will best solve the problem of administrative corruption in Jordan?
l__l

114. What is the type of economic system that suits Jordan the most and presents solutions for the high
levels of unemployment and poverty?
l__l
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115.a Rate your support or opposition to women’s participation in the political, social, and economic
development.
Strongly Somewhat Moderately Strongly Don’t
No response
Oppose
Oppose
Support
Support Know
Type of Contribution
6
1
2
3
4
5
1. Political participation

I___I

2. Social participation

I___I

3. Economic participation

I___I

115.b If you support women’s participation in the three fields, why do you think the participation of
Jordanian
women is lagging behind?
l_l l_ll_l

116. Have/had you ever practiced formal or informal lobbying to influence members of Parliament?
0. No (proceed to Q. 118)
1. Yes
5. Don’t know (proceed to Q. 118)
l__l
6. No response (proceed to Q. 118)

117. What were your reasons for lobbying?
1.
To implement important changes
2.
To pursue my democratic values
3.
To support Pluralism
4.
To participate in policymaking
5. All the above

l__l

118. ‘Pluralism’ is the participation of all political forces in governance. Does pluralism exist under Jordan’s
authoritative monarchical political structure?
0. No
1. Yes
5. Don’t know
l__l
6. No response

119. Are you affiliated with a political party?
0. No (proceed to Q. 121)
1. Yes
5. Don’t know

l__l
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6. No response
120. Which political party, do you think, has the most dedicated leadership?
____________________________________

121. How do you describe the different mottos, missions, and vision statements as depicted in the
campaigning culture of political parties and Parliament members?
1. Appealing and engaging to most Jordanians
2. Appealing and engaging to some Jordanians
3. Neither appealing nor engaging
4. Used as campaign propaganda
5. I don’t know
6. No response

l__l l__l

l__l

122. What are the reasons behind the weakness of political parties in Jordan?
1.
2.
3.

____________________________________
_____________________________________
_____________________________________

l_l l_ll_l
l_l l_ll_l
l_l l_ll_l

123. State three elements that would activate the party system and empower political parties
1. _____________________________________
2. _____________________________________
3. _____________________________________

l_l l_ll_l
l_l l_ll_l
l_l l_ll_l

124. The one-man, one-vote law empowered tribalism at the expense of the partisan structure of the
Parliament and weakened political party and Parliament institutions. Please indicate your level of
agreement.
1. Strongly disagree
2. Disagree
3. Agree
4. Strongly agree
l__l
5. Don’t know
6. No response

125. Is it true that Parliament members stay connected and follow through with their promises to their
constituencies and communities after the elections?
0. No
1. Yes
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5. Don’t know
6. No response

126. In what way do you think tribalism impacts the political and social developments in Jordan?
1. Positive
2. Negative
3. Positive at times and negative at others
5. Don’t know
6. No response

l__l

127. Why?
1. ________________________________________
2. ________________________________________
3. ________________________________________

l__l l__l l__l
l__l l__l l__l
l__l l__l l__l

128. Elites’ tribal affiliations have influence on their political culture. What is your agreement level with
this
statement?
1. Strongly disagree
2. Disagree
3. Agree
4. Strongly agree
l_l
5. I don’t know
6. No response

129. Have you participated, donated, or done any voluntary work, or become a member of any of the
following voluntary organizations?
Type of NGO
Yes
No
1. Philanthropic institutions
2. Syndicates
3. Youth clubs
4. Cultural organizations
5. Sports clubs
6. Religious organizations
7. Family associations
8. Cooperative groups
9. National or international foundations
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130. Does the government interfere in the affairs of nonprofit organizations?
0. No (proceed to Q. 132)
1. Yes
2. Sometimes
5. Don’t know (proceed to Q. 132)
6. No response (proceed to Q. 132)

l__l

131. Tell me about the government’s interference in the affairs of nonprofit organizations?

________________________________________
________________________________________
________________________________________

l__l l__l l__l

132. Do you think economic and political developments should occur together, or one should take
precedence because it fosters the other?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

The economic development should take precedence
The political development and civil liberties should take precedence
Both developments should occur simultaneously
Neither, both are imposed by external powers
Don’t know
No response

l__l l__l

133. Why do you think this is a better development plan for Jordan?

________________________________________
________________________________________
________________________________________

l__l l__l l__l

134.a Do you believe the Prime Minister should be elected from a Parliament majority?
0. No
1. Yes
5. Don’t know
6. No response
134.b Why or why not?
________________________________________
________________________________________
________________________________________

l__l

l__l l__l l__l
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135. Democracy is not merely a motto; it is a way of life that serves and empowers citizens under a rule of
law system. It assures freedoms, protects citizenship rights, and guarantees the occurrence of regular,
competitive, transparent, and fair elections while practicing the two freedoms of choice and press.
According to the above definition of democracy, how do you view the transitional process to
democracy in Jordan?

1. ____________________________________
2. _____________________________________
3. _____________________________________

l_l l_ll_l
l_l l_ll_l
l_l l_ll_l
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Appendix D
Descriptive Statistics Tables and Figures

(Q. 112)

Democratic Governance: Political Systems

Figure 1

The suitability of a pluralistic parliamentary democratic political
system
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Figure 2

The suitability of an authoritarian political system ruled by an
ultimate power

(Q.112.1)

One-way ANOVA results for pluralistic parliamentary democratic
political system

Table 1

Pluralistic parliamentary democratic by three groups of elites
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SS

df

.307

2

.153

Within groups

66.333

97

.684

Total

66.640

99

Between groups

Mean Square

F
.224

P
.800

F (2, 97) = .224, p=ns.

(Q. 112.3)

Authoritarian with ultimate power

Table 2

Authoritarian Political System by three groups of elites
SS

df

.108

2

.54

Within groups

9.532

97

.98

Total

9.640

99

Between groups

Mean Square

F

P

.549

.579

F (2, 97) = .549, p=ns.

(Q. 112.4)

Religious non-parliamentary

Table 3

Religious non-parliamentary rules with Shari’ah by three groups of elites
SS

df

.048

2

.024

Within groups

8.862

97

.091

Total

8.910

99

Between groups

F (2, 97), =.265, p =ns

Mean Square

F

P

.265

.768
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Table 4

Four political systems suitability: Mean (SD) of by three groups of elites

Four political systems by
Three Elites Groups

Mean (SD)

N

Political Elites

3.57 (.829)

65

Social Elites

3.61(.839)

23

Economic Elites

3.42 (.793)

12

Political Elites

1.00 (0.00)

65

Social Elites

1.00 (0.00)

23

Economic Elite

1.00 (0.00)

12

Political Elites

1.08 (.367)

65

Social Elites

1.00 (.000)

23

Economic Elites

1.08 (.289)

12

Political Elites

1.05 (.372)

65

Social Elites

1.00 (.000)

23

Economic Elites

1.00 (.000)

12

1. Parliamentary democratic

2. Parliamentary Islamic

3. Authoritarian ruled by an
ultimate power

4. Religious non-parliamentary
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Table 5

Suitability percentage of four political systems – Cross Tabulation

Four Political Systems by
Three Groups of Elites

Not
Suitable
N (%)

Somewhat
Suitable
N (%)

Suitable
N (%)

Very
Suitable
N (%)

1. Pluralistic Parliamentary
Democratic
Political Elites
Social Elites
Economic Elites
Total %

4 (6.2%)
1 (4.3%)
0 (0.0%)
5 (5.0%)

2 (03.1%)
2 (08.7%)
2 (16.7%)
6 (06.0%)

12(18.5%)
2 (08.7%)
3 (25.0%)
17(17.0%)

47 (72.3%)
18 (78.3%)
07 (58.3%)
72 (72.0%)

2. Parliamentary Islamic
Political Elites
Social Elites
Economic Elites
Total %

65 (100%)
23 (100%)
12 (100%)
100(100%)

0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0

3. Authoritarian Ruled by
an ultimate Power
Political Elites
Social Elites
Economic Elites
Total %

62(95.0 %)
23(100. %)
11(91.0 %)
96(96.0%)

1 (01.5%)
0
1 (08.3%)
2 (02.0%)

2 (3.1%)
0
0
2 (02.0%)

0
0
0
0

4. Religious non
Parliamentary
Political Elites
Social Elites
Economic Elites
Total %

64 (98.5%)
23 (100%)
12 (100%)
99 (99.0%)

0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0

1 (1.5%)
0
0
1 (1.0%)
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(Q. 113)

In addition, the subsequent belief question, question (113) investigated

the best political system type for solving Jordan’s political and administrative challenges.
The theme with the highest frequency reported by the three groups of elites was the
“Democratic Parliamentary Pluralistic” political system.
(Q.104.2)

The Implementation of Rule of Law

Figure 3

Beliefs in the Supremacy of Rule of Law System by Three Groups of

Elites
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Table 6

Rule of Law by three groups of elites
SS

df

5.43

2

2.716

Within groups

136.12

97

1.403

Total

141.56

99

Between groups

Mean Square

F

P

1.935

.150

F (2, 97) = 1.94, p=ns.

Table 7

Rule of Law Means (SD)

Three Elites Groups

Mean (SD)

N

Political Elites

3.32 (1.566)

65

Social Elites

3.22 (1.087)

23

Economic Elites

4.00 (1.091)

12

Total

3.38 (1 .196)

100

The following table displays the N and percentage values for elites’ beliefs and a
detailed distribution for the six ratings
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Table 8

Rule of Law Supremacy – Cross Tabulation

Beliefs in Rule of Law Supremacy
Three Elite Groups

N

%

Political Elites

65

65%

Very poor

4

6.2

Poor

13

20

Standard

22

33.8

Good

12

18.5

Very good

12

18.5

Excellent

2

3.1

23

23%

Very poor

1

4.3

Poor

4

17.4

Standard

10

43.5

Good

5

21.7

Very good

3

13

Excellent

0

0

12

12%

Very poor

0

0

Poor

0

0

Standard

5

41.7

Good

3

25

Very good

3

25

Excellent

1

8.3

Social Elites

Economic Elites

Total

100

100%
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(Q.106.3)

Democratic governance: the coordination between public & private
sectors

Figure 4

Attitudes towards the public/private sectors
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Table 9

Public/private coordination by three groups of elites
SS

df

Mean Square

F

P

.070

2

.035

.089

.915

Within groups

38.090

97

.393

Total

38.160

99

Between groups

F (2, 97) =.089, p=ns.

Table 10

Attitudes towards Public/Private Coordination –Means (SD)

Three Elites Groups

Mean (SD)

N

Political Elites

2.74 (.644)

65

Social Elites

2.70 (.635)

23

Economic Elites

2.67 (.492)

12

Total

2.72 (.621)

100
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(Q 106.4)

The Coordination between public & nonprofit sectors

Figure 5

Attitudes towards the public/nonprofit sectors
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Table 11

Public/nonprofit coordination by three groups of elites
SS

df

Mean Square

F

P

.860

2

.430

.962

.386

Within groups

43.380

97

.447

Total

44.240

99

Between groups

F (2, 97) =.962, p=ns

Table 12

Attitudes towards public/nonprofit coordination – Means (SD)

Three Elites Groups

Mean

N

Political Elites

2.22 (.673)

65

Social Elites

2.39 (.583)

23

Economic Elites

2.08 (.793)

12

Total

2.24 (.668)

100
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(Q. 107)

Coordination among the three sectors

Figure 6

The three sectors effectiveness in delivering services
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Table 13

Beliefs in democratic governance progress – Means (SD)

Three Elites Groups

Mean (SD)

N

Political Elites

2.34 (.567)

65

Social Elites

3.35 (.487)

23

Economic Elites

2.50 (.522)

12

Total

2.36 (.542)

100

Table 14

Attitudes towards democratic governance – N(%) – Chi-square
Agree %

χ2

37 (63.8%)

25(64.1)

.654

0 (0.0%)

15 (25.9%)

8 (20.5)

Economic

0 (0.0%)

6 (10.3%)

6 (15.4)

Total

3 (3%)

Three Elite Groups
Total
Political

Disagree %
3 (4.6%)

Social

100
χ2 (4, N=100) = 2.44, p = .654.

Uncertain%

58 (58%)

39 (39%)
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Q. 134.a)

King’s Prerogative vs. Electing the Prime Minister

Figure 7

Electing verses appointing the Prime Minister
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A one-way ANOVA test was used to check if there is any significant difference
among the three means.
Table 15

Electing verses appointing the Prime Minister Means (SD)

Three Elites Groups
Political Elites

Mean (SD)
.46 (.502)

N
65

Social Elites

.61 (.502)

23

Economic Elites

.42 (.502)

12

Total

.49 (.502)

100

Table 16

Electing verses appointing the Prime Minister – N(%) – Chi-square

Three Elite Groups
Political

No %
35 (53.8%)

Yes %
28 (46.2%)

Social

9 (39.1%)

14 (60.9%)

Economic

7 (58.3%)

5 (41.7%)

χ2 (2, N=100) = 1.77, p = .414.

χ2
.414
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(Q. 134.b)

Qualitative Analysis: Thematic Analysis: Electing the Prime Minister

Table 17

Electing vs. Appointing the Prime Minister – N (%)

Core Themes Political Elites
(N=65)
Guarantees a
Parliamentary
Majority

28
43 %

Social Elites

Economic Elites

Total

(N=23)

(N=12)

(N=100)

14
60.9%

5
41.7%

Inapt Change at 26
the Present
40.1%

8
34.8%

7
58.3%

Encroachment
on King’s
11
prerogative
16.9%

1
4.3%

0
0%

47
47%

41
41%

12
12%
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(Q. 118)

Pluralism

Figure 8

Jordanian pluralism
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Table 18

Pluralism Means (SD)

Three Elites Groups

Mean (SD)

N

Political Elites

.31

(.467)

64

Social Elites

.17

(.388)

23

Economic Elites

.17

(.389)

12

Total

.26

(.422)

99

Table 19

Pluralism– N (%) – Chi-square

Three Elite Groups

No

(%)

Political

44

(68.8%)

20 (31.3%)

Social

19

(82.6%)

4 (17.4%)

Economic

10

(83.3%)

2 (16.7%)

Within Three groups

73

(73.7%)

26 (26.3%)

χ2 (2, N=99) =2.33, p=.312

Yes

χ2

(%)
.312
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(Q. 135)

Qualitative Analysis: Democracy in Jordan

The beliefs of elites in the transition to democracy are assessed in this open-ended
question that inquired about the necessary reforms for the success of the democratization
process. The three most frequent core themes were enforcing a “rule of law system,”
“social reforms,” and a serious implementation of “political reforms.” Several
subordinate themes to these three core themes are displayed in the tables below:

Table 20

Core and Subsequent Themes: Democracy in Jordan

Core Themes

Frequency

Rule of Law System

63

Social Development/Democracy a Way of Life

59

Political Development

44
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Table 21

Democracy in Jordan: Core and Subordinate Themes

Theme 1

Theme 2

Rule of law system
Legislative
amendments

Social
development/democracy
a way of life
Curriculum
change

Political development
Political
participation

Theme 3

Elites’
Quotations from
the Survey

Reforming
the
Parliament

Amending
legislations and
implementing
reforms empowers
all institutions,
particularly the
Parliament.

Empowering
nationalism
& Patriotism

Infusing schools’
curricula with
democratic values
to teach new
generations the
meaning of
nationalism and
patriotism.

Activating
political
parties

The political
development
enhances political
participation and
restores freedoms
and political party
activities.
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(Q. 101)

Elites’ self-determination and impact on policymaking

Figure 9

Estimated marginal means for elites' self determination and liberty
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(Q. 101)

Elites’ self-determination and impact on policymaking

Table 22

Elites’ impact on policymaking – Means (SD)

Three Elites Groups

Mean

N

Political Elites

.94 (.242)

65

Social Elites

.95 (.213)

22

Economic Elites

.67 (.492)

12

Total

.91 (.289)

96

Table 23

Elites’ impact on policymaking – N (%) – Chi-square
χ2

Total

.008

65

Three Elite Groups

No (%)

Yes (%)

Political

4 (44.4)

61 (67.8)

Soc

1 (11.1)

21 (23.3)

22

Econ

4 (44.4)

8 (8.9)

12

The test indicates a significant difference at: χ2 (2, N=99) = 9.76, p = .008

(Q. 102)

Elites’ accomplishment of political goals is measured on a 4-point scale of

Table 24

Accomplishment of Political Goals by Three Groups of Elites
SS

df

Mean Square

F

P

.376

2

.188

.341

.712

Within groups

47.422

86

.551

Total

47.798

88

Between groups

F (2, 86) = .341, p=ns
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(Q.103.1)

Value of civil rights and freedoms

Figure 10

Civil rights and freedom Value by the three groups of elites
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Table 25

Civil Rights and Freedoms by Three Groups of Elites
SS

df

Mean Square

F

P

.384

2

.192

.194

.824

Within groups

96.256

97

.992

Total

96.640

99

Between groups

F (2, 97) = .194, p=ns.

Table 26

Civil Rights and Freedoms Value – Cross Tabulation

Three Elites Groups

N

Political Elites

65

%

Extremely unimportant

03

04.6%

Unimportant

06

09.2%

Somewhat important

19

29.2%

Important

23

35.4%

Extremely important

14

21.5%

Social Elites

23

Extremely unimportant

00

00.0%

Unimportant

03

13.0%

Somewhat important

06

26.1%

Important

13

56.5%

Extremely important

01

04.3%

Economic Elites

12

Extremely unimportant

01

08.3%

Unimportant

00

00.0%

Somewhat important

04

33.3%

Important

07

58.3%

Extremely important

00

00.0%
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(Q.104.3)

Free Access to Information

Figure 11

Free accesses to information by three groups of elites
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Table 27

Free access to information- One way ANOVA

Between groups
Within groups
Total

SS
.142
121.968
122.110

df
2
97
99

Mean Square
.071
1.255

F
.056

F (2, 97) = .056, p=ns.

Table 28

Beliefs in the free access to information – Cross Tabulation

Three Elites Groups

N

Political Elites

65

%

Very poor

01

01.5%

Poor

03

04.6%

Standard

17

26.2%

Good

14

21.5%

Very good

23

35.4%

Excellent

07

10.8%

Social Elites

23

Very poor

00

00.0%

Poor

02

08.7%

Standard

03

13.0%

Good

08

34.8%

Very good

08

34.8%

Excellent

02

08.7%

Economic Elites

12

Very poor

00

00.0%

Poor

01

08.3%

Standard

01

08.3%

Good

06

50.0%

Very good

04

33.3%

Excellent

00

00.0%

P
.945
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(Q. 105)

Freedom of Opinion: Ideological Backgrounds

The freedom of opinion and ideological affiliation is tested in question (105) that
provides the respondents with three different ideologies to choose the one that applies
ideologically to them. The three ideologies were identified to the interviewees during the
interviews as follows: Liberal values include the appreciation for free and fair elections,
civil rights, freedoms, the rejection of absolute monarchy and the rejection of state religion.
Conservative ideological background is the appreciation for traditionalism, rejection of
modernity, and supporting the continuation of the status quo, which may also express the
appreciation for the regime’s notion of “Jordan First.” The independent ideological
background is described as free of control, not influenced by a particular opinion, conduct,
or thinking.
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Table 29

Ideological backgrounds Means (SD)

Three Elites Groups

Mean (SD)

N

Political Elites

1.75 (.867)

65

Social Elites

1.17 (.388)

23

Economic Elites

1.42 (.669)

12

Total

1.58 (.794)

100

A Chi-square test was run to confirm this significance:
Table 30
Elites’ ideological backgrounds – N(%) – Chi-square
Three Elite Groups
Political
Social
Economic
χ2
N (%)
N (%)
N (%)
Liberal
34 (52.3%)
19 (82.6%)
8 (66.7%) .032

Total
65

Independent

13 (20.0%)

4 (17.4%)

3 (25.0%)

23

Conservative

18 (27.7%)

0 (0.0%)

1 (8.3%)

12

χ2 (4, N=100) =10.53, p < .05
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Public Sector Reform
(Q. 104.1)

Administrative reforms

Figure 12

Minimizing bureaucracy and reforming administrative statutes
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Table 31

Administrative reforms by three groups of elites
SS

df

.349

2

.174

Within groups

116.891

97

1.205

Total

117.240

99

Between groups

Mean Square

F

P

.145

.865

F (2, 97) = .145, p =ns.

Table 32

Beliefs in administrative reforms – Means (SD)

Three Elites Groups

Mean (SD)

N

Political Elites

2.75 (1.199)

65

Social Elites

2.78 (.850)

23

Economic Elites

2.58 (.950)

12

Total

2.74 (1.088)

100

The table below indicates the frequencies of the six ratings provided in the
question by the three groups of elites.
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Table 33

Administrative reforms– Cross Tabulation

Elites’ Beliefs

N

%

Political Elites

65

65%

Very poor

12

18.5

Poor

14

21.5

Standard

22

33.8

Good

13

20

Very good

3

4.6

Excellent

1

1.5

23

23%

Very poor

1

4.3

Poor

8

34.8

Standard

9

39.1

Good

5

21.7

Very good

0

0

Excellent

0

0

12

12%

Very poor

2

16.7

Poor

2

16.7

Standard

7

58.3

Good

1

8.3

Very good

0

0

Excellent

0

0

Social Elites

Economic Elites

Total

100

100%
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(Q. 106.1)

Implementing transparency and accountability

Figure 13

Transparency and accountability
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Table 34

Transparency and Accountability by three groups of elites
SS

df

Mean Square

Between group

5 .277

2

2.639

Within groups

49.163

97

.507

Total

54.440

99

F

P

5.206

.007

F (2, 97) = 5.206, p < .05

Table 35

Transparency and accountability – Chi-square

Pearson Chi-Square

Value

df

13.737

6

χ2
.033

χ2 (6, N=100) =13.74, p = .033. The Chi-square result confirms the statistic
significance by .033. The probability of significance = (1-.033) = .967 = 96.7%.

Table 36

Transparency and accountability –Means (SD)

Three Elites Groups
Political Elites

Mean (SD)
2.51 (.753)

N
65

Social Elites

2.00 (.522)

23

Economic Elites

2.08 (.793)

12

Total

2.34 (.742)

100
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Transparency and accountability – Cross Tabulation

Table 37

Three Elite Groups

N

%

Political

65

65%

Very unfavorable

5

7.7

Unfavorable

27

41.5

Neutral

28

43.1

Favorable

5

7.7

23

23%

Very unfavorable

3

13

Unfavorable

17

73

Neutral

3

13

Favorable

0

0

12

12%

Very unfavorable

3

25

Unfavorable

5

41.7

Neutral

4

33.3

Favorable

0

0

100

100

Social

Economic

Total
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Corruption Control

Figure 14

Corruption control
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Table 38

Corruption control by three groups of elites
SS

df

Mean Square

Between group

4.655

2

2.328

Within groups

49.935

97

.515

Total

54.590

99

F

P

4.522

.013

F (2, 97) = 4.52, p < .05.

Table 39

Corruption control –Means (SD)

Three Elites Groups

Mean (SD)

N

Political Elites

2.45 (.771)

65

Social Elites

2.04 (.475)

23

Economic Elites

1.92 (.793)

12

Total

2.29 (.743)

100

Table 40

Corruption control –Chi-square

Pearson Chi Square

Value

df

15.545

6

χ2 (6, N=100) = 15.55, p= .016.

χ2
.016
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Corruption control – Cross Tabulations

Table 41

Elites’ Beliefs

N

%

Political

65

65%

Very unfavorable

6

9.2

Unfavorable

29

44.6

Neutral

25

38.5

Favorable

5

7.7

23

23%

Very unfavorable

2

8.7

Unfavorable

18

78.3

Neutral

3

13

Favorable

0

0

12

12%

Very unfavorable

4

33.3

Unfavorable

5

41.7

Neutral

3

25

Favorable

0

0

100

100

Social

Economic

Total
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Ending Nepotism

Figure 15

Ending nepotism
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Table 42

Ending nepotism by three groups of elites

SS

df

Mean Square

F

P

.520

2

.260

.442

.644

Within groups

57.040

97

.588

Total

57.560

99

Between groups

F (2, 97) = .442, p=ns

Table 43

Ending nepotism –Means (SD)

Three Elites Groups

Mean (SD)

N

Political Elites

2.43 (.770)

65

Social Elites

2.26 (.689)

23

Economic Elites

2.33 (.888)

12

Total

2.38 (.763)

100
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Merit system

Figure 16

Frequencies of attitudes towards a merit system by three groups of
elites
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Table 44

Merit system by three groups of elites
SS

df

Mean Square

F

P

.249

2

.125

.229

.795

Within groups

52.751

97

.544

Total

53.000

99

Between groups

F (2, 97) =.229, p=ns.

Table 45

Merit system – Means (SD)

Three Elites Groups

Mean (SD)

N

Political Elites

2.91 (.785)

65

Social Elites

2.83 (.717)

23

Economic Elites

3.00 (.426)

12

Total

2.90 (.732)

100
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Financial Disclosure Law

Elites were asked another question about corruption control in terms of a recent
law that was issued enforcing transparency and holding Parliament members and those
who occupy high incumbencies in the government accountable. This value question
inquired about the effectiveness of “Financial Disclosure Law” and if it controls
corruption and ensures accountability and transparency in the political system. The
respondents were asked to rate the value or effectiveness of the law using a 4-point scale
(1=extremely ineffective to 4=effective).

The provisions of this law shall apply to the

following positions: prime minister and cabinet; senate president; speaker of the house
and members of both houses; judges; heads of official public institutions; military and
civilian managers; senior level staff; officials in public institutions and ambassadors;
mayors, heads, and members of the large municipalities; heads and members of bidding
and procurement of civil and military committees; officials of government, public
institutions, and municipalities; incumbents of cabinets; heads of the Boards of Directors
of companies that contribute 50% more than the government.
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Figure 17

Financial disclosure law
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Table 46

Financial disclosure law by three groups of elites
SS

df

Mean Square

F

P

.192

2

.096

.113

.893

Within groups

76.539

90

.850

Total

76.731

92

Between groups

F (2, 90) = .113, p=.ns

Table 47

Financial disclosure law – Means (SD)

Three Elites Groups

Mean (SD)

N

Political Elites

2.31 (.969)

59

Social Elites

2.27 (.883)

22

Economic Elites

2.17 (.718)

12

Total

2.28 (.913)

93
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Qualitative Analysis: Efficiency and productivity Levels

The following reforms were categorized as core themes and classified under
(Theme 1): improving individuals’ performance, applying the hiring codes and conducts,
enforcing transparency and accountability, reinforcing the democratic values into the
organizational culture, reforming managements, organizational development, and policy
coordination. But, the core themes that registered high frequencies in this analysis were
these three following themes: 1) improving the individual’s performance, 2) applying the
hiring codes and conducts, 3) enforcing transparency and accountability. See below
tables for core and subordinate themes:
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Table 48

Core themes of improving efficiency

Core Themes

Frequency

Improving the individual’s performance

128

Applying the hiring codes and conducts

44

Enforcing transparency and accountability

28

In addition, in their explanations and elaborations, the respondents underlined
several subordinate and secondary themes that were categorized as (Theme 2) and
(Theme 3). For example, training, education, incentives, assigning retreats, or improving
the work environment were all subordinate themes to the most frequent core theme of
improving the individual’s performance. The vocational training theme and the
enforcement of the national allegiance through schools’ curricula and including the
educational level of candidates as a criterion for certain job positions were classified
secondary themes (Theme 3).
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The following is a demonstration of core and subordinate themes:

Table 49

Core & subordinate themes of efficiency and productivity levels

Theme 1

Theme 2

Theme 3

Elites’ Quotations
from the Survey
Managers and all employees
should be assigned training

Improving

and vocational training

individuals'
performances

Training

Vocational

sessions to stay efficient and

Training

productive.

Applicants should be
selected lawfully & hired
based on their qualifications,
or their knowledge, skills,
and abilities; not on their
Abiding by the

personal relations with a

organizational codes

Merit

& conducts

system

parliament member or a
KSAs

minister

Improving the levels of
Enforcing

proficiency and efficiency by

transparency and

holding officers accountable

accountability

and enforce transparency.
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The distribution of frequencies:

Table 50

Identification of core themes

Core Themes

Political Elites

(N=65)
Improving performances

Hiring codes & conducts

Transparency
& Accountability

Social Elites

(N=23)

Economic Elites

(N=12)

7

33

17

120.0 %

143.2%

141.6%

31

9

4

47.7%

39.1%

33.3%

20
30.8%

5
21.7%

3
25.0%
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(Q. 110) Institution-building
Table 51

Beliefs in Institution-building – N(%) – Chi-square

Elite Groups

No (%)

Yes (%)

Incomplete

χ2

Political

29 (46)

12 (19)

22 (34.9)

.027

Soc

11 (47)

2 (8.7)

10 (43.5)

2 (16.7)

00 (00)

10 (83.3)

Econ

Chi square result indicates significance: χ2 (4, N=100) = 10.93, p < .05.

Table 52

Institution-building – Means (SD)

Three Elites Groups

Mean

N

Political Elites

.89 (.900)

63

Social Elites

.96 (.976)

23

Economic Elites

1.67 (.778)

12

Total

1.00 (.931)

98
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Qualitative Analysis: Attitudes towards institution-building

Table 53

Institution-building frequency of core themes

Core Themes

Frequency

Seriousness in Implementing Reforms

57

Decreasing the Authority of the Royal Court

33

Enforcing Democratic Values

22

The below table demonstrates the frequency distribution of core and subordinate
themes:
Table 54

Identification of core themes by three groups of elites

Core Themes

Political Elites
(N=65)

Serious implementation
of reforms

Reducing Royal

31

Social Elites
(N=23)

Economic Elites
(N=12)

17

7

47.7 %

73.9%

58.3 %

30

9

3

Court’s power

46.2%

Enforcing democratic

13

4

5

20.0%

17.4%

41.6%

values

39.1%

25.0%
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Political Participation
(Q. 104.6)

Political Party Reform Policy

Figure 19

Political party affiliation by three groups of elites
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Table 55

Political party reform policy- One way ANOVA
SS

df

.119

2

.060

Within groups

60.921

97

.628

Total

61.040

99

Between groups

Mean Square

F (2, 97) = .095, p=ns

Table 56

Political party reform policy –Means (SD)

Three Elites Groups

Mean (SD)

N

Political Elites

1.62 (.722)

65

Social Elites

1.70 (.926)

23

Economic Elites

1.67 (.888)

12

Total

1.64 (.785)

100

F

P

.095

.910
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Table 57

Political party reform policy – Cross Tabulation

Three Elites Groups

N

Political Elites

65

%

Very poor

34

52.3%

Poor

22

22.8%

Standard

9

13.8%

Good

00

00

Very good

00

00

Excellent

00

00

Social Elites

23

Very poor

12

52.2%

Poor

08

34.8%

Standard

01

04.3%

Good

02

08.7%

Very good

00

00

Excellent

00

00

Economic Elites

12

Very poor

06

50.0%

Poor

05

41.7%

Standard

00

00

Good

01

08.3%

Very good

00

00

Excellent

00

00

Total

100
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Elites’ affiliation with political party

Figure 20

Elites’ affiliations with political parties
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Table 58

Elites’ affiliation with political party –Means (SD)

Three Elites Groups

Mean (SD)

N

Political Elites

2.74 (.644)

65

Social Elites

2.70 (.635)

23

Economic Elites

2.67 (.492)

12

Total

2.72 (.621)

100

Table 59

Elites’ affiliation with political party –N(%) –Chi-square

Three Elite Groups

No

Yes

Political

55 (61.8)

Social

22 (24.7%)

1 (9.1%)

Economic

12 (100%)

0 (0%)

Total

89 (89%)

11 (11%)

χ2 (2, N=100) = 3.8 p=ns

10 (90.0%)

χ2

Total

.150

100
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(Q. 121) Campaigning culture: mottos, missions, and vision statements

Figure 21

Value distribution of elites’ campaigning culture
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Table 60

Campaigning culture by three groups of elites
SS

Between groups

df

Mean Square

.396

2

.198

Within groups

119.786

96

1.248

Total

120.182

98

.159

F (2, 96) = .159, p =ns

Table 61

F

Campaigning culture –Mean (SD)

Three Elites Groups

Mean (SD)

N

Political Elites

2.75 (1.141)

64

Social Elites

2.70 (1.105)

23

Economic Elites

2.92 (0 .996)

12

Total

2.76 (1.107)

99

P
.854
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Table 62

Campaigning culture – Cross Tabulation

Three Elites Groups

N

Political Elites

64
Appealing and engaging to most Jordanians
Appealing and engaging to some Jordanians
Neither Appealing nor engaging

09
24
05

14.1%
37.5%
07.8%

Used as campaign propaganda

26

40.6%

Social Elites

23
Appealing and engaging to most Jordanians
Appealing and engaging to some Jordanians
Neither Appealing nor engaging
Used as campaign propaganda

Economic Elites
Appealing and engaging to most Jordanians
Appealing and engaging to some Jordanians
Neither Appealing nor engaging
Used as campaign propaganda
Total

%

03
09
03
08

13.0%
39.1%
13.0%
34.8%

12
0
06
01
05
99

00.0%
50.0%
08.3%
41.7%
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(Q. 122) Qualitative Thematic Analysis: Political Party Weakness

In the open-ended question (122), elites expressed their beliefs of the weakness of
political parties. The below table displays the core themes that registered the highest
frequencies:

Table 63

Frequencies of core themes: Political party weakness

Core Themes

Frequency

Authoritarianism

52

Absence of Programs

51

Past Failures

34

The frequency distribution of core and subordinate themes in percentages:

Table 64

Core themes for political party weakness

Core Themes

Authoritarianism

Political Elites Social Elites Economic Elites
Total
(N=65)
(N=23)
(N=12)
(N=100)
31
47.7 %

15
65.2%

6
50%

52
52%

Absence of Programs 30
46.2%

15
65.2%

6
50%

51
51%

Past Failures

9
39.1%

4
33.3%

34
34%

21
32.3%
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(Q. 123) Qualitative Analysis Activating and Empowering Political Parties

A variation of reforms was illustrated by the respondents and sorted in the
following most frequent core themes as demonstrated in the below table:

Table 65

Core themes for activating and empowering political parties

Core Themes

Frequency

Reforming Political Parties

86

Legislative Amendment

44

Raising Awareness Levels

40
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Elites’ elaborations on core and subordinate themes:
Table 66

Activating Political Parties: Core and Subordinate Themes
Elites’ Quotations from
the Survey

Theme 1

Theme 2

Theme 3

Reforming political
parties

Activating
political party
programs

Emphasizing
the national
roles of
political parties

The absence of programs
weakens the national
roles of political party
institutions; therefore,
they must be allowed to
pursue the political,
social, and economic
goals on their agendas.

Legislative
amendment

Amending
political party
law

Voiding out
the One Man
One Vote Law

The one-man, one-vote
rule leads to
disproportionate results;
election laws must be
based on the population
in each district not on
who populates the
district.

Raising awareness
levels

Understanding
the negative
effect of
tribalism on
political parties

The tribal affiliation
should never replace the
political party affiliation.
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Electoral laws: One-man, One-vote

Figure 22

One-man, One-vote Laws
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A One-way ANOVA testing differences between elites’ beliefs:
Table 67

One-man, one-vote by three groups of elites
SS

df

Mean Square

Between groups

1.187

2

.594

Within groups

72.449

96

.755

Total

73.636

98

F
.787

F (2, 96) = .787 p=ns.

Table 68

One-man, One-vote law –Mean (SD)

Three Elites Groups

Mean (SD)

N

Political Elites

3.55 (.952)

65

Social Elites

3.61(.783)

23

Economic Elites

3.91(.302)

12

Total

3.61(.867)

100

P
.458
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Table 69

One-man, One-vote – Cross Tabulation

Elites’ beliefs in the One-man, One-vote Law

N

%

65

65%

Strongly disagree

6

9.2

Disagree

3

4.6

Agree

5

7.7

51

78.5

23

23%

1

4.3

17

73

4

17.4

17

73.9

12

12%

Strongly disagree

0

0

Disagree

0

0

Agree

1

9.1

10

90.9

100

100

Political

Strongly agree
Social
Strongly disagree
Disagree
Agree
Strongly agree
Economic

Strongly agree
Total
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Lobbying

Figure 23

Practicing lobbying distribution
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Table 70

Practicing lobbying – N (%) – Chi-square

Three Elite Groups

No (%)

Yes (%)

χ2

.009

Political

9 (13.8)

56 (86.2)

Social

3 (13.0)

20 (87.0)

Economic

6 (50.0)

6 (50.0)

18 (18)

82 (82.0)

Total

χ2 (2, N=100) =9.45, p < .05

Total

100
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Lobbying Reasons

Figure 24

Elites’ reasons for lobbying?
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Table 71

Lobbying reasons by three groups of elites
SS

df

Mean Square

F

P

3.608

2

1.804

.738

.481

Within groups

193.078

79

2.444

Total

1 96.695

81

Between groups

F (2, 79) = .738, p=ns

Table 72

Lobbying reasons Cross-Tabulation

Three Elites Groups

N

Political Elites

56

68.3%

To implement important changes

10

18.0%

To pursue my democratic values

00

00

To support pluralism

00

00

To participate in policy making

11

20.0%

All the above

35

63.0%

20

24.4%

To implement important changes

06

30.0%

To pursue my democratic values

00

00

To support pluralism

00

00

To participate in policy making

00

00

All the above

14

70.0%

06

07.3%

To implement important changes

00

00

To pursue my democratic values

00

00

To support pluralism

00

00

To participate in policy making

02

33.0%

All the above

04

67.0%

82

100

Social Elites

Economic Elites

Total

%
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Social Development
(Q.103.2)

Social change through modernizing schools’ curricula

Figure 25

School curricula reform
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A one-way ANOVA test result was not significant:
Table 73

School curricula reform- One way ANOVA
SS

df

Mean Square

F

P

1.765

2

.882

.541

.584

Within groups

158.19

97

1.631

Total

159.96

99

Between groups

F (2, 97) =.541, p=ns

Table 74

School curricula reform –Means (SD)

Three Elites Groups

Mean (SD)

N

Political Elites

3.08 (1.315)

65

Social Elites

2.78 (1.126)

23

Economic Elites

3.17 (1.337)

12

Total

3.02 (1.271)

100
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Table 75
Importance of education policy reform & school curricula
values – Cross Tabulation
Modernizing School Curricula Value

N

%

Political Elites

65

65%

Extremely unimportant

6

6.0

Unimportant

20

20

Somewhat important

17

17.

Important

7

7.0

Extremely important

15

15.

23

23%

Extremely unimportant

3

3.0

Unimportant

7

7.0

Somewhat important

6

6.0

Important

6

6.0

Extremely important

1

1.0

12

12%

Extremely unimportant

2

2.0

Unimportant

1

1.0

Somewhat important

4

4.0

Important

3

3.0

Extremely important

2

2.0

100

100%

Social Elites

Economic Elites

Total
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Importance of tribal values to policymakers

Figure 26

Tribal values by three groups of elites
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Table 76

Tribal values- One way ANOVA
SS

df

Mean Square

F

P

4.786

2

2.393

2.156

.121

Within groups

107.654

97

1.110

Total

112.440

99

Between groups

F (2, 97) = 2.16, p=ns.

Table 77

Importance of tribal values to policymakers – Means (SD)

Three Elites Groups

Mean

N

Political Elites

4.18 (1.171)

65

Social Elites

4.70 (.765)

23

Economic Elites

4.50 (.798)

12

Total

4.34 (1.066)

100

1.066
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Table 78

The tribal values by three elite groups

Elites’ Tribal Values
Political Elites

%

65

Extremely unimportant

04

06.2%

Unimportant

02

03.1%

Somewhat important

09

13.8%

Important

13

20.0%

Extremely important

37

56.9%

Social Elites

23

Extremely unimportant

00

00.0%

Unimportant

01

04.3%

Somewhat important

01

04.3%

Important

02

08.7%

Extremely important

19

82.6%

Economic Elites

Total

N

12

Extremely unimportant

00

00.0%

Unimportant

00

00.0%

Somewhat important

02

16.7%

Important

02

16.7%

Extremely important

08

66.7%

100

100%
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Tribal impact on development

Figure 27

Beliefs distribution of tribal impact on development

Table 79

Tribal impact on development – Means (SD)

271

Three Elites Groups

Mean (SD)

N

Political Elites

2.23 (.702)

65

Social Elites

2.43 (.662)

23

Economic Elites

2.25 (.622)

12

Total

2.28 (.638)

100

Beliefs in tribalism impact on development – Cross
Tabulation

Table 80

Tribalism Impact

N

%

Political

65

65%

Positive

10

15.4%

Negative

30

46.2%

Positive/Negati

25

38.5%

23

23%

Positive

02

08.7%

Negative

09

39.1%

Positive/Negative

12

52.2%

12

12%

Positive

01

08.3%

Negative

07

58.3%

Positive/Negati

04

33.3%

Social

Economic

Total

100 100%

272
Table 81
Elite Groups

Tribalism impact on development– N (%) – Chi-square
Positive (%)
Negative (%)
Pos/Neg (%) χ2
Total

Political
Social
Economic

10 (15)
2 (9.0)
1 (8.0)

30 (86.2)
9 (87.0)
7 (50.0)

25(39)
12 (52)
4 (33)

13 (13%)

46 (82%)

41 (41%)

Total

χ2 (4, N=100) =.659, p <ns

.009

100
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Qualitative analysis: Reasons behind tribalism impact on development

Table 82

Frequencies of core themes: tribalism impact

Core Themes

Frequency

Sociopolitical imbalances & disloyalty

49

Compound impact

37

Smooth developments

14

Elites’ elaborations on core and subordinate themes:

Table 83

Tribalism impact on development: core and subordinate themes

Theme 1

Theme 2

Hindrance &

Tribalism
delays
democratic
governance

regression

Confuses
Loyalty

Substitutes for
political parties
and
Nationalism

Theme 3

Elites’ Quotations
from the Survey
Loyalty for the tribe
overcomes the
national loyalty, and
tribal rules
overcome the rule
of law; it creates
fanaticism,
extremism, and
spreads corruption.

Weakens
Modernity

Fills the gap that the
absent political
parties could not
fill, but it weakens
the modern state
and generates non-
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democratic
measures.

Enhancing
development

Tribalism
strengthens the
social cohesion

Tribalism enhances
its members’
stability, solidarity,
unity, economic
situations; it
controls crime.
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Table 84

Tribalism impact on development – N (%)

Core Themes

Political Elites

Social Elites

Hindrance and
regression

(N=65)
30
46.2 %

(N=23)
11
47.8%

Confused
Loyalty

25
38.5%

9
39.1%

Enhancing
Development

10
5.4%

Economic Elites
(N=12)
8
66.6
3
25.0

3
13.0%

1
8.3%

(Q. 128)

Tribalism influence on elites’ political culture

Table 85

Tribal influence on elites’ political culture by three groups of elites
SS

df

Mean Square

F

P

.747

2

.374

.436

.648

Within groups

82.243

96

.857

Total

82.990

98

Between groups

F (2, 96) = .436, p=ns
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Figure 28

Tribal influence on elites’ political culture

277

Table 86

Tribal influence on elites’ political culture: Means (SD)

Three Elites Groups

Mean (SD)

N

Political Elites

3.06 (.924)

64

Social Elites

3.09 (1.041)

23

Economic Elites

3.33 (.651)

12

Total

3.10 (.920)

99

Tribal influence on elites’ political culture –Cross Tabulation

Table 87

Elites’ Values on Tribal Influence

N

%

Political

64

64%

5

5.1

Disagree

10

10.1

Agree

25

25.3

Strongly agree

24

24.2

Strongly disagree

Social

23
Strongly disagree

3

3.0

Disagree

2

2.0

Agree

8

8.1

10

10.1

12

12%

Strongly disagree

0

0

Disagree

1

1.0

Agree

6

6.1

Strongly agree

5

5.1

Strongly agree
Economic

Total

23%

99

100%
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Importance of religious values in social development

Figure 29

Religious values by three groups of elites
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Table 88

Religious values- One way ANOVA
SS

df

Mean Square

F

P

Between groups

4.976

2

2.488

3.040

.052

Within groups

79.384

97

.818

Total

84.360

99

F (2, 97) = 3.04, p=ns

Table 89

Importance of Religious Values – Means (SD)

Three Elites Groups

Mean (SD)

N

Political Elites

4.26 (1.004)

65

Social Elites

4.78 (.600)

23

Economic Elites

4.58 (.793)

12

Total

4.42 (.923)

100

280

Table 90

Importance of religious values – Cross Tabulation

Elites’ Religious Values
Political Elites

N

%

65

65%

Extremely unimportant

2

2.0

Unimportant

2

2.0

Somewhat important

8

8.0

Important

18

18.

Extremely important

35

35.

23

23%

Extremely unimportant

0

0

Unimportant

0

0

Somewhat important

2

2.0

Important

1

1.0

Extremely important

20

20.

12

12%

Extremely unimportant

0

0

Unimportant

0

0

Somewhat important

2

2.0

Important

1

1.0

Extremely important

9

9.0

100

100%

Social Elites

Economic Elites

Total
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Women’s political, social, and economic participation

Figure 30

Women’s Political Participation by Three Groups of Elites
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Table 91

Women’s political participation by three groups of elites
SS

df

Mean Square

.041

2

.020

Within groups

19.669

97

.203

Total

19.710

99

Between groups

F (2, 97) = .100, p=ns

F
.100

P
.905
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Figure 31

Women’s social participation by three groups of elites
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Figure 32

Women’s social participation by three groups of elites
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Table 92

Women’s social participation-One way ANOVA
SS

df

Mean Square

F

P

.335

2

.167

1.239

.294

Within groups

13.105

97

.135

Total

13.440

99

Between groups

F (2, 97) = 1.24, p=ns

Table 93

Women’s economic participation by three groups of elites
SS

df

Mean Square

F

P

.114

2

.057

.309

.735

Within groups

17.886

97

.184

Total

18.000

99

Between groups

F (2, 97) = .309, p=ns
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Table 94

Women’s Political, Social, and Economic Participation Means (SD)

The Participation of Women

Mean (SD)

N

Political elites

3.78 (.056)

65

Social elites

3.74 (.094)

23

Economic elites

3.75 (.131)

12

3.77 (.045)

100

Political elites

3.86 (.348)

65

Social elites

3.74 (.449)

23

Economic elites

3.92 (.289)

12

3.84 (.368)

100

Political elites

3.82 (.429)

65

Social elites

3.74 (.449)

23

Economic elites

3.83 (.389)

12

3.80 (.429)

100

Political Participation

Total

Social Participation

Total

Economic Participation

Total
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Table 95

Women’s Political, Social, and Economic Participation – Cross Tabulation

Women’s Participation by
Three Groups of Elites

Moderately
Oppose

Strongly Oppose
N

%

Political Elites

0

0%

Social Elites

0

Economic Elites
Total %

N

Moderately
Support

Strongly
Support

%

N

%

N

%

1

1.5%

12

18.3%

52

80.0%

0%

0

0%

6

26.1%

17

73.9%

0

0%

0

0%

3

25.0 %

9

75.0 %

0

0%

1

1.5%

21

21.0 %

78

78.0 %

Political Elites

0

0%

0

0%

9

13.8%

56

86.2%

Social Elites

0

0%

0

0%

6

26.1%

17

73.9%

Economic Elites

0

0%

0

0%

1

0 8.3%

11

91.7%

Total %

0

0%

0

0%

16

16.0%

84

84.0 %

Political Elites

0

0%

1

1.5%

10

15.4%

54

83.1%

Social Elites

0

0%

0

0%

6

26.1%

17

73.9%

Economic Elites

0

0%

0

0%

2

16.7%

10

83.3%

Total %

0

0%

1

1.5%

18

18.0 %

81

81. %

1. Political Participation

2. Social Participation

3. Economic participation
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Qualitative Thematic Analysis: Women’s participation

Table 96

Frequencies of core themes: Women’s participation

Core Themes

Frequency

Traditionalism

47

Social Underdevelopment

27

Propaganda

27

Table 97

Women’s participation: core and subordinate themes

Theme 1

Theme 2

Traditionalism

Obsolete traditions
& beliefs

Social
underdevelopment

Gender inequality/
patriarchy

Propaganda

Theme 3

Elites’ Quotations
from the Survey
Both men and women
believe in obsolete
beliefs, which slow
down the response for
social development.

Female subordinance

Women in the suburbs
are not empowered
due to high levels of
patriarchy.
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Table 98
Core Themes

Women’s participation by three groups of elites
Political Elites
(N=65)

Social Elites
(N=23)

Traditionalism

31
47.7 %

9
39.1%

Social UnderDevelopment

12
18.5%

12
52.2%

Propaganda

20
30.8%

5
21.7%

Economic Elites
(N=12)
7
58.3%

3
25.0%

2
16.7%
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Volunteerism

Figure 33

Volunteerism
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Table 99

Volunteerism- One way ANOVA
SS

df

.113

2

.056

Within groups

133.997

97

1.381

Total

134.110

99

Between groups

Mean Square

F (2, 97) =.041, p=ns

Table 100

Volunteerism - Mean (SD)

Three Elites Groups

Mean

(SD)

N

Political Elites

2.83 (1.180)

65

Social Elites

2.87 (1.140)

23

Economic Elites

2.75 (1.215)

12

Total

2.83 (1.164)

100

F

P

.041

.960
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Table 101

Volunteerism Beliefs – Cross Tabulation

Three Elites Groups

N

Political Elites

65

%

Very poor

07

10.8%

Poor

21

32.3%

Standard

21

32.3%

Good

09

13.8%

Very good

06

09.2%

Excellent

01

01.5%

Social Elites

23

Very poor

01

04.3%

Poor

10

43.5%

Standard

06

26.1%

Good

03

13.0%

Very good

03

13.0%

Excellent

00

00.0%

Economic Elites

12

Very poor

01

08.3%

Poor

05

41.7%

Standard

04

33.3%

Good

00

00.0%

Very good

02

16.7%

Excellent

00

00.0%

Total

100
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Civic engagement: involvement with voluntary organizations

Figure 34

Cultural organizations by three groups of elites

294

Figure 35

Involvement with national and international foundations by three
groups of elites
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Table 102

Affiliation with cultural and national/international –Means (SD)

Affiliations with NGOs

Mean (SD)

N

Political elites

1.42 (.497)

65

Social elites

1.04 (.209)

23

Economic elites

1.41 (.515)

12

1.33 (.473)

100

Political elites

1.46

(.502)

65

Social elites

1.30

(.470)

23

Economic elites

1.00

(.000)

12

1.37

(.485)

100

Cultural Institutions

Total

National and International Foundations

Total
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Chi-square test results confirmed the significance of the two affiliations:
Table 103

Affiliations with cultural and national/international NGOs
No (%)

Yes (%)

χ2

ƞ2

27 (41.5)

38 (58.5)

.004

.333

Social

1 (04.3)

22 (95.7)

Economic

5 (41.7)

7 (58.3)

.007

.313

NGO Type
Cultural Institutions
Political

National/International
Political

30 (46.2)

35

(53.8)

Social

7 (30.4)

16

(69.6)

Economic

0 (0.0)

12

(100)

Chi-square result: χ2 (2, N=100) = 11.091, p < .05
Chi-square result: χ2 (2, N=100) = 9.809, p < .05
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Government interference in NGO affairs

Figure 36

Government interference in NGO affairs by three groups of elites
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Table 104

Government interference in NGO affairs – Means (SD)

Three Elites Groups

Mean (SD)

N

.72 (.761)

65

1.13 (.751)

23

Economic Elites

.83 (.853)

12

Total

.83 (.779)

100

Political Elites
Social Elites

Table 105
Elite Groups

Government interference in NGO affairs – N (%) – Chi-square
Never (%) Always (%)

Sometimes (%)

χ2

Political

30 (47)

5 (21)

5 (41)

Social

23 (35)

10 (44)

4 (33)

37

Economic

12 (19)

8 (35)

3 (25)

23

Total

.300

Total

40

100
χ2 (4, N=100) =4.88, p < .05

(Q. 131)

Qualitative Thematic Analysis: Government Interference in

NGO Affairs
Most elites consider that “authoritarianism/national security,” is the core reason
behind interfering in the affairs of voluntary organizations. This core theme occurred by
56% across the sample.
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Economic Development
(Q. 103.6)

Prosperity and work value

Figure 37

Prosperity and work value by three groups of elites
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A one-way ANOVA test results are displayed below:
Table 106

Prosperity by three groups of elites
SS

df

1.471

2

.071

Within groups

87.919

97

1.257

Total

89.390

99

Between groups

Mean Square

F

P

.812

.447

F (2, 97) =.812, p=ns

Table 107

Prosperity – Means (SD)

Three Elites Groups

Mean (SD)

N

Political Elites

3.82 (.967)

65

Social Elites

3.65 (1.027)

23

Economic Elites

4.08 (.669)

12

Total

3.81 (.950)

100
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Economic liberalization

Figure 38

Economic liberalization by three groups of elites
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Table 108

Economic Liberalization by Three Groups of Elites
SS

Between groups

df

Mean Square

1.985

2

.071

Within groups

116.925

97

1.257

Total

118.910

99

F (2, 97) =.823, p=ns

Table 109

Economic Liberalization – Means (SD)

Three Elites Groups

Mean (SD)

N

Political Elites

4.63 (1.098)

65

Social Elites

4.30 (1.222)

23

Economic Elites

4.42 (.793)

12

Total

4.53 (1.096)

100

F

P

.823

.442
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Table 110

Economic Liberalization: Cross Tabulation

Three Elite Groups

N

Political Elites

65

%

Very poor

02

03.1

Poor

00

00.

Standard

08

12.3

Good

11

16.9

Very good

33

50.8

Excellent

11

16.9

Social Elites

23

Very poor

00

00.

Poor

01

4.3

Standard

06

26.1

Good

06

26.1

Very good

05

21.7

Excellent

05

21.7

Economic Elites

12

Very poor

00

00.

Poor

00

00.

Standard

01

08.3

Good

06

50.0

Very good

04

00.

Excellent

01

08.3

Total

100
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Development precedence Economic verses Political

Figure 39

Economic development precedence
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Table 112

Economic Development Precedence by Three Groups of Elites
SS

df

.672

2

.336

Within groups

34.718

97

.358

Total

35.390

99

Between groups

Mean Square

F (2, 97) =.939, p=ns

Table 113

Economic Development Precedence – Means (SD)

Three Elites Groups

Mean (SD)

N

Political Elites

2.63 (.651)

65

Social Elites

2.78 (.518)

23

Economic Elites

2.83 (.389)

12

Total

2.69 (.598)

100

F

P

.939

.395
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Table 114

Economic development precedence by three groups of elites

Three Elite Groups
Political

N
65

%
65%

1. The economic development
should take precedence

4

4%

2. The political development and civil
liberties should take precedence

18

18%

3. Both developments should occur
simultaneously Neutral

41

41%

2

2%

23

23%

1. The economic development
should take precedence

0

0%

2. The political development and civil
liberties should take precedence

6

6%

3. Both developments should occur
simultaneously Neutral

16

16%

4. Neither, both are imposed by
external powers

1

1%

12

12%

1. The economic development
should take precedence

0

0%

2. The political development and civil
liberties should take precedence

2

2%

3. Both developments should occur
simultaneously Neutral

10

10%

4. Neither, both are imposed by
external powers

0

0%

4. Neither, both are imposed by
external powers
Social

Economic
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Qualitative Thematic Analysis: The relationship between the economic &
political developments

Table 115

Political and economic development plan choice by elites

Core Themes

Frequency

Political and economic Stability

64

Reinstatement of Freedoms

29

Economic Development

4

The following table illustrates elites’ core and subordinate themes and their
elaborations on their responses on the development plan that they chose in (Q. 132).
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Table 116
Theme 1

Political and economic development plan choice: core and subordinate
themes
Theme 2
Theme 3
Elites’ Quotations from
the Survey

Political &
Economic Stability

Ensures higher
growth &
productivity at
all levels

The achievement of
higher levels of growth
and productivity
enhances the government
credibility and improves
its relative political
capacity.

Reinstatement of
freedoms

Establishment
of Free
Enterprising
Economy

Protection
from
globalization

The Globalization led
Jordanians to discontents
because it did not lead to
economic development.

Economic
development

Open economy
& globalization

Free markets

Liberalization &
globalization open the
door for modernity,
encourage the world
investments, and
accentuate freedoms.
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The below table demonstrates the distribution of elites’ beliefs in the effectiveness
of their chosen development plan:

Table117

Political and economic development plan choice (N %)

Core Themes

Political Elites
(N=65)

Social Elites

Economic Elites

(N=23)

(N=12)

Political & Economic
Stability

38
58.5 %

16
69.6%

10
83.3 %

Reinstatement of
Freedoms

21
32.3%

6
26.0%

2
16.6 %

Economic
Development

4
6.2%

0
00.0%

0
00.0 %

